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RIASSUNTO 
 
Nel presente elaborato sono descritti una serie di 5 esperimenti, condotti con la 
tecnica dei potenziali evento-relati (Event-Related Potentials, ERPs). E’ stata indagata 
la natura multisfaccettata dell’empatia umana per il dolore (Esperimento 1) e la sua 
variabilità in funzione della razza (Esperimento 2) e dell’affidabilità di un volto 
(Esperimenti 4 e 5). Il paradigma classicamente impiegato in questo tipo di studi è il 
compito di decisione del dolore in cui viene richiesto ai partecipanti di dire se 
l’individuo che si osserva (o parti del suo corpo) sta subendo una stimolazione dolorosa 
oppure neutra. 
 Inoltre, prima di indagare se l’affidabilità potesse modulare la risposta empatica, 
è stato condotto l’Esperimento 3 per testare se le caratteristiche fisiche di affidabilità 
fossero automaticamente estratte da un volto influenzandone l’elaborazione in memoria 
di lavoro visiva (MLV). E’ stato impiegato un diverso paradigma, il compito di 
rilevamento del cambiamento, e un correlato neurale diretto della risoluzione delle 
rappresentazioni in MLV.  
 La ricerca neuroscientifica sull’empatia al dolore si è focalizzata principalmente 
sulla natura multicomponenziale di questa capacità. Sono stati identificati almeno due 
sotto processi dell’empatia anatomicamente dissociati: l’experience sharing e il 
mentalizing. Il primo include gli aspetti più affettivi e legati al contagio sensorimotorio 
che permettono di sentire internamente lo stato emotivo dell’altro; il secondo si riferisce 
alla capacità di inferire gli stati mentali altrui. Un importante scopo del presente 
elaborato è quello di fornire evidenza empirica di una loro possibile dissociazione anche 
funzionale, nel dominio temporale. 
 Nell’Esperimento 1 è stato indagato questo aspetto implementando una specifica 
versione del compito di decisione del dolore. Ai partecipanti sono state presentate sia 
un’informazione sensorimotoria (una faccia con espressione neutra o di dolore) che 
un’informazione contestuale (la descrizione di un contesto neutro o di dolore) nella 
stessa prova sperimentale per evidenziare il decorso temporale della reazione 
elettrofisiologica al dolore legata ad entrambi i sotto processi dell’empatia. Si è così 
dimostrata una selettiva attivazione dell’experience sharing e del mentalizing in due 
diverse finestre temporali. 
 Sulla base di questi risultati è stato possibile esplorare la variabilità della risposta 
empatica a diversi tipi di stimoli esterni. Precedenti studi hanno suggerito che le persone 
sono più empatiche nei confronti del dolore subito da un individuo appartenente alla 
nostra stessa razza rispetto ad individui appartenenti ad altre razze (Avenanti et al., 
2010; Xu et al., 2009). Nell’Esperimento 2 è stato dimostrato che questa risposta 
preferenziale è confinata ai meccanismi dell’experience sharing. Il mentalizing mostra 
infatti una risposta empatica anche verso il dolore di individui di un’altra razza. 
 Sebbene la valutazione della razza di un volto sia implicita, questa viene 
elaborata in modo automatico e veloce sulla base delle caratteristiche fisiche di un volto. 
Recentemente è stato dimostrato che anche la valutazione di affidabilità di un volto 
avviene a prima vista (Willis e Todorov, 2006) similmente alla razza. E’ stato così 
ipotizzato che l’affidabilità, sia in volti computerizzati (Esperimento 4) che in volti reali 
(Esperimento 5) modulasse l’empatia, anche in assenza di una conoscenza della 
personalità di dell’individuo o del suo comportamento sociale, perché questa può 
implicitamente e velocemente influenzare le nostre interazioni sociali. Per determinare 
l’efficacia della valutazione di affidabilità (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008), 
nell’Esperimento 3 è stato testato l’impatto delle caratteristiche fisiche standardizzate di 
affidabilità sulle rappresentazioni in MLV, anche quando irrilevanti ai fini del compito.   
  
SUMMARY 
 
The present work consists of a review of 5 event-related potentials (i.e., ERPs) 
experiments I conducted, which deal with the multifaceted nature of human empathy for 
pain (Experiment 1) and variances in empathic processes, as a function of others’ race 
(Experiment 2) and others’ perceived trustworthiness, i.e. driven by facial features 
(Experiments 4-5), addressed through classical and modified versions of the pain 
decision task. The classical version of the pain decision task requires participants to 
decide whether presented stimuli (either pictures of individuals or body parts) receive 
either painful or neutral stimulation.  
Furthermore, prior to investigate trustworthiness as modulator of neural empathic 
response, I adopted in Experiment 3 a different paradigm, namely the change detection 
task, and a direct neural correlate of the resolution of  visual working memory (i.e., 
VWM) representations to test whether trustworthiness is automatically extracted from 
faces biasing VWM processing. 
The main issue of the neuroscientific research on empathy for pain is about its 
multiple aspects. Indeed, neuroscientific research identified at least two subprocesses 
constituting empathy: Experience sharing and mentalizing. The former encompasses 
affective and sensorimotor aspects to inner feel the other’s emotive state; the latter 
allows to infer/attribute the other’s mental state. Experience sharing and mentalizing 
appear to be at least anatomically dissociated. One important aim of the present thesis is 
to provide evidence on the possible functional dissociation in the temporal domain. 
In Experiment 1 I addressed this issue by implementing a new version of the pain 
decision task. I presented participants with both sensorimotor (picture of a face with 
either painful or neutral expression) and contextual information (a sentence describing 
either a painful or neutral context) to highlight the deployment of electrophysiological 
reaction to pain related to the both subprocesses and I provided evidence of selective 
engagement of experience sharing and mentalizing into two time-windows. 
This is the starting point of the present studies on the way of exploring variance in 
neural empathic response. Previous studies suggested that people are more naturally 
empathic towards own-race individuals relative to other-race individuals (Avenanti et 
al., 2010; Xu et al., 2009). In Experiment 2 I provided compelling evidence that such 
preference is confined to experience sharing. Indeed, mentalizing is responsive to other-
race pain.  
Although implicitly appraised, race of a face is processed quickly and automatically 
driven by physical facial features. Recently it has been demonstrated that evaluation of 
perceived individuals’ facial trustworthiness is appraised at first sight (Willis and 
Todorov, 2006), similarly to race. I hypothesized that trustworthiness, either in 
computerized faces (Experiment 4) and real faces (Experiment 5) plays another key role 
in modulating empathy even in the absence of previous knowledge on others’ 
personality and social behavior because it can implicitly and quickly shape our social 
interactions. In an attempt to determine the efficacy of trustworthiness appraisal, I tested 
in Experiment 3 whether and how standardized physical facial features of 
trustworthiness (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008) bias VWM processing even when task-
irrelevant.  
 
  
  
Chapter 1 
 
 Neuroscience of empathy 
 
Empathy in a shot 
Over millenniums, the evolution of our brain arose in a context of continuous 
interactions among individuals organized in social groups, it follows that it is doubtless 
specialized in such capacity. Empathy allows people to be connected and react 
appropriately in social interactions by relating to and understanding the emotional states 
of the others, likely but not necessarily, either for prosocial behaviour (i.e., the 
motivation to improve others’ experiences by, for instance, reducing others’ sufferance, 
e.g. de Waal, 2008) or reducing personal distress. Whether it is permanently true is the 
broad question of the current studies.  
Social neuroscience laboratories deeply investigated empathy, predominantly with 
fMRI, in several contexts such as, for instance, empathy to disgust (e.g., Benuzzi, Lui, 
Duzzi, Nichelli, & Porro, 2008; Wicker Keysers, Royet, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2003) to 
fear (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004), to neutral touch (e.g., 
Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi & Gallese, 2004) and to others’ pain, which 
is the object of the current studies.  
Social neuroscientists specifically tested empathy to others’ pain by manipulating 
either the affective relationship between the perceiver and the target, i.e. lovers (Singer, 
Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & Frith, 2004), or the social fairness of the target 
(Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Stephan, Dolan & Frith,  2006); by manipulating either 
the contextual reality of stimuli (Gu & Han, 2007) or facial expressions (Botvinick, Jha, 
Bylsma, Fabian, Solomon & Prkachin, 2005). More recently, also the racial group of 
both the perceiver/observer and the target was investigated as a potential modulator of 
empathy (e.g., Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Chiao & Mathur, 2010; Forgiarini, 
Gallucci, & Maravita, 2011; Sheng & Han, 2012; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009) 
But what is empathy? People commonly define empathy as that complex 
isomorphic capacity to feel, vicariously, the other’s emotional state with the other. 
Indeed, empathy can be considered that capacity that makes the interaction between 
people possible by reading others’ facial expressions and understanding intentions or, 
more subtly, potential intentions, which appear to be an additional step for a full-blown 
empathic experience. 
And what is not empathy? Empathy is not merely emotional contagion, which is the 
tendency to adopt others’ emotional states; it is not simple mimicry, which is the 
automatic synchronization of our affective expressions, gestures or vocalization with 
those of an observed individual; empathy can be followed by sympathy, compassion 
and empathic concern that, as opposed to empathy per se, are other-oriented (for a more 
detailed distinction between these terms, please see Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
In the next sections, I’ll go into deeper detail about a neuroscientific definition of 
empathy. I’ll first analytically discuss existing literature on empathy and on empathy 
towards others’ pain, which is the object of the present thesis. Secondly, I’ll go into 
more detail of the neuroimaging technique I adopted to conduct the current studies and 
I’ll describe evidence on empathy for pain, which used the same technique: Event-
Related Potentials (i.e., ERPs). Thirdly, I’ll critically discuss the variability of the 
empathic process and, fourthly, the promises and the pitfalls of this body of research. 
Lastly, I’ll provide an overview of the current studies. 
1.1 Neuroscience of empathy 
Several theoretical models have been proposed in social and cognitive 
neuroscience domains in an attempt to define the nature of empathy and its underlying 
mechanisms. 
Mirror neurons. Some scholars proposed that empathy starts with motor 
resonance by means of mirror neuron system (Gallese, 2001), which allows internal 
simulation for action understanding. Mirror neurons are a class of neuronal cells first 
discovered in the rostral area of macaques’ ventral premotor cortex (F5 area) by di 
Pellegrino and colleagues in 1992 (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 
1992) and then termed mirror neurons in a subsequent study by Gallese and colleagues 
in 1996 (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). In that early study, single-cells 
activity was recorded from electrodes positioned inside the monkeys’ brain while 
observing an experimenter grasping some food. Surprisingly enough, these cells seem to 
have the property to discharge when a specific goal-directed motor act is either executed 
or observed by the monkeys. Indeed, the mere observation of either an object, a mimed 
or a non-goal-directed (e.g. intransitive) action was not sufficient to trigger mirror 
response. Importantly, one may argue, against the early evidence of the existence of 
mirroring, that monkeys exposed to some food might have been preparing the motor act 
of grasping for hunger, and reported neurons discharge was related to that instead of 
being related to the observation of such action by an experimenter. This argument can 
be ruled out by the evidence that the food per se does not trigger mirror neurons 
discharge. So does not another interesting object. Crucially, the fundamental aspect for 
mirroring is the interaction between the agent and the target by means of a biological 
effector (either the mouth or a hand). Thus, it’s the observation of a realistic goal-
directed (i.e. transitive) action toward the food that triggers mirror response in monkeys. 
Such evidence suggests that mirror neurons are involved in action understanding. In this 
regard, Umiltà and collaborators (Umiltà, Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, Keysers, & 
Rizzolatti, 2001) demonstrated that mirror neurons of F5 area discharge even when 
monkeys can’t see the occurring action although they can infer it (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Adapted from Umiltà et al., 2001. Example of a neuron responding in action 
observation in full vision (A) and hidden condition (B) but not in the mimed conditions (C and 
D).  
 
Over these last twenty years, single-cell recordings studies have reported mirror 
neurons not only in the rostral division of the ventral premotor cortex (i.e., vPMC) in 
macaques but also in the dorsal premotor (i.e., dPMC) and primary motor cortex (i.e., 
MC) and in the inferior parietal lobule (i.e., IPL; for reviews, please see e.g., Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fabbri-destro, & Cattaneo, 2009). 
Although there is no single-cell recordings evidence of mirror neurons in humans, 
there is a huge amount of studies suggesting the existence of such neuronal cells system 
in humans. Neuroimaging data demonstrated that the circuit of mirror neurons in 
humans involves the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the lower part of the precentral gyrus 
(i.e., PCG) and the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) including the 
Broadmann Area (BA) 44, i.e. the pars opercularis (i.e., PO), which is the homologue 
of macaques’ F5.  
Notably, in adult humans the homologue mirror neuron system is active also for 
intransitive movements, i.e. those movements that are not goal directed or are 
meaningless. Fadiga et al. (1995) used transcranial magnetic stimulation
1
 (i.e., TMS) to 
stimulate the motor cortex while motor evoked potentials
2
 (i.e., MEPs) were recorded 
during the observation of either a transitive, an intransitive action and a control 
condition. The observation of both transitive and intransitive action, relative to the 
control condition, elicited, in the observer, a selective increase in MEPs recorded from 
the corresponding muscle being observed, supporting then sensorimotor contagion in 
the observer as index of empathic reaction to others’ pain.  
Electrophysiological studies showed evidence of mirror activity in the 
desynchronization of mu rhythm, which is a particular rhythm of the alpha band (8-15 
Hz) registered from the motor cortex with the electroencephalography (i.e., EEG) over 
the central sites. Mu rhythm desynchronization manifests when an individual observes 
an action done by another individual (e.g., Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, & Martineau, 
1999; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, Altschuler, 
Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2005); a similar result has been observed also in infants 
                                                          
1
 In brief, the TMS is a non-invasive method that uses focal electromagnetic induction to induce weak 
electric currents with rapidly changing magnetic field. This induction causes the alternative 
depolarization and hyperpolarization of the neuron cells under the coil used to induce electric currents. 
2
 The registration of electrical activity through the placement of specific electrodes along the muscles of 
interest.  
(Nyström, Ljunghammar, Rosander, & von Hofsten, 2011; Nyström, 2008). Notably, 
similarly to monkeys, only transitive, and not intransitive, movements trigger mirror 
activity in infants, this can be taken as suggestion of primitive stages of mirror system 
that finally develops in a more sophisticated form of action understanding and other 
forms of intersubjective sensitivity, such as empathy, for instance. However, other lines 
of reasoning suggest that an alternative hypothesis is that action understanding of 
intransitive movements might be related to the activation of mirror neurons mediated by 
mentalizing, i.e. mindreading, which is a more cognitive subprocess of empathy that I’ll 
discuss in the following sections (Goldman & Jordan, 2013).  
Gallese (2003) proposed that mirror-like neural response is based on shared brain 
areas for first- and third-hand experience. Neuroimaging studies on humans showed that 
mirror mechanism is not confined to the premotor system but it is present also in those 
cortical circuitries that mediate visceromotor and emotion-related behaviors such as 
observing or firsthand feelings. Wicker and co-workers (Wicker et al., 2003) showed, 
for instance, that the anterior part of the insula (i.e., AI) is involved in both feeling and 
seeing disgust.  
The insular cortex has an integrative role in linking information from several 
functional systems and is characterized by anatomical distinctions, a recent meta-
analysis revealed that it shows four functionally distinct regions: the anterior-dorsal 
region is involved in processing some cognitive functions; the right middle insular 
gyrus is specific for the olfacto-gustatory-domain; the mid-posterior insula can be 
activated by tasks from the sensorimotor domain; finally the anterior-ventral insula is 
associated with socio-emotional functions, such as emotional processing and empathy 
(Kurth, Zilles, Fox, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010). The insular cortices are a center of 
integration of interoceptive information; in the case of empathy, it can perceive and 
internally represent external stimuli; according to several psychophysiological models 
the experience of emotions depends on changes in bodily arousal states (e.g., Craig, 
2003; 2009). Specifically, it has been suggested that the anterior-ventral insula is the 
link between mirror neuron system and emotional processing, allowing empathy to 
others’ emotions through underlying mechanisms of emotion understanding (Iacoboni 
& Dapretto, 2006; Iacoboni, 2009a; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). 
Singer and collegues (2004; 2006) showed that the bilateral AI together with the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are involved in both experiencing and observing 
physical pain.  
Whereas the insula is a center of representation and integration of others’ internal 
and emotional feelings, the ACC has been proposed to be the motivational and action-
related counterpart (Craig, 2002; 2009). Of course, the ACC is not an “empathy region” 
per se but it is related to the abstract and subjective feeling of unpleasantness, or more 
specifically the unpleasantness of pain (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Kong, Gollub, Polich,  
Kirsch, LaViolette, Vangel, Rosen, & Kaptchuk, 2008). It is part of the limbic system 
and it acts as a hub for affective, cognitive and motor control functions (Paus, 2001). 
Several studies proposed the involvement of the ACC in pain processing (Craig, 
2003a;b; Dum, Levinthal, & Strick, 2009; Qiu, 2005); Hutchinson and colleagues 
(Hutchison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostrovsky, 1999) corroborated such view by 
identifying single neurons in the ACC that respond selectively for painful stimuli, in 
this vein, Iacoboni (2009) suggested that these neurons might act as pain-specific mirror 
neurons. The International Association for the Study of Pain (i.e. IASP) defined pain as 
“an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (IASP, 1994). First-hand 
experience of pain is endowed with three dimensions: A sensory-discriminative, related 
to bodily location, intensity and duration of pain; an affective-motivational level, related 
to the unpleasantness of nociceptive stimulus; and a cognitive level, related to the 
cognitive evaluation of pain and the class of motor planning aiming at reducing pain. 
Indeed, the functional magnetic resonance imaging
3
 (i.e., fMRI) study conducted by 
Singer and co-workers (e.g., Singer et al., 2004) provided evidence in line with this. 
They tested empathy towards others’ pain in lovers: Female partners were lying in the 
scanner next to their partner, which were taking part of the study by seating in the same 
room. Women either received a painful or non-painful stimulation or observed a light 
signaling that their partner would receive the same stimulation, either painful or non-
painful. The experience of perceiving pain in first person activated the pain-related 
network known as “pain-matrix” (e.g., Singer et al., 2004). This network consists of 
brain areas coding for sensory-discriminative, affective-motivational and evaluative 
cognitive dimensions of pain experience described above (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. This so-called pain matrix mainly involves the thalamus, the amygdala, the insula 
cortex, the supplementary motor area, the posterior parietal cortex, the prefrontal cortex, the 
cingulate cortex, the periaqueductal gray, the basal ganglia and cerebellar cortex (not shown), 
and the primary and secondary sensory cortex. Abbreviations: ACC, cingulate cortex; Insula, 
insula cortex; PAG, periaqueductal gray; PFC, prefrontal cortex; PPC, posterior parietal cortex; 
S1, primary sensory cortex; S2, secondary sensory cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area. 
Taken from Springer Science + Business Media: Neurological Sciences, Neuroimaging: 
                                                          
3
 In brief, the functional magnetic resonance imaging (i.e., fMRI) is a procedure that uses magnetic 
resonance imaging technology to measure brain activity by detecting associated changes in blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (i.e., BOLD) signal while participants are performing a cognitive task. Its spatial 
resolution is about 3 mm
3
 and each scan can be acquired in less than 1 minute. 
visualizing the brain in pain, volume 28, 2007, May.  
 
Notably, in Singer et al.’s study, the first-hand experience of pain activated the 
somatosensory node of the pain matrix, which, again, processes the bodily location and 
intensity of pain, whereas third-hand experience did not. Crucially, in both trials when 
women were receiving painful stimulation or were signaled their partners were 
receiving painful stimulation, the affective-motivational node of the pain-matrix was 
activated. Specifically, the anterior medial cingulate cortex (ACC), the anterior insula, 
and the cerebellum. Interestingly, these regions are involved in processing the desires, 
urges, or impulses to avoid the painful experience and shared the first- and third-hand 
experience of pain (Singer et al., 2004; 2006). However, the absence of the 
sensorimotor node of the pain matrix is in contrast with TMS evidence as it has been 
shown by Avenanti and collegues (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005). I will 
describe this contradictory evidence below. 
Gallese’s shared manifold hypothesis has been suggested to be at the basis of the 
intersubjectivity that conveys empathy. Consistently with the Perception-Action 
coupling Model (PAM)
4
 theorized by Preston and de Waal (2002), witnessing the 
emotional state of someone determines the inner representation of such state 
automatically and unconsciously. The closer are the observer and the perceiver, the 
stronger would be such coupling (e.g., de Waal, 2008; Singer et al., 2004; Xu et al., 
2009). The modulation of the strength between perceptual input and the corresponding 
representation is also a function of individual differences in empathy capacity. An 
intriguing evidence of this interplay was provided by an fMRI study of Gazzola, Aziz-
Zadeh and Keysers (2006). Some participants were selected on the basis of their scores 
                                                          
4
 The Perception-Action coupling Model posits that seeing an object’s state lead to automatically form in 
the observer a corresponding representation, which in turn, finally activates somatic and autonomic 
responses. 
obtained in an empathy questionnaire, i.e. the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (i.e. IRI; 
Davis, 1980, 1983). This self-report questionnaire (see Appendix 1) is composed of four 
7-items subscales that measure both the capacity of taking others’ perspective 
(Perspective Taking, i.e. PT, and Fantasy, i.e. F, subscales) and the capacity to feel with 
the others their feelings (Empathic Concern, i.e. EC, and Personal Distress, i.e. PD, 
subscales). Responses are given of 5-point scale ranging from 1 to 5. The authors 
observed that participants with high scores of Perspective Taking showed stronger 
mirror activation whereas participants with low scores on the same subscale showed no 
significant mirror activity suggesting that mirroring seems to interact with mechanisms 
involved in goals understanding (also defined as mentalizing) and others’ motivation 
rather than emotional sharing. However, a recent meta-analysis showed that the mirror 
neuron system and the mentalizing are rarely concurrently active, so they do not interact 
but they are rather complementary (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
 Such result opens a crucial issue on the way of defining empathy: the multiple 
aspects of such cognitive process, namely the capacity of either internally simulating 
and mentalizing others’ emotional state and whether and how they are related for a full-
blown empathic experience.  
Mentalizing. The mentalizing refers to that process that allows to cognitively infer 
the others’ mental state through diverse modalities, e.g. by either observing the other’s 
facial expression, through the contextual appraisal or our knowledge about the other. It 
is a subprocess of empathy. Most of the neuroimaging studies that investigated the 
cognitive aspects of empathy asked participants to imagine what the observed target 
person was either thinking or feeling, other studies investigated how individuals are able 
to take the other’s perspective.  
An exemplar study in this particular domain is the one of Ruby and Decety (2004), 
in which they explored a particular aspect of mentalizing, namely the ability of taking 
the other perspective.  
That was the third of two prior positron emission tomography
5
 (i.e., PET) studies 
(Ruby & Decety, 2001; 2003) in which the authors instructed participants to adopt their 
own perspective or the perspective of another person in performing an action (i.e., 
motor domain) and in responding to a medical question  (i.e., conceptual domains, this 
study was conducted with medical students). The main claim of these studies was that 
individuals need to distinguish the self from the other in order to activate the 
mentalizing system and to correctly attribute the agency to the other. Indeed, their 
findings revealed the involvement of brain areas largely involved in the self-
representation, such as the IPL and the precuneus other than the posterior cingulate and 
the frontopolar cortex. Ruby and Decety (2004) conducted this third study in order to 
extend their results to the emotional domain. The authors asked participants, selected as 
medical students, to adopt their own perspective or the perspective of their mother in 
neutral or emotional condition. In the neutral condition, they were requested to give an 
opinion on the reliability of some declarations in the medical domain; in the emotional 
condition, participants were requested to report the emotional reaction that some real-
life situations would induce. Results replicated previous ones and extended them to the 
emotional context: the first person relative to the third person perspective showed the 
activation of the somatosensory cortex, whereas the right IPL and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (i.e., vmPFC) including the frontopolar cortex and the gyrus rectus 
were activated in the reverse comparison, regardless of the emotional content of 
situations presented. Brain areas involved in emotional processing, including the 
amygdala and the temporal poles, were activated in the emotional relative to the neutral 
                                                          
5
 The positron emission tomography is a nuclear medicine, functional magnetic technique. The system 
detects pairs of gamma rays emitted indirectly by a positron-emitting-radionuclide (i.e., tracer) which is 
introduced into the body on a biologically active molecule. Through the detectors is possible to calculate 
activation of neural populations in different brain areas while participants are performing a cognitive 
task. 3D images of tracer concentration within the body are then constructed by computer analysis 
through subtractive method. Its spatial resolution is 5-10 mm
3
, each scan needs several minutes to be 
acquired. 
condition, regardless of the perspective participants adopted. 
As I mentioned above, the crucial aspect of mentalizing is the representation of the 
mental states of the others, by attributing/inferring them. Commonly, participants 
perform “false beliefs” tasks to test whether individuals can form a belief about the 
other in discrepancy with what they know to be the truth. In these kind of tasks, 
participants read some stories or rather are exposed to a figurative representations of 
them and are required to say what the characters of the stories think. Indeed, in these 
stories the main character puts something in a box, then leaves the room and in its 
absence another character takes it and leaves the room. Finally, the main character 
returns in the room. Participants’ task is to say what is the belief of the main character, 
that is, what the main character will do or think (e.g., “Will the main character look in 
the box to take what put inside?”).  
Several reviews and meta-analysis, vastly reported that this kind of tasks involve 
frontal circuitries (Frith & Frith, 2003; 2006; Frith & Singer, 2008; Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). Frith and Frith (2006) reviewed that other brain 
areas involved in mentalizing are a sub-set of temporal regions such as the posterior end 
of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and the adjacent temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ); the former is involved in gaze-cueing (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004) and 
in visual detection of the biological motion (Gao, Scholl, & McCarthy, 2012), and the 
latter is involved in the representation of the body in the space (Blanke, Mohr, Michel, 
Pascual-Leone, Brugger, Seeck, Landis, & Thut, 2005) and in the identification of 
human goals and intentions (Van Overwalle, 2009). These functions make observers 
direct their attention to the context and to change perspective by distinguishing the self 
from the other. Other regions involved in mentalizing are the precuneus, which is also 
implied in self/other distinction (e.g., Ruby & Decety, 2001) and the temporal pole (i.e., 
TP), which is activated during memory retrieval from autobiographical memory 
(Maguire, Mummery, & Büchel, 2000); Frith and Frith (2003) suggested that this last 
region might help in generating a semantic and emotional context that allows the 
interpretation of stories and pictures that are currently being processed, on the basis of 
personal past experience. 
In the light of these early studies, several neuroscientists agreed that empathy is the 
resulting process of bottom-up, stimulus driven and automatic, and top-down, 
controlled, mechanisms (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Hein & 
Singer, 2008; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Singer, 2006). 
Decety and Jackson (2006) proposed a first model in which three major 
components of empathy are identified despite several definitions: 
- Affective response to other’s emotional state. Consistently with Singer’s lab 
findings (2004; 2006) this component endorses only an affective nature and 
does not count a sensorimotor contagion. Importantly, it is thought to be 
automatically activated by perceptual input that directly matches with action in 
a bottom-up process. This view is related to the mirror neuron system theory, 
the perception-action coupling model by Preston and de Waal (2002) and 
shared neural bases for first and third-hand emotional experience hypothesis; 
- the cognitive capacity to represent the other’s emotional state by taking its 
perspective and inferring the other’s mental state. It entails the involvement of 
executive resources that top-down regulate empathy; 
- emotion regulation, which implies the capacity to disentangle the observer from 
the other in order to prevent a total overlapping between representations of the 
self and the other and so provoking distress or anxiety. 
Sensorimotor contagion. Recently, Avenanti and collegues (Avenanti et al., 2005) 
revealed with a TMS study that the sensorimotor cortex is active during observation of 
pain in others. They registered MEPs induced by TMS stimulation of the left motor 
cortex while healthy participants observed a needle penetrating either the hand or the 
feet of a model. The authors found a reduction of corticospinal excitability that was 
specific to the muscle that participants observed being penetrated (for similar results, 
please see also Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Sforza, & Aglioti, 2009). This findings seem 
in contrast with fMRI studies of empathy toward others’ pain but a recent meta-analysis 
showed that such discrepancy might be due to differences in experimental paradigms 
(Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). Indeed, in those fMRI studies, which used a paradigm 
similar to that used by Avenanti and colleagues (2005), sensorimotor activation is 
observed. Crucially, the class of neuroimaging studies on empathy investigated the 
different aspects of empathy by presenting participants either with coloured arrows 
signalling that another person was receiving a painful stimulation (i.e., cue-based 
paradigms) or with pictures representing a painful or non-painful stimulation (i.e., 
picture based paradigms). The cue-based paradigms require participants to imagine (i.e., 
to mentally represent) the painful stimulation inflicted to the other after being signalled 
about it. That might reliably be more related to the mentalizing dimension of empathy. 
Picture-based paradigms, such as the one used in Avenanti and collegues’ studies (2005; 
2009), requires the direct observation of the painful stimulation and it might be more 
related with the sense of sharing, which may involve the sensory contagion. 
 Recent model of empathy. An important consequence of this interesting 
evidence was that empathy has been enclosed in a multicomponential model endowed 
with an affective/sensorimotor and a cognitive nature. Zaki and Ochsner (2012) 
proposed a new model of empathy that mainly refers to: 
- Experience sharing: The abilities of sharing others’ experience as a neural 
resonance mechanism (i.e., affective/sensorimotor component) 
- Mentalizing: The ability of representing other people’s internal states by taking 
others’ perspective (i.e., cognitive component).  
Although several promising findings, it is still not clear whether or how experience 
sharing and mentalizing are interrelated or rather completely dissociated. Neuroimaging 
studies evidence an anatomical dissociation: The experience sharing has neural 
underpinnings in the mirror neuron system (i.e., IPL, IFG, and dPMC), and in the limbic 
system (i.e., amygdala, ACC, AI and ventral striatum; e.g., Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 
2010; Lamm & Singer, 2010; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).  The mentalizing has been 
shown to be originated in prefrontal cortical circuitries (Decety & Jackson, 2006; 
Decety & Lamm, 2006), with neural underpinnings in the dorsomedial, dorsolateral, and 
medial prefrontal cortices (DMPFC, DLPF, and MPFC, respectively), middle frontal-
gyrus (MFG), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and precuneus (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 
2006; Decety, 2011; Lamm et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Figure 3 depicts a 
schematic representation of the anatomical dissociation between experience sharing and 
mentalizing. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the anatomical dissociation between experience sharing 
(green areas) and mentalizing (blue areas). 
  
A precious empirical landmark of such anatomical dissociation came from a 
lesional study by Shamay-Tsoory and collegues (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & 
Perry, 2009). The authors individuated patients with lesions in either the IFG (i.e. a core 
region of the experience sharing) or in the vmPFC (i.e. a core region of the mentalizing 
system) and administered them with two empathy tasks, one for measuring experience 
sharing and the other for measuring the capacity of mentalizing. Their results revealed 
that IFG patients showed a selective deficit in experience sharing whereas vmPFC 
patients showed a selective deficit in mentalizing. 
 
Perspective. Although research on empathy demonstrated that human brain can 
understand and empathically react to others’ facial emotions such as disgust (Gallese, et 
al., 2004) fear (de Gelder et al., 2004), happiness (Foroni & Semin, 2011) or emotional 
suffering (Cheon, Im, Harada, Kim, Mathur, Scimeca, Parrish, Park, & Chiao, 2011), 
empathy towards others’ physical pain research arose fundamental findings in 
improving research on empathy. That’s because of the objectivity of receiving painful 
stimulation, which allowed a clear distinction of the brain areas active in the first person 
experience of pain and those active in observing pain (e.g. Avenanti et al., 2005; Ruby 
& Decety, 2004; Singer et al., 2004). 
Empathy to others’ physical pain research suggested an anatomical dissociation 
between experience sharing and mentalizing but less is known about functional 
dissociation and the time-course of the neural empathic response to others’ pain (e.g., 
Spunt & Lieberman, 2012). Indeed, fMRI and TMS techniques do not offer a good 
temporal resolution. In the current studies the Event-Related Potentials (i.e., ERPs) 
technique has been used by virtue of its excellent temporal resolution (i.e., 1 ms) in 
order to track the time-course of the cognitive processes involved in empathy and so 
unravelling possible functional dissociation between them. 
In the light of the studies discussed in this section, empathy is an ability composed 
of at least two subprocesses: the experience sharing, which encompasses affective and 
sensorimotor aspects to inner feel the other’s emotive state, and mentalizing, which 
allows to infer/attribute the other’s mental state. Experience sharing and mentalizing 
appear to be at least anatomically dissociated. One important aim of the present thesis is 
to provide evidence on the possible functional dissociation in the temporal domain. 
1.2 Electrophysiological studies of empathy to others’ physical pain 
ERPs are revealed through the registration of the electroencephalogram (i.e., EEG). 
The EEG is used to monitor and graphically observe oscillations of the electrical 
potential
6
 originated from the spontaneous electrical activity of the cerebral cortex, 
which is captured on the scalp. The EEG is obtained by placing some electrodes on 
participants’ scalp. It reveals the total amount of the synchronized excitation in the 
neural population underlying each electrode; in particular the sum of post-synaptic 
potentials of pyramidal cells.  
ERPs are a technological evolution of the EEG and they are fluctuations of the 
electrical potential in response to a sensory stimulation, associated with a psychological 
process and in preparation of motor activity. Crucially, ERPs are strictly in temporal 
relation with the presented event. The registered waves contain the so-called 
components, which are non-aleatory oscillations and rather have specific waveforms, 
polarity (i.e. either positive or negative), latency and scalp distribution; noteworthy, 
they can be classified as either early, intermediate or late depending on their latency. 
Importantly, they reflect on a sort of virtual continuum the perceptual process of the 
sensory stimulation, i.e. the earliest components, to higher level cognitive process, such 
as attention, memory, the mid- and long-latency components. Figure 2 offers a synthetic 
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 Electrical Potential = the force exerted on a particle with electrical charge, it is represented with the V 
symbol and it is measured in volt, i.e. voltage or potential difference. It is important to pinpoint that an 
ERP waveform reflects the active and reference site, which can be placed in either an active electrode, 
too, in an inactive electrode, such as the earlobe, or computed as the average of all the active 
electrodes, i.e. the average reference (for more details, see for example Picton et al., 2000). In the 
studies described in the chapter, the average of the electrodes placed on the two earlobes have been 
used. 
view of some of a waveform including some of the most common ERP components: 
The P1
7
, N1, P2, N2 and the P3. 
 
Figure 4. A synthetic view of a waveform including some of the most common ERP 
components: The P1, N1, P2, N2 and the P3. Note that the negative voltages are plotted upward, 
a common, but obsolete, practice in ERP research. 
 
In the context of electrophysiological studies on empathy for pain some specific 
mid-latency (i.e., N1, P2, N2, and N3) and long-latency (i.e., P3) ERP components are 
involved. 
The electrophysiological empathic response to others’ pain manifests as a more 
positive deflection in response to painful relative to neutral stimulation registered in all 
the observed components, either positive or negative. 
The N1, the P2 and the N2 are sensitive to attentional manipulations. In particular, 
the N1 and the P2 amplitudes are enhanced for unfamiliar stimuli, whereas the N2 
amplitude is grater for familiar stimuli (e.g., Luck & Kappenman, 2011). For instance, 
when participants search for targets defined by specific features or combinations of 
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 The capital letter is related to the polarity of the components: “N” is for negative and “P” for positive. 
The number can be related to the serial number in which the oscillation occurs within the waveforms  
(e.g. the N1 is the first negative oscillation after the presentation of an event) or rather can be related to 
the latency, expressed in milliseconds, of the component (e.g. N100). The two way of classifications are 
not completely equivalent. Indeed, the first way of classification does not take into account the latency. 
Depending on the experimental design, the process the component is reflecting, and the sensorial 
modality in which the stimuli are presented, the deflection can occur with different latency range. The 
second way of classification pinpoints the temporal sequence in which the deflection occurs. 
features in a visual search paradigm
8
, a modulation of the P2 and the N2 amplitudes is 
observed.  
Luck and Hillyard (1994a) required participants to perform a visual search task in 
which a pop-out feature was designated as target at the beginning of each block. 
Participants had to respond as fast as possible to the presence of the target pop-out 
resulting in three experimental conditions: The target pop-out, the nontarget pop-out 
(i.e., the pop-out feature was not the one designated at the beginning of the block) and 
the homogeneous condition (i.e., no pop-out features). At frontal sites, the N2 was 
larger for both the target and nontarget conditions when compared to homogeneous 
arrays. By contrasts, the P2 was larger only in response to target pop-out relative to 
nontarget and homogeneous conditions. So, whereas the N2 appears to be related to an 
automatic detection of popout stimuli, irrespective of their relevance for the task; what 
appear to be important in the P2 modulation is the presence of the relevant feature to be 
attended, irrespective of the presence or absence of irrelevant, although popout, 
features. Thus, the P2 reflects the detection of a specific feature. 
Interestingly, the modulation of the N2 elicited by the presence of popout features 
irrespective of the relevance of the stimulus, has been observed only when participants 
actively searched for an item that differed from the others. It further confirms that the 
N2 is an attention-related rather than a bottom-up, perception-related component. 
In the context of social neuroscience, relevant physical features, such as the race of 
a face, can modulate either the N1 together with both the N2 and the P2. White 
participants show larger N1 and P2 for Black faces (i.e., other-race) relative to White 
faces (i.e., own-race) and the opposite pattern on the N2 (for review, see Ito & 
Bartholow, 2009). Sheng and Han (2012) presented Chinese participants with own- and 
other-race individuals with either painful and neutral facial expressions, while 
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 The visual search paradigm is a kind of perceptual task that requires attention to actively scan the 
visual field in which a target stimulus is presented among a series of distractor stimuli. Participants are 
required to detect as fast as possible the target stimulus. 
monitoring ERP responses during both a pain and a race
9
 judgment tasks. Own-race 
faces, but not other-race faces with painful facial expressions elicited a more positive 
deflection in the P2–N2 range relative to neutral facial expressions, unravelling a racial 
bias in empathic response towards own- and other-race individuals’ pain. A more recent 
study from the same laboratory (Sheng, Liu, Zhou, Zhou, & Han, 2013) demonstrated 
that such racial bias observed on the P2 component, is increased in participants treated 
with oxytocin, i.e. a neuropeptide involved in the development of trust among ingroup 
members. 
The functional meaning of the N3 component remains instead still unclear. 
As more clearly stated below, the above-mentioned ERP components have been 
associated with the mechanisms underlying the experience sharing because they appear 
to be modulated by physical facial features in a more automatic and bottom-up manner. 
 The P3 is, instead, one of the most studied ERP components in cognitive 
psychology, it is classically generated for rare and unexpected stimuli in an oddball 
paradigm but it is related also to the update of short-term memory, to the evaluation and 
categorization processes of the stimuli and as response to motivationally significant 
events (for a comprehensive review of the cognitive processes underlying the P3 
elicitation, please see Polich, 2012).  
In the context of the electrophysiological studies on empathy for pain, all the 
described components, either the earlier N1, P2, N2, N3 and the P3 are more positive 
for painful relative to neutral stimuli.  
Importantly, as better described below, evidence suggests that the P3 is mainly 
related to mechanisms underlying the mentalizing because it appears to be modulated by 
the specific task participants are required to perform, in a top-down manner. 
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 In the race judgment task, participants are required to say whether the presented face belongs to 
either own or different race. 
For instance, Decety and colleagues (Decety, Yang, & Cheng, 2010) provided early 
evidence about the involvement of down-regulation mechanisms on the empathic 
response to pain registered on the P3. In their study, 15 physicians and 15 control 
participants performed a pain decision task while their electrical activity was monitored. 
They were exposed to pictures depicting either painful or neutral stimulation. Whereas 
control participants showed an empathic response towards others’ pain, as indexed by 
more positive P3 deflection in response to painful relative to neutral stimulation, 
physicians did not show such modulation (see Figure 5). Results of this study have been 
interpreted in terms of down-regulation of the response to pain in individuals working 
with patients. Likely, this down-regulation is adaptive, in order to  have more cognitive 
resources available to be of assistance, and to consequently reduce personal distress. 
 
Figure 5. Results of Decety et al.’s study (2010). Control participants (left panel) showed larger 
(i.e., more positive) P3 for painful (i.e., body parts pricked by a needle) relative to neutral (i.e., 
body parts touched by a Q-tip), whereas physicians (right panel) did not. 
 
Meng and colleagues (Meng, Hu, Shen, Yang, Chen, Huang, and Jackson, 2012) 
showed that although larger P3 amplitude is observed in response to painful relative to 
non-painful stimuli, such modulation can be increased if a negative, but not positive or 
neutral, emotional picture is presented as a prime before the target pictures depicting 
either painful or neutral stimulation, supporting the “threat value of pain hypothesis” 
(i.e., TVPH; Ibáñez, Hurtado, Lobos, Escobar, Trujillo, Baez, Huepe, Manes, Decety, 
2011), see Figure 6. The TVPH posits that witnessing pain is potentially threatening for 
the observers and that might activate a threat-detection response instead of eliciting 
automatic empathic response.  
 
Figure 6. Differential P3 amplitudes (i.e., activity elicited in response to painful pictures minus 
activity elicited in response to non-painful pictures) in negative (black line), neutral (blue line), 
and positive (red line) prime conditions. The differential P3 in negative emotional prime 
condition is larger relative to neutral and positive prime conditions. The right bottom panel 
depicts the topographical maps of the scalp distribution of the differential waves in the time-
range of the P3 in negative, neutral and positive emotional prime conditions. 
 
Importantly, compelling evidence supporting the association between empathic 
response to others’ pain and ERP components has been provided by a more recent study 
conducted in the same laboratory (Meng, Jackson, Chen, Hu, Yang, Su, and Huang, 
2013). The authors directly investigated the interaction between pain perception in the 
self and observation of others by testing whether other-pain and self-pain primes 
differently modulate responsiveness to self-pain or other-pain targets in two ERP 
studies. Specifically, in one study participants underwent painful or non-painful heat 
stimulation after being primed with either painful or non-painful pictures and were 
required to rate the perceived pain. In the other study the self-pain or the self-heat 
stimulations were used as primes and stimuli depicting others’ pain or non-pain were 
used as targets. Results showed that observing others’ pain primes elicited faster 
reaction times, higher pain intensity rates and smaller P2 amplitude in response to self-
pain stimulation; complementary, self-pain stimulation primes elicited faster reaction 
times, higher pain intensity rates and smaller P3 amplitude in response to others’ pain. 
This pattern of results not only suggests that these ERP components are related to 
empathic responses but also supports the model of empathy that includes shared 
representations of others’ pain. 
The important contribute of electrophysiological research is that it can elucidate the 
time-course of empathy to other’s pain. 
Fan and Han (2008) registered electrical activity from Chinese adults required to 
perform a pain decision vs. a counting task about pictures of 1 or 2 hands painfully or 
not painfully stimulated. In the pain decision task, the authors observed that event-
related potentials (i.e., ERPs) differentiated between painful and not painful conditions 
in a time-range from 140 ms until about 660 ms post-stimulus over the frontal-central 
area modulating a family of ERP components including P2, N2, N3 that appeared to be 
related to early stimulus-driven processes and the late P3 related to cognitive top-down 
processes. Thus, in the counting task, when attention was withdrawn from cues of pain, 
the effect of perceiving pain was intact on the early components (i.e., P2, N2 and N3) 
but significantly reduced on this later component, (i.e., P3) thus indicating − according 
to the well-known cognitive origin of the P3 (Donchin, 1981; Sessa, Luria, Verleger, & 
Dell’Acqua, 2007) − that the cognitive processes involved in empathy needs attentional 
resources, see Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Results of Fan and Han’s study. In the pain judgment task (red lines) a modulation of 
ERP components in response to painful stimuli relative to non-painful stimuli is observed 
between 140 and 660 ms. In the counting task (blue lines) such modulation is suppressed on the 
P3 component. 
 
In similar conditions, Li and Han (2010) asked their participants to shift their 
perspective in performing the pain decision task from the self to that of an unfamiliar 
person. When taking other’s perspective, ERP responses to pain were observed only in 
the time-range including N1, P2, N2 and N3 but not the P3, highlighting the 
dissociation between two mechanisms, one earlier, mediated in a bottom-up manner and 
thus related to stimulus-driven reactions that are task-independent (N1, P2, N2 and N3) 
and one later (P3) that is task-dependent and so related to cognitive processes (i.e., 
perspective shifting).  
These results suggest, even though do not comprehensively clarify, that the early 
components could be associated with experience sharing processes whereas the P3 with 
mentalizing. The study proposed in Chapter 2: Dissecting empathy, had the main aim of 
addressing such dissociation in a direct way.  
 
1.3 Variances in empathic processes 
Empathy is a commonly experienced ability in healthy individuals, but extant 
evidence revealed a big variability in this ability both among individuals and as a 
function of contextual cues. Indeed, people may show differences in empathic response 
according to personality traits or might be influenced by either the contextual appraisal 
or specific characteristics of the person who is perceiving pain, such as race or social 
fairness. 
Individual differences. For instance, Decety and Jackson (2004) highlighted that 
self-awareness is an important modulator of empathy, as an example of empathy 
variability as a function of individual differences. The capacity of recognizing one’s 
own emotional state is at the basis of identification with others’ emotional states (see 
also Asendorpf and Baudonnière, 1993). An empirical support to this view has been 
provided by Moriguchi and collegues (Moriguchi et al., 2007), which tested empathic 
abilities in healthy participants with high and low scores of alexithymia, which is a 
personality trait characterized by the difficulty in recognizing and expressing one’s own 
emotional states. Alexithymic participants rated painful stimuli as less painful than 
nonalexithymic participants and showed lower scores in perspective taking and 
decreased neural activity in brain areas involved in empathy towards others’ pain, such 
as DLPFC and ACC (for similar results, see also (Bird, Silani, Brindley, White, Frith, 
and Singer, 2010; Silani, Bird, Brindley, Singer, Frith, and Frith, 2008).  
Reduced neural empathic response to others’ pain has been observed also in 
children with conduct problems and callous traits (Lockwood, Sebastian, McCrory, 
Hyde, Gu, De Brito, and Viding, 2013) or in patients with congenital insensitivity to 
pain (Danziger, Prkachin, and Willer, 2006). On the contrary behavioral evidence 
suggests that people that report high scores on questionnaires assessing pain 
catastrophizing, i.e. a particular response to pain that includes elements of rumination, 
magnification and helplessness, perceive more intense pain in others (e.g. Sullivan, 
Martel, Tripp, Savard, and Crombez, 2006). 
 Of course, as already mentioned in the first section, people show interindividual 
variance in empathy traits. An easy way to assess empathy abilities is to administer 
participants with self-report empathy questionnaires, for instance the above described 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (i.e. IRI; Davis, 1983) to either correlate the scores with 
neural responses or to establish the empathy range of participants sample, with for 
instance the Empathy Quotient (i.e. EQ) developed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
in 2004. In this self-report measure, there are 60 items including 20 filler items; responses are 
given on a 4-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ and the EQ score 
may fall in different ranges: low empathy (i.e., 0−32), middle empathy (i.e., 33−52), high 
empathy (i.e., 53−63), extremely high empathy (i.e., 64−80) and maximum empathy (i.e., 80). 
An English and Italian version of the EQ is reported in Appendix 1 together with the 
IRI.  
Several studies reported a significant association between hemodynamic 
response to others’ pain and the cognitive perspective taking (e.g. (Cheng, Lin, Liu, 
Hsu, Lim, Hung, and Decety, 2007; Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, and Decety, 2008) or the 
affective empathic concern subscales of the IRI (e.g. Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 
2004; 2006). Further, participants with high scores in the cognitive fantasy subscale of 
the IRI showed greater sensorimotor contagion assessed by recording MEPs under TMS 
stimulation on participants’ motor cortex (Avenanti et al., 2010).  
Contextual cues. Race. In the study by Avenanti et al. (2010) another important 
modulator of empathy has been identified, namely the race of the person who perceives 
pain. Over the last decade, a large body of neuroimaging studies adopting variants of 
this approach have established that own-race and other-race faces are processed 
differently, likely at all stages of the identification process (e.g., Amodio, Harmon-
Jones, & Devine, 2003; Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Hart et al., 2000; 
Wheeler & Fiske, 2005).  Results from studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) are 
exemplar in this perspective.  Race-driven modulations of face processing occur as early 
as the N1 component time-locked to face onset (Ito & Urland, 2003). Race, however, 
continues to modulate neural activity in cascade even during post-sensory stages of 
processing, up to and including working memory maintenance of face stimuli, as 
reflected in race-dependent effects observed on subsequent P2, N2, P3 (e.g., Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007) and sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN; e.g. Sessa, 
Tomelleri, Luria, Castelli, Reynolds, & Dell'Acqua, 2012) ERP components (see Ito & 
Bartholow, 2009, for a review). 
Avenanti et al. (2010) used TMS to explore corticospinal excitability of both Black 
and White participants while they were exposed to short video-clips showing either a 
needle penetrating either own-race or other-race model’s hand (i.e. painful stimulation) 
or a Q-tip touching model’s hand (i.e. neutral stimulation), see Figure 8. MEPs were 
recorded to single-pulse TMS on the left motor cortex from both the corresponding 
muscle that participants observed being stimulating (i.e. the right FDI, first dorsal 
interosseus) and from the ADM, abductor digiti minimi, taken as control.  
 
 
 Figure 8. Results of Avenanti et al.’s study (2010). A) MEP amplitudes registered from the FDI 
(upper panel) and from ADM (lower panel) in response to to the painful, compared to the 
neutral, stimulation of both ingroup and outgroup hands. B) Example of experimental 
conditions. 
 
The authors observed greater sensorimotor contagion for own- compared to other-
race pain as revealed by greater FDI, but not ADM, corticospinal inhibition (i.e. similar 
to that observed as defense to self-experienced painful event) while observing own-
race’s pain. Interestingly, the corticospinal contagion for own-race targets was 
associated with participants’ implicit racial prejudice towards other-race individuals – as 
assessed by the Implicit Association Test (i.e.; IAT Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji, 
2003). The IAT will be described in deeper detail in Chapter 3: Empathy towards other-
race pain. Nonetheless, when both Black/White participants were presented with a 
model’s hand of a different but unfamiliar race, i.e. a violet hand, greater sensorimotor 
contagion was restored, see Figure 9.  
 
 Figure 9. MEP amplitudes from the FDI in response to the painful, compared to the neutral, 
stimulation of violet hands. 
 
These findings lead to an explanation of culturally learnt racial prejudice − that is 
race-specific −, which in turn modulates empathy-related brain responses (for similar 
results observed in pupil dilation see Azevedo et al., 2012; Forgiarini et al., 2011 for 
similar results observed in skin conductance response, SCR). However, an association 
between individual difference in implicit racial prejudice and cross-racial empathy for 
pain is not consistent with all the neuroscientific techniques, or it has not been 
addressed at all; I’ll discuss such issue in deeper detail in Chapter 6: Conclusions.  
Empirical support to the role of implicit race bias in the neural empathic response 
towards other-race pain has been provided also with fMRI by Xu, Zuo, Wang, and Han 
(2009) who observed analogous selective empathic response in Chinese and Caucasian 
participants towards own-race models. Similarly to Avenanti and collegues’ study 
(2010), participants were exposed to short video clips featuring Chinese or Caucasian 
characters whose faces were either painfully (e.g., the face was penetrated by a needle) 
or neutrally (e.g., the face was touched by a Q-tip) stimulated. The participants’ task 
was to categorize the video clips based on whether the characters were feeling pain or 
not, so-called pain decision task, disregarding their race. Bold-Oxygen-Level-
Dependent (i.e., BOLD) responses recorded from the ACC was increased when 
participants watched faces under painful stimulation relative to faces stimulated with the 
non-painful object. Further, such BOLD response increase detected in ACC was of 
greater magnitude when the painful stimulation was applied to own-race characters 
compared to other-race characters. To note, results and conclusions from this study were 
compatible with the view proposed in prior work (Singer et al., 2004) that, among the 
diverse structures composing the pain matrix, the selective involvement of the ACC is a 
direct reflection of an empathic reaction of emotional/affective nature, which, in 
addition, depended on race (see also Sheng & Han, 2012), likely because the race of a 
face conveys any closer relationship between the observer and the target. 
Race, as important element of variance in empathic processes, has been 
investigated in one of the proposed studies, which is described in Chapter 3: Empathy 
towards other-race faces. 
Notably, physical facial features are processed in a bottom-up manner; however, in 
all of the cited studies the race of the target was completely task-irrelevant, so that it 
was implicitly appraised by participants. 
Singer and colleagues (2006) have offered an elegant demonstration that also non-
perceptual implicit information can modulate empathy, such as attribution of specific 
traits to perceivers. In the first phase of their study, the authors engaged male and 
female participants in an economic game (i.e., a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game) 
in which two confederates could play in either fair or unfair modality. In the second 
phase, BOLD fMRI signal was monitored in the same participants while a colored 
arrow signaled whether a painful stimulation would have been applied to either 
themselves (i.e., self condition), to the fair confederate (i.e., fair condition) or to the 
unfair confederate (i.e., unfair condition). Both female and males exhibited reduced 
activation of empathy-related brain regions (including AI, fronto-insular cortex and 
ACC) towards unfair confederates. Furthermore, in women this reduction in activity 
was small compared to men, which in turn showed hemodynamic response in some 
brain areas associated with desire of revenge, that is desire of punishment because of the 
social unfair behavior. These findings suggest that implicit appraisal of social fairness 
can modulate empathic neural responses. 
Variance in empathic processes is complemented by the contribution of explicit 
information learnt by observers in the experimental context. Socially derogated targets 
(Harris and Fiske, 2006) or manipulated group membership constitute examples of 
explicit contextual appraisal (Eres and Molenberghs, 2013; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, 
Batson, and Singer, 2010), so does inducing participants to believe that the painful 
stimulation is used as successful or useless therapeutic treatment (Lamm, Batson, and 
Decety, 2007) or feeling emotional pain for HIV/AIDS due to drug abuse patients 
relative to HIV/AIDS due to infected transfusion patients (Jean Decety, Echols, and 
Correll, 2009). 
Trustworthiness. In current studies, implicitly perceived trustworthiness is 
proposed in Chapter 4 (Trustworthiness implicit appraisal) as additional modulator of 
empathy towards others’ pain. 
Indeed, people immediately form impressions of others on first meeting on the 
basis of others’ physical appearance and immediately like or dislike them adjusting their 
behaviour even in the absence of previous knowledge on others’ personality and social 
behavior. Evaluation of a stranger as trustworthy or untrustworthy is one of these 
appraisals ‘at first sight’ taking only a fraction of a second (e.g., Todorov, Said, 
Oosterhof, & Engell, 2011; Willis & Todorov, 2006). A large body of behavioral 
research has individuated physical characteristics that guide people in trustworthiness 
evaluation (e.g., Montepare & Dobish, 2003; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov, 
Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). Compelling advancement in this field has been 
provided by the work of Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) who first individuated facial 
features that people use to appraise others’ trustworthiness: Faces appearing trustworthy 
are characterized by high inner eyebrows, pronounced cheekbones, wide chins and 
shallow nose sellion, while faces perceived as untrustworthy are characterized by low 
inner eyebrows, shallow cheekbones and thin chins and deep nose sellion; and secondly 
generated a database of standardized 2D models of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces, 
see Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Oosterhof and Todorov’s 2D models of trustworthy (right side of the continuum) 
and untrustworthy (left side of the continuum) faces. 
 
Importantly, this appraisal seems reliable: Convincing evidence substantiates that 
individuals perceived as untrustworthy tend in fact to exploit the trust of others in social 
and economic exchanges (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010
10
); on the other hand, individuals 
perceived as trustworthy are more likely to possess a particular variation of the oxytocin 
receptor gene, known as the GG genotype, associated with a more prosocial and 
empathetic behavior (Kogan, Saslow, Impett, Oveis, Keltner & Saturn, 2011).  
Trustworthiness of a face is a very intriguing characteristic because it is directly 
conveyed by the physical facial features, similarly to the race of a face; to note, it seems 
to be the physical counterpart of the social fairness. 
I hypothesize that trustworthiness is a cue that people use at first sight to shape 
properly social interactions. In this vein, I hypothesize that even in absence of explicit 
information about either the social behavior or personality traits of the others, people 
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 Stirrat and Perrett’s faces are not Oosterhof and Todorov’s 2D models. They manipulated pictures of 
real faces in order to change the facial-width ratio, which was calculated as bizygomatic width divided 
by height, such as wide faces are more untrustworthy and slim faces more trustworthy. 
might use such cue as a heuristics to either approach or avoid strangers, and that in turn 
might modulate empathy towards trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals. 
1.4 Promises and pitfalls of neuroscience of empathy 
At present, one of the main focus of research on empathy is whether experience 
sharing and mentalizing are isolated processes or rather deeply interactive. 
In a previous paragraph, I elucidated evidence of an anatomical dissociation 
underlying these processing streams but nothing can still be argued about the functional 
dissociation. The principal obstacle in addressing such issue is mainly referred to a 
subtle logical fallacy in the great majority of the early studies on empathy: Usually tasks 
either engage experience sharing or mentalizing processes. First, it must be underlined 
that the involvement of one of them does not necessarily imply the concurrent 
involvement of the other just because of the experimental paradigm. This leads to a 
second fundamental factor: The experimental task, or the cue used in it, selectively 
activates either experience sharing or mentalizing. Dissociating a priori the possible 
contribution of the two prevents interaction between them, if present, from being 
uncovered. 
This approach, indeed, contributes to build mutually exclusive single-process 
models of empathy and lead to two main consequences. First, it strengthens studies 
which support the predominant contribution of either experience sharing or mentalizing 
in human empathic abilities and with that, the partial or total theoretical exclusion of the 
other (see for example Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; Gallese et al., 2004; 
Hickok, 2008; Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, & Rumiati, 2011; Rizzolatti et al., 2009; 
Saxe, 2005). Second, it leads to an oversimplification of experimental tasks and cues 
aimed at investigating either one of the two processes. Commonly, neuroimaging 
studies aiming at isolating as much as possible hemodynamic response associated with 
experience sharing, remove elements useful to infer contextual information from 
pictorial sensorimotor cues; in fact, additional contextual information might enrich 
empathic experience in perceivers. This is usually the case of picture-based paradigms, 
described in the first section. On the contrary, mentalizing studies ask participants 
exclusively to appraise the context from descriptions of internal states or from colored 
cues signaling the internal state of someone who is not visible or, possibly, does not 
even exist. This is rather the case of cue-based paradigms. 
Noteworthy, this approach is not negligible per se because it provided first steps in 
elucidating how experience sharing and mentalizing can be triggered on the way of 
empathy and allowed a first and rigorous exploration of how these processes are 
subjective to inter-individual and context-dependent variability.  
Nonetheless, the importance of the use of more naturalistic paradigms in exploring 
social cognition needs to be taken in serious consideration. Indeed, oversimplifying 
experimental contexts do not directly test cognitive processes in realistic social 
contexts, which might shape in an unpredictable way brain activity deployed to perform 
the experimental task. Zaki and Ochsner (2009) highlighted that the processing of 
targets’ states involves multimodal information that need to be dynamically integrated 
by perceivers. Further, external information is usually part of a social context that might 
constrain perceivers’ interpretation of targets’ internal states. 
Crucially, empathy is an emergent property of empathic subprocesses that are 
engaged when one is dealing with others’ internal states. This assumption implies that 
there is no clear evidence of how empathic subprocesses manifest behaviorally. Indeed, 
some scholars advocate that the definition of empathy as the ability to share leans on 
reverse inference. Thus, no brain-behavior relationship has been described to link 
overlapping brain areas involved in both first- and third-hand experience of pain. In 
addition, these brain areas, like the ACC and the insula, are largely involved in many 
other functions and so, at present, the relation between these brain regions and empathic 
processes is not univocal, since they could be activated by the experimental tasks to 
some unspecifiable extent.  
To go beyond such limit, researchers have started searching a specific association 
between brain areas consistently involved in one empathic subprocess and some 
behavioral measure. An example has been provided by linking hemodynamic activation 
to prosocial/altruistic behavior. However, there is still no strict converging evidence 
about either which brain areas activation are predictive of altruism nor, by consequence 
of it, which empathic process needs to be mostly engaged in order to observe prosocial 
behavior. On one hand, Mathur, Harada, Lipke and Chiao (2010) suggested that 
altruistic motivation for one’s own social group is predicted by greater activation in 
MPFC;  Waytz, Zaki and Mitchell (2012) observed a key role of the DMPFC in 
predicting altruistic behavior, of course these regions have been exclusively associated 
with mentalizing (for similar results see also Telzer, Masten, Berkman, Lieberman, & 
Fuligni, 2011). On the other hand, Morelli, Rameson and Lieberman (2012) found that 
daily helping was associated with greater activity in the septal area, a region that has 
been only indirectly associated with maternal caregiving in humans (e.g., Lieberman, 
2013). Nonetheless, recent behavioral study demonstrated that a good mediator of 
prosocial attitude in 18-months-old infants is rather mimicry (Carpenter, Uebel, & 
Tomasello, 2013). Edele, Dziobek and Keller (2013) observed that affective, but not 
cognitive, empathy explains altruistic behavior, assessed with monetary offers, in an 
economic game (i.e., the dictator game). In line with these findings, Cialdini, Brown, 
Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg (1997) suggested that prosocial behavior is due to emotional 
reaction towards others’ states and aiming at reducing personal distress. 
Of note, there is no evidence that empathy-related behavior is confined to altruism 
and prosocial attitudes. In addition, the leading corpus of research on empathy has 
mainly been expanded through fMRI technique. 
Although its excellent spatial resolution allowed scholars to localize empathic 
subprocesses in the brain, its poor temporal resolution did not helped in disentangling 
crucial issues such as functional interplay between them. 
In the light of pitfalls that have been listed, other techniques could enrich the 
knowledge about empathy. 
The current studies have been conducted using the ERPs technique in order to study 
the lacking information about the time-course of experience sharing and mentalizing in 
the empathic response. 
 
1.5 Overview of the studies 
The following chapters consist in a review of five ERPs experiments I conducted, 
which deal with the multifaceted nature of empathy (Chapter 2: Dissecting empathy) 
and variances in empathic processes, as a function of others’ race (Chapter 3: Empathy 
toward other-race faces) and others’ perceived trustworthiness (Chapter 5: Empathy and 
Trustworthiness, Experiments 4 and 5) of a face, addressed through classical and 
modified versions of the pain decision task.  
The pain decision task requires participants to decide whether presented stimuli 
receive either painful or neutral stimulation. Classically, stimuli are pictures depicting 
either faces or parts of the body while receiving one of the possible stimulations as 
illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Example of stimuli used in empathy for pain research: pictures depicting either faces 
or part of the body while receiving either painful or neutral stimulation. 
 Furthermore, prior to investigate trustworthiness as modulator of neural empathic 
response, I adopted in Experiment 3 (Chapter 4: Trustworthiness implicit appraisal) a 
different paradigm, namely the change detection task, and a particular component of the 
ERPs, which is the Sustained Posterior Contralateral Negativity (i.e. SPCN), to test 
whether trustworthiness is automatically extracted from faces biasing visual working 
memory (i.e. VWM) processing. 
The first experiment has arisen from the necessity to provide direct evidence, at 
least in the temporal domain, of the possible dissociation, or rather the interaction, 
between experience sharing and mentalizing. A first suggestion of a temporal 
dissociation between the empathic subprocess resulted from Fan and Han’s study 
(2008). As I described in the second section of the current chapter, the authors observed 
that a family of early ERP components were modulated by painful context 
independently of the task requirements, indicating that in this early time-window ERP 
modulation is related to bottom-up mechanisms. By contrast, the P3 component was 
reduced when attention was withdrawn by painful context, as an index of down-
regulation in the time-window including the P3.  
In an attempt to make a step forward on the basis of the new flow of empathy 
research, I first propose a study in which both sensorimotor (picture of a face with either 
painful or neutral expression) and contextual information (a sentence describing either a 
painful or neutral context) are presented. This first experiment was aimed at testing 
directly the possible functional dissociation, or rather interaction, of the multifaceted 
nature of empathy in the temporal domain. Indeed, the temporal deployment of 
electrophysiological reaction could help in highlighting how the subprocesses 
functionally contribute at any given time. 
Based on the results of this first experiment, I was able to dissect empathy into two 
time-windows, one earlier, pre-P3 associated with mechanisms underlying experience 
sharing, and one later, that includes the P3 component, associated with cognitive 
mentalizing. This is the starting point of the proposed studies on the way of exploring 
variance in neural empathic response. Neuroimaging and TMS studies suggested that 
people are more naturally empathic towards own-race individuals relative to other-race 
individuals (Avenanti et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2009). Noteworthy, such preference 
appeared to be confined to a particular subprocess of empathy, although the 
neuroscientific technique involved, i.e. fMRI and TMS, are suboptimal to clearly define 
this evidence. By virtue of excellent temporal resolution of the ERPs, I revealed that 
such implicit race bias is confined to experience sharing but empathic response towards 
other-race pain is observable in mentalizing time-window. 
Although implicitly appraised, race of a face is processed quickly and automatically 
driven by physical facial features. Recently it has been demonstrated that evaluation of 
perceived individuals’ facial trustworthiness is appraised at first sight in a fraction of 
second (Willis & Todorov, 2006), similarly to race. I propose that trustworthiness plays 
another key role in modulating empathy even in the absence of previous knowledge on 
others’ personality and social behavior because implicit trustworthiness perception can 
quickly shape our social interactions. Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) individuated facial 
features that convey evaluation of trustworthiness perceived in others. In an attempt to 
determine the efficacy of such appraisal, I tested in Experiment 3 whether and how 
standardized physical facial features of trustworthiness, such as those of Oosterhof and 
Todorov’s computerized 2D models, are automatically maintained in VWM even when 
irrelevant for the task. VWM is a crucial step in defining the relevance of specific 
characteristics because it constantly feeds higher-order cognitive processes (e.g., long 
term memory) through the processing of lower-order functions (e.g., perception). To 
this aim, I adopted the change detection task, which is a paradigm specifically designed 
to test the resolution of VWM representations. Participants are required to memorize the 
identity of the face presented in the visual hemifield previously cued by an arrow and 
ignore the one presented in the non-cued hemifield; after a brief blank interval, the faces 
are presented again and participants have to say whether the face presented in the cued 
side was the same as that to memorize or not (for a schematic illustration of the early 
version of this task, see Figure 12a). I monitored the SPCN, which is an 
electrophysiological marker of the quantity (e.g., Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), the 
quality (e.g., Luria, Sessa, Gotler, Jolicoeur, & Dell’Acqua, 2010) and the resolution 
(e.g., Sessa et al., 2012) of visual information held in memory at any given moment 
during the retention interval, when the visual information was held in memory. The 
SPCN is a lateralized response characterized by greater negativity over the hemisphere 
contralateral to the visual hemifield where the target is presented relative to the response 
over the hemisphere ipsilateral to the target. To be visualized, the SPCN needs to be 
computed as the difference between contralateral and ipsilateral activity time-locked to 
the lateralized target stimulus (see Figure 12b,c). 
 Figure 12. a) Example of change detection task. In the panel is also depicted the time-window 
during which the SPCN is monitored. Participants are required to maintain in memory simuli 
presented in the visual hemifield previously cued by an arrow (i.e. colored squares in the red 
circle). After a retention interval, a test array is displayed and participants’ task is to say whether 
the color of one of the to be held in memory targets has changed or not. The red circle has been 
drawn for representative aims. The SPCN is monitored during the retention interval and is the 
result of the difference between contralateral and ipsilateral hemispheric activities. b) Example 
of pre-subtracted activities in response to targets. c) Example of the modulation of SPCN (i.e. 
post-subtracted activity) as function of the number of to be held targets. 
 
To anticipate, the SPCN trustworthiness is extracted from faces, even when task-
irrelevant, modulating VWM representations of faces. Noteworthy, although implicit 
trustworthiness appraisal appears to be slower than explicit appraisal, its influence on 
higher-order cognitive processes, such as VWM, suggests that perceived trustworthiness 
might shape social interactions. Thus, I investigated empathy as a function of facial cues 
of trustworthiness. 
In Experiment 4 I introduced, as first step, computerized Oosterhof and Todorov’s 
trustworthy and untrustworthy faces in a modified version of the pain decision task. The 
modification consisted in temporally separating the face from the object inflicting 
painful stimulation because of the time needed to implicitly process trustworthiness. 
Finally, in order to use more ecologically valid stimuli, consistently with the new flow 
of research on empathy, I used real faces (Experiment 5) that I submitted to the rate of 
an independent sample of participants on the trustworthiness dimension. As expected, 
trustworthy faces induce magnified empathic reaction relative to untrustworthy faces. 
Noteworthy, it has never been demonstrated that electrophysiological reaction to 
pain is empathy-specific. In fact, empathy is a multicomponential process and cognitive 
sub-mechanisms might occur. That would qualify the reaction to pain as a general 
activity elicited in some affective context. Indeed, pain decision task procedure might 
have overlapping mechanisms with those underlying an affective priming task. The 
affective priming is that effect occurring in a paradigm where two kinds of stimuli are 
presented sequentially and interleaved by a blank screen. To rule out the possibility that 
previous findings were not specific to empathic reactions to pain, I conducted 
Experiment 6 (reported in Appendix 2). I administered some participants with an 
affective priming task and I provided evidence supporting the empathy-specificity of the 
electrophysiological response observed in the presented studies.  
  
  
Chapter 2 
 
 
Experiment 1: Dissecting Empathy 
 
 
In Experiment 1, I directly tested the hypothesis according to which the existing 
evidence of an anatomical dissociation between experience sharing and mentalizing are 
followed by complementing functional dissociation, or rather interaction, in the 
temporal domain. 
As I discussed at great length in Chapter 1, the main focus of research on empathy 
is about its multifaceted nature and more specifically whether experience sharing and 
mentalizing are isolated processes or rather deeply interactive. 
Although there is evidence of an anatomical dissociation underlying these 
processing streams, nothing can still be argued about the functional level. It must be 
noticed that the great majority of studies investigating empathy usually engage either 
experience sharing or mentalizing processes and in doing this they fall in a subtle 
logical fallacy at the interpretation level. First, it must be considered that the 
involvement of one of them does not necessarily imply the concurrent involvement of 
the other just because of the experimental paradigm. Most importantly, empathy 
subprocess, namely the experience sharing and the mentalizing, can be selectively 
activated by the specific experimental task, or by the cue used in it, and that might be 
taken as evidence that they can be activated independently. Certainly, dissociating a 
priori the possible contribution of the two prevents interaction between them, if present, 
from being unrevealed. 
This approach, indeed, contributed to build mutually exclusive single-process 
models of empathy and led to two main consequences. First, it strengthened studies 
which support the predominant contribution of either experience sharing or mentalizing 
in human empathic abilities and with that, the partial or total theoretical exclusion of the 
other (see for example Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti, 2004; Hickok, 2008; Papeo et al., 
2011; Rizzolatti et al., 2009; Saxe, 2005). Second, it led to an oversimplification of 
experimental tasks and cues aimed at investigating either one of the two processes. 
Commonly, neuroimaging studies aiming at isolating as much as possible hemodynamic 
response associated with either experience sharing or mentalizing, used commonly two 
kind of paradigms. Picture-based paradigms allow to enhance mechanisms underlying 
experience sharing because they focus on pictorial sensorimotor cues, on the other hand 
these paradigms totally miss contextual information, which might be crucial in 
experiencing empathy. By contrast, cue-based paradigms enhance mechanisms 
underlying mentalizing because they focus on contextual cues, by asking participants 
exclusively to appraise the context from descriptions of internal states or from colored 
cues signaling the internal state of the targets.  
Consistently with this view, a recent meta-analysis on about 200 neuroimaging 
studies of human understanding of intentionality showed that at least mirror neuron and 
mentalizing systems are never concurrently active, each of them is specialized in the 
processing of either sensorimotor or contextual cues, respectively. According to this 
study, these systems are rather competitive and so mirror system does not aid the 
mentalizing in understanding others, nor viceversa (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
However, there is some contrasting evidence, which suggests that they may cooperate 
during emotion understanding (e.g. Brass et al., 2007; Iacoboni, Lieberman, Knowlton, 
Molnar-Szakacs, Moritz, Throop, & Fiske, 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Spunt, 
Falk, & Lieberman, 2010; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011). 
Spunt and Lieberman (2012) explicitly tested such hypothesis and proposed a first 
integrative model of empathy by using an ecologically valid paradigm for the explicit 
identification and attribution of observed emotional expressions. They exposed 
participants undergoing fMRI to short silent video-clips taken from a dramatic 
television show, in which characters were mimicking a specific emotion. The two tasks 
where either to say how characters were showing their feeling (i.e., identification, how) 
or to infer why they were feeling it (i.e., attribution, why).  Indeed, according to the 
authors, experience sharing and mentalizing could be functionally linked during 
attributional processing. Thus, once emotional expressions are identified (how) through 
the identification of motor acts in the face that allow specific expressions, such emotion 
can be attributed to an inferred social cause such as mental state (why). One advantage 
of this study is that stimuli were ecologically valid, that is sensorimotor and contextual 
cues were concurrently present at any given moment but the experimental tasks could 
strongly distinguish between the two systems. Results revealed dissociable yet 
functionally related contributes of mirror and mentalizing systems: Mirror, but not 
mentalizing, system was predominantly active in the explicit identification task; 
mentalizing, but not mirror, system, was predominantly active in the attribution task. 
However, during attributional processing the right posterior IFG (i.e. a brain area of the 
mirror system) activity precedes and was functionally related to the mentalizing system 
activity. These findings have been taken as evidence of an integrative model of mirror 
and mentalizing systems in understanding others’ emotions. 
Although the excellent spatial resolution of fMRI technique allowed scholars in 
localizing empathic subprocesses in the brain, its poor temporal resolution did not 
helped in deploying empathy abilities in the temporal domain so that it is still unclear 
when, if so, a functional interplay between them occurs. 
A first suggestion of a temporal dissociation between the empathic subprocess 
resulted from an ERPs study by Fan and Han (2008). The authors observed that a family 
of early ERP components were modulated by painful context independently of the task 
requirments, indicating that in this early time-window ERP modulation is related to 
bottom-up mechanisms. By contrast, no modulation of the P3 component was found 
when attention was withdrawn by painful context, as an index of down-regulation in the 
time-window including the P3.  
In an attempt to make a step forward on the basis of the new flow of empathy 
research, I conducted a study in which both sensorimotor (picture of a face with either 
painful or neutral expression) and contextual information (a sentence describing either a 
painful or neutral context in which the face is presented) are displayed. The temporal 
deployment of electrophysiological reaction could help in highlighting how the 
subprocesses functionally contribute at any given time. 
 
2.1 Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from 20 volunteer healthy students (7 males) from the 
University of Padova (mean age: 25 years, SD = 3.14) who reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorders. Only one was left-
handed. All participants gave their informed consent according to the ethical principles 
approved by the University of Padova. 
 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli were 32 sentences describing either a painful or neutral situation and 32 
Caucasian face stimuli, 6 females and 6 males with either a neutral or painful 
expression, the same as those used in Sheng and Han (2012). 
The face stimuli were scaled using an image-processing software so that each face 
fit in 2.9° x 3.6° (width x height) rectangle and the sentences were presented on three 
lines at the center of the screen in a 1.73° x 3.9° (width x height) virtual rectangle from 
a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm. Stimuli were presented on a 17-in cathode 
ray tube monitor controlled by a computer running E-prime software.  
Participants performed a modified version of the pain decision task. Each trial 
began with the presentation of a fixation cross at the center of the screen, after 600 ms 
one of the 32 sentences (contextual cue) was displayed for 3000 ms at the center of the 
screen; after a blank interval of variable duration (800-1600 ms, jittered in step of 100 
ms) one of the 32 faces (perceptual cue) was displayed for 250 ms. Participants were 
required to say whether the face had either a painful or neutral expression by pressing 
one of two response keys on the computer keyboard (“F” or “J”) using their left or right 
index finger, respectively, not before than 800 ms after the face offset. The mapping of 
the response keys was counterbalanced between participants. Each trial ended by asking 
participants to say the degree of their perceived empathy towards the presented face in 
the situation described on a 7-points Likert scale. This last display was needed to make 
sure the sentence to be considered and not simply ignored. The entire sequence of 
events is shown in Figure 1. 
 Figure 1. Example of the stimuli and the paradigm. 
 
Faces and sentences were randomly intermixed for a total of 64 trials in each of 5 
blocks.  
The experiment lasted not more than 50 minutes. Before saving data participants 
performed a practical session in order to familiarize with the experiment and to learn to 
blink only after their response and to fix the gaze at the center of the screen.  
EQ
11
. The EQ index was computed by adding points as follows: 2 points have been 
assigned when participants responded “strongly agree” and 1 point for “slightly agree” 
responses to the following items: 1, 6, 19, 22, 25, 26, 35,36, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 
55, 57, 58, 59, 60. By contrast, 2 points have been assigned when participants 
responded “strongly disagree” and 1 point for “slightly disagree” responses to the 
following items: 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 37, 39, 46, 48, 49, 
50. 
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 As the reader might remember from the third section of Chapter 1, the EQ has been developed by 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004). In this self-report measure, there are 60 items including 20 filler 
items; responses are given on a 4-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ and the 
EQ score may fall in different ranges: low empathy (i.e., 0−32), middle empathy (i.e., 33−52), high 
empathy (i.e., 53−63), extremely high empathy (i.e., 64−80) and maximum empathy (i.e., 80). See 
Appendix 1. 
IRI
12
. The IRI does not have a total score, instead, each of its four subscales 
constitutes an index per se: PT, F, EC and DP scores. To calculate each index, reverse 
scores (i.e. assigning 5 when participants responded 1 and 4 when responded 2 and 
viceversa) in items 7 and 12 have been considered for the F subscale; in items 3 and 15 
for PT subscale; in items 4, 14 and 18 for EC subscale and reverse scores in items 7 and 
12 have been considered for PD subscale. 
Electrophysiological recording and analyses  
The EEG was recorded during the change detection task from 64 active electrodes 
distributed over the scalp in accordance with the international 10/20 system placed on 
an elastic Acti-Cap, referenced to the left earlobe. The EEG was re-referenced offline to 
the average of the left and right earlobes. Horizontal EOG (i.e., HEOG) was recorded 
bipolarly from two external electrodes positioned laterally to the left and right external 
canthy. Vertical EOG (i.e., VEOG) was recorded from Fp1 and one external electrode 
placed below the left eye. The electrode impedance was kept less than 10KΩ because of 
the highly viscous electro gel and the properties of active electrodes. 
EEG, HEOG and VEOG signals was amplified (pass band 0.1-80 Hz) and digitized 
at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. The EEG was segmented into 1200-ms epochs starting 
100 ms prior to the onset of the faces. The epochs were baseline corrected based on the 
mean activity during the 100-ms prestimulus period, for each electrode site. Trials 
associated to incorrect responses or contaminated by large horizontal eye movements, 
eye blinks or other artifacts (exceeding ± 30μV, ± 60μV and ± 80μV, respectively) were 
excluded from analysis. Separate average waveforms for each condition were then 
generated time-locked to the face. According to the visual inspection in butterfly 
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 As the reader might remember from the first section of Chapter 1, the IRI is a self-report 
questionnaire, which is composed of four 7-items subscales that measure both the capacity of taking 
others’ perspective (Perspective Taking, i.e. PT, and Fantasy, i.e. F, subscales) and the capacity to feel 
with the others their feelings (Empathic Concern, i.e. EC, and Personal Distress, i.e. PD, subscales). 
Responses are given of 5-point scale ranging from 1 to 5. See Appendix 1. 
view13, I selected different time-windows as follows: 88-96 ms for the N1; 108-
180 ms for the P2; 200-360 ms for the activity between N2-N3; and 400-840 ms 
for the P3. Electrical activity was explored over all the electrodes placed on the scalp. 
Mean ERPs amplitude values were measured at pooled electrodes selected from the 
fronto-central (Fz, F1–F2, F3–F4, F5-F6, FCz, FC1–FC2, FC3–FC4, FC5-FC6), and 
centro-parietal (CPz, CP1–CP2, CP3–CP4, CP5-CP6, Pz, P1-P2, P3-P4, P5-P6) regions 
measured in time windows specifically selected for each ERP component, according to 
the visual inspection and previous work (e.g., Fan & Han, 2008). In all multi-factorial 
analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where appropriate. 
Neural reactions to pain were calculated by subtracting mean amplitude values for 
neutral conditions (i.e. neutral information regarding either the facial expression, the 
description, or both of them) from those recorded for painful conditions. Three 
differential scores resulted from these computations. I’ll refer to picture-based empathic 
reaction (i.e. picture-based ER) when neutral condition was subtracted from the 
condition in which only the facial expression was painful. I’ll rather refer to context-
based empathic reaction (i.e. context-based ER) when neutral condition was subtracted 
from the condition in which only the description was painful. I’ll finally refer to 
combined empathic reaction (i.e., combined ER) when the neutral condition was 
subtracted from the condition in which both the facial expression and the description 
were painful. 
At the end of the ERPs recording session, participants completed the two self-report 
measures of empathy: the IRI and the EQ.  
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 The butterfly view allows to overlap waveforms observed in each electrode for each condition. In this 
way, a very precise time window can be identified. 
2.3 Results 
Pain decision task. Reaction times (RTs) exceeding each individual mean RT in a 
given condition +/-2.5 SD and RTs associated with incorrect responses were excluded 
from the RT analysis.  Individual mean proportions of correct responses and RTs were 
submitted to separate repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVAs), both 
considering facial expression (painful vs. neutral) and description (painful vs. neutral) 
as within-subjects factors. Neither ANOVA showed significant factor main effects (max 
F = 2.844; min p = .11). Interestingly, individual mean proportions of correct responses 
showed marginally significant interaction between facial expression and description  (F 
= 3.670; p = .07) in the direction of better accuracy for neutral (M=.99) relative to 
painful facial expression (M=.97) with neutral description and for painful (M=.99)  
relative to neutral facial expression (M=.98) with painful description, indexing a 
tendency to be more accurate in conditions of valence congruency. 
EQ. Mean EQ score was similar to those found in the original study (Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright, 2004), i.e. 46.95/80 (SD = 9.92), so that the sample of participants 
reported an EQ score falling in the “middle empathy” range. 
IRI. Inter-individual mean rating scores were: 3,31 (SD = 0,77) for F subscale; 3,79 
(SD = 0,42) for PT; 3,824 (SD = 0,63) for CE; and 2,44 (SD = 0,61) for PD subscale.  
ERPs: N1, P2, N2-N3 and P3. Figure 2 shows grand averages of the face-
locked ERP components recorded at pooled fronto-central electrodes (upper 
panel) for each experimental condition in comparison to neutral condition (i.e. 
the condition in which both the face and the description were neutral in the same 
experimental trial). Noteworthy, a similar pattern of waveforms was observed at 
centro-parietal pooled electrodes (lower panel).  
 Figure 2. Grand averages of the face-locked ERP components recorded at pooled fronto-central 
and centro-parietal electrodes for each experimental condition in comparison to the neutral 
condition. a) The P2 and N2-N3, but not the P3, are significantly more positive in response to 
painful relative to neutral facial expression with neutral descriptions. b) The P3, but not the P2 
and the N2-N3, is significantly more positive in response to painful relative to neutral 
description with neutral faces. c) The P2, N2-N3 and the P3 are significantly more positive 
when both the face and the description are painful relative to the neutral condition. 
 
I submitted to ANOVA individual mean amplitude values of each component 
considering facial expression (painful vs. neutral) and description (painful vs. neutral) 
as within-subjects factors, separately for each region, i.e. fronto-central and centro-
parietal pooled electrodes.  
N1 (88-96). The ANOVA carried out on N1 mean amplitude values revealed no 
main effects over none of the pooled electrode regions nor interactions between facial 
expression and description (all Fs < 1). However, context-based and combined ERs to 
pain registered on the fronto-central pooled electrode sites, negatively correlated with 
the EQ score (r = -424 p = .031, for the context-based ER; r = -391 p = .044, for the 
combined ER) indicating that the higher was the EQ score the little was the empathic 
reaction.  
P2 (108-156). The ANOVA carried out on P2 mean amplitude values revealed 
main effect of facial expression at pooled fronto-central sites F(1,19) = 8.269, p = .01,  
ηp
2
 = .303, and a marginally significant effect at centro-parietal pooled electrodes 
F(1,19) = 3.609, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .160), indicating that painful facial expressions elicited 
larger P2 (at fronto-central pooled electrodes 3.419 μV; at centro-parietal electrodes 
5.393 μV) than neutral facial expression (at fronto-central pooled electrodes 2.559 μV; 
at centro-parietal electrodes 4.736 μV) irrespective of the description. The main effect 
of description did not reach significance level nor did the interaction between factors  
(all ps > .09). 
Planned comparisons revealed that the facial expression elicited larger P2 
amplitude than neutral face at both fronto-central and centro-parietal pooled electrodes 
(all ps < .005) and that the condition in which both facial expression and the description 
were painful was not significantly different to the conditions in which either only the 
face or the description was painful (all ps > .05). 
In addition, I further explored the functional significance of the P2 reaction to pain 
in relation to empathy subprocesses. Fronto-central pooled electrodes showed a negative 
correlation between individual picture-based ER to pain and the PT subscale scores of 
the IRI, r = -.545 p = .007 indicating that the higher was the PT score the smaller was 
the picture-based ER on this ERP component at the fronto-central area. That might be 
due to the fact that on this early time-window, people with high cognitive empathy 
abilities need contextual information, lacking in this specific condition, to trigger 
empathic reaction. By contrast, indeed, positive correlations have been observed at 
centro-parietal pool between individual context-based ER to pain and the EC subscale of 
the IRI: r = .386 p = .046 indicating that the higher was the EC score the greater was the 
empathic reaction to painful description on this ERP component at centro-parietal area. 
That might be an index of the fact that people with high empathy abilities related to 
experience sharing are more efficient in triggering an empathic reaction in this early 
time-window even conveyed only by contextual information.  
N2-N3 (200-360). The ANOVA carried out on N2-N3 mean amplitude values 
revealed the main effect of facial expression at both fronto-central pooled electrodes, 
F(1,19) = 12.875, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .404, and centro-parietal pooled electrodes F(1,19) = 
19.656, p < .000,  ηp
2
 = .508. The main effect of description did not reach significance  
level (F < 1) nor did the interaction between factors (F(1, 19) = 1.261, p > .05). 
Planned comparisons revealed that the condition in which both facial expression 
and the description were painful was not significantly different from the conditions in 
which only the face was painful (all ps > .05) but was significantly different to the 
conditions in which only the description was painful (t = 3.423, p = .003) at centro-
parietal pooled electrodes indicating that in this time-window the presence of painful 
facial expression does contribute in enhancing empathic reaction to others’ pain. 
In addition, I further explored the functional significance of the N2-N3 reaction to 
pain in relation to empathy subprocesses. Interestingly, in this time-range, N2-N3 
reaction to pain was associated with individual differences in EC scores at both fronto-
central and centro-parietal electrodes. Figure 3 shows positive correlations between EC 
scores and individual both picture-based (r = .432 p = .028 at fronto-central area; r = 
.451 p = .023 at centro-parietal area) and combined ERs to pain and the (r = .357 p = 
.061 at fronto-central area; r = .453 p = .022 at centro-parietal area) indicating that the 
higher was the EC score the greater was the empathic reaction to either painful facial 
expression and neutral description or both painful facial expression and description in 
this time-range. This strongly suggests that the N2-N3 empathic reaction is strongly 
related to a subprocess of empathy associated with experience sharing mechanisms.  
 
Figure 3. Scatterplots of correlations between individual empathic reactions (i.e. picture based, 
left panel; combined, right panel) and EC scores, registered at pooled both fronto-central and 
centro-parietal electrodes. 
 
P3 (400-840). The ANOVA carried out on P3 mean amplitude values revealed 
main effect of description at both fronto-central pooled electrodes, F(1,19) = 8.504 p = 
.009  ηp
2
 = .309, and at centro-parietal pooled electrodes F(1,19) = 4.665 p = .044  ηp
2
 = 
.197. The main effect of facial expression did not reach significance level nor did the 
interaction between factors (all ps > .05). 
Planned comparisons revealed that the condition in which both facial expression 
and the description were painful was not significantly different from the conditions in 
which either only the description was painful (all ps > .05). 
As I did for the other ERP components, I further explored the functional 
significance of the P3 component in relation to empathy subprocesses. Interestingly, the 
fronto-central electrodes showed marginally significant negative correlation between 
individual picture-based ERs to pain and the PT scores: r = .370 p = .054 indicating that 
the higher was the PT score the little was the empathic reaction to either painful facial 
expression and neutral description on the P3. That further confirms correlations found 
on the P2. Thus, people with high cognitive empathy abilities need contextual 
information to trigger an empathic reaction.  
Hence, results are clear-cut: in the time-window including the P2 and the N2-N3 
the perceptual cue selectively activates mechanisms underlying the experience sharing; 
in the immediately following time-window, which includes the P3, the contextual cue 
selectively activates mechanisms underlying the mentalizing. This selectivity suggests 
that experience sharing and mentalizing are dissociable.  
However, the visual inspection of the waveforms suggests that the time-window 
between the N2-N3 and ascendant part of the P3 may represent a critical time-window, 
in which processes involved can act as a hub between the experience sharing and 
mentalizing. Aiming at exploring this possible connection, I selected an additional time-
window, i.e. 380-520 ms between the N2-N3 and the P3.  
N2-N3–P3 (380-520). The ANOVA carried out on mean amplitude values of this 
time-window revealed a main effect of facial expression at centro-parietal pooled 
electrodes (F(1,19) = 5.699, p = .028,  ηp
2
 = .231), a main effect of description at fronto-
central pooled electrodes (F(1,19) = 6.292, p = .021, ηp
2
 = .249). Most importantly, 
interaction between the factors was observed at both fronto-central (F(1,19) = 4.414, p 
= .049,  ηp
2
 = .189) and at centro-parietal (F(1,19) = 4.942, p = .039, ηp
2
 = .206) pooled 
electrodes. Post-hoc analysis showed that neutral condition was significantly more 
negative than conditions in which either only the description, the facial expression or 
both of them were painful (all ps < .05). In addition, at fronto-central pooled electrodes 
the comparison between the neutral condition and the condition in which only the facial 
expression was painful was only marginally significant (t = 1.805, p = .08)
14
.  
These findings are taken as evidence that there is an intermediate time-window the 
face might be processed at the level of mentalizing because participants are required to 
rate their empathy towards the face’s pain.  
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that experience sharing and mentalizing are 
two dissociable mechanisms. In the time-window including the P2 and the N2-N3 the 
perceptual cue selectively activated mechanisms underlying the experience sharing; in 
the immediately following time-window, which includes the P3, the contextual cue 
selectively activated mechanisms underlying the mentalizing.  
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 For the sake of completeness, I report that at fronto-central pooled electrodes a negative correlation 
between individual picture-based ERs to pain and the F scores was observed (r = -.402, p = .039) 
indicating that the higher was the F score the smaller was the empathic reaction to painful facial 
expression and neutral description in this restricted time-window relative to the P3; centro-parietal 
pooled electrodes showed, instead, a negative correlation between individual picture-based ERs to pain 
and the EQ scores: r = -.399 p = .041 indicating that the higher was the EQ score the smaller was the 
empathic reaction to painful facial expression and neutral description in this time-window. That further 
confirms correlations found on the P2. Thus, people with high cognitive empathy abilities need 
contextual information to trigger an empathic reaction. 
However, a more fine-grained inspection of the waveforms suggested that there was 
an intermediate time-window between N2-N3 activity and the P3 peak sensitive to both 
cues of pain. 
Crucially, planned comparisons revealed that the concurrent presence of both 
painful facial expression and painful description did not enhance the empathic reaction 
to pain. Indeed, neither the P2, the N2-N3 or the P3 components were significantly 
more positive in this condition relative to the conditions in which only one of the cues 
was conveying painful information. Moreover, empathic reaction to pain observed in 
these time-windows have been associated with specific empathic abilities, underlying 
either experience sharing or mentalizing. 
Consistently with Fan and Han’ s first suggestion (2008), I demonstrated that the 
time-window which precedes the P3 peak, namely including the N2-N3 activity, is 
related to experience sharing: picture-based and combined ER were larger the higher 
was the score of participants obtained in the EC subscale of the IRI, which directly 
measures experience sharing abilities in empathy. By contrast, the time-window 
including the P3 was related to mentalizing: picture-based ER was reduced the higher 
was the score of participants obtained in the PT subscale of the IRI, which measures 
cognitive abilities underlying mentalizing. Indeed, such correlation suggests that painful 
information conveyed by the sensorimotor cue is not sufficient to trigger an empathic 
response in those participants with high cognitive abilities. 
Interestingly, similarly to the P3, the P2 time-window revealed that picture-based 
ER was negatively correlated with PT scores at the fronto-central region. That might be 
due to the fact that on this early time-window, people with high cognitive empathy 
abilities need contextual information, lacking in this specific condition, to trigger 
empathic reaction. At the same time, context-based ER positively correlated with the EC 
scores at the centro-parietal area: the higher was the EC score the greater was the 
empathic reaction to painful description and neutral facial expression. That might be an 
index of the fact that people with high empathy abilities related to experience sharing 
are more efficient in triggering an empathic reaction in this early time-window even 
conveyed only by contextual information.  
Intriguingly, these findings are in line with a recent study by Sheng and Han 
(2012). The authors presented participants with suffering and neutral facial expressions, 
while monitoring ERP responses during a pain judgment task. Painful facial expressions 
elicited ERP responses that were characterized by a more positive deflection in the P2–
N2 range relative to neutral facial expressions. The potential source of this ERP reaction 
to pain in the P2 time window was the ACC. Furthermore, P2 amplitude values in 
subtracted face-locked ERPs (i.e., ERPs elicited by painful facial expressions minus 
ERPs elicited by neutral facial expressions) correlated positively with EC scores of the 
IRI. 
Altogether, these results appear to indicate that the P2 component is strictly related 
to mechanisms underlying the experience sharing. 
So, in line with the meta-analysis conducted by Van Overwalle and Baetens (2009), 
results of Experiment 1 showed that experience sharing and mentalizing are extensively 
dissociable mechanisms and that experience sharing does not facilitate mentalizing 
mechanisms. 
However, there is an intermediate time-window between the N2-N3 and the P3 
peak ssensitive to both as indicated by the effect of the interaction between facial 
expression and description registered in this time-range (i.e., 380-520). Indeed the 
neutral condition was significantly more negative than conditions in which either only 
the description, the facial expression or both of them were painful.  
Spunt and Lieberman (2012) provided evidence of particular ecologically valid case 
in which mirror neuron system precedes and can be functionally related to the 
mentalizing system and proposed on the basis of their findings an integrative model of 
empathy. According to this model the mirror systems facilitates the rapid identification 
of facial expressions, which is then used as inputs to attributional processing in the 
mentalizing system. Furthermore, Brass et al. (2007) suggested that mirror system can 
be involved in action understanding in those cases in which familiar motor acts are 
observed in congruent and usual contexts (for a review, please see also Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). The results of Experiment 1 nicely dovetail with these previous 
findings by suggesting that although experience sharing and mentalizing are extensively 
dissociable, there is an intermediate time-window that temporarily falls between these 
two subprocesses during which they appear to be, to a certain degree, functionally 
connected. At the light of Spunt and Lieberman’s findings, I speculate that this critical 
time-window acts as a node of transfer of information from experience sharing to 
mentalizing processing in the comprehension of others’ pain. 
 
  
  
Chapter 3 
 
 
Experiment 2: Empathy towards other-race pain 
 
 
In Experiment 2, the influence of the race of a face was investigated as 
modulator of neural empathic response.  
Over the last decade, a large body of neuroimaging studies adopting variants of this 
approach have established that own-race and other-race faces are processed differently, 
likely at all stages of the identification process (e.g., Amodio et al., 2003; Cunningham 
et al., 2004; Hart et al., 2000; Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). Results from studies using 
event-related potentials (ERPs) are exemplar in this perspective, by revealing that race 
influence can be related to perception (Ofan, Rubin, & Amodio, 2011), attention 
(Amodio, 2010; Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003) or maintenance of 
other-race faces in visual working memory (Sessa et al., 2012). Indeed, race-driven 
modulations of face processing occur as early as the N1 component time-locked to face 
onset and its effects are reflected up to subsequent P2, N2, P3 and Sustained Posterior 
Contralateral Negativity (i.e.,SPCN) ERP components (see Ito & Bartholow, 2009, for a 
review). 
In the introduction section, I reported that recent neuroimaging and TMS studies 
revealed that race can also bias the processing of elements other than those strictly 
necessary to build and maintain a visual representation of a face: The ability to 
empathize with other persons, which appear to be selective towards own-race 
individuals when compared to that towards other-race individuals (Avenanti et al., 
2010; Xu et al., 2009). Noteworthy, such preference appeared to be confined to a 
particular subprocess of empathy, although the time-scale of neuroscientific technique 
involved, i.e. fMRI and TMS, are suboptimal to capture effects arising from subtle 
factorial interactions and so clearly define this evidence. Indeed, although both studies 
provided fundamental information about where the potential neural loci of the interplay 
between racial bias and empathy may be localized in the brain, these studies are 
virtually tacit relative to when such interplay takes place 
In both Xu’s et al. (2009) and Avenanti’s et al. (2010) studies, participants were 
exposed to face/hand stimuli conveying racial and empathy-eliciting information for a 
relatively long interval prior to recording their joint effects on stimuli processing.  The 
use of long stimuli exposure makes it plausible that the affective/emotional and sensory-
motor reactions described in those studies were in fact both mediated by higher level 
processes linked to the cognitive aspects of empathy, including attention, emotion 
regulation and cognitive evaluation of others’ pain.  In this vein, the long stimuli 
exposure provided participants with the opportunity to create a cognitive representation 
of others’ suffering which may have in turn mediated — in a top-down fashion, as 
hinted by Decety and Jackson (2004; 2006; see also Decety, 2011)) — their 
emotional/affective and sensory-motor reactivity to the stimuli used by Xu et al. (2009) 
and Avenanti et al. (2010). Fan and Han (2008) described the time-course of the neural 
empathic response by suggesting a temporal dissociation between bottom-up and top-
down mechanisms, the firsts in a time-window preceding the P3 component and the 
seconds in a time-window including the P3 component. In addition, Experiment 1 
provided direct evidence of extensive functional dissociation in the temporal domain of 
experience sharing and mentalizing associated with these two time-windows. Mapping 
out the temporal locus of the interplay between race and empathy-related subprocesses, 
was the primary scope of Experiment 2, as it would allow determining the nature of the 
influence of race on empathy. 
White participants in the present ERP study were presented with own- (i.e., White) 
and other-race (i.e., Black) faces in a painful condition (i.e., penetrated by a needle) or 
in a non-painful condition (i.e., touched by a Q-tip) under the requirement to perform a 
pain decision task.  Extant evidence of modulations of ERP responses to faces as a 
function of race occurring as early as the N1 component would lead to hypothesize that, 
if an interaction between race and pain stimulation conditions were evident in ERPs, it 
might surface relatively early in time, within a pre-P3 onset time window, thereby 
suggesting that neural resonance is reduced when facing other-race individuals in pain.  
An alternative scenario would be more congruent with our interpretation of Xu’s et al. 
(2008) and Avenanti’s et al. (2010) results, namely, that of a cognitive involvement in 
the reduction of brain responses to the pain of other-race individuals reflected in 
interactive effects largely confined to the P3 time-range. 
Noteworthy, results from Experiment 1 suggest that the racial bias observed by Xu 
et al., and Avenanti’ et al. might be related to experience sharing and so to the pre-P3 
rime-range. In this vein, in order to better qualify the meaning of each ERP component 
modulated by pain and/or race, participants in the present study were also administered, 
at the end of the pain decision task, a standard-race IAT and the Italian version of the 
IRI (Italian version by Albiero, Ingoglia, & Lo Coco, 2006). These measures were 
collected in order to assess parametrically whether implicit racial bias, as assessed by 
the IAT, influenced ERP reactions to pain, and whether affective and cognitive 
components of empathy, as assessed by the IRI, correlated with earlier (i.e., pre-P3) and 
later (P3 and following) ERP reactions to pain. 
 
3.1 Method 
Participants 
Informed consent was obtained from twelve White students at the University of 
Padova (8 females; mean age = 26.4 years, SD = 8.6; 1 left-handed) volunteered to 
participate in the present experiment.  
 
Stimuli and procedure (ERP recording session). The stimuli were colored digital 
photographs of 20 White (i.e., own-race; 10 males and 10 females) and 20 Black (i.e., 
other-race; 10 males and 10 females) faces with a neutral expression selected from 
Minear and Park’s (2004) database.  Each photograph was scaled to fit in a rectangular 
portion of the computer screen subtending 3.7° x 3.1° (width x height) of visual angle at 
a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm.  Each face was manipulated digitally so as 
to be displayed in two different conditions.  In the painful stimulation condition, the 
face was displayed with a needle of a syringe penetrating the cheek.  In the non-painful 
stimulation condition, the face was displayed with a Q-tip touching the cheek.  Figure 
1a shows a sample of the stimuli (in grayscale), one for each experimental condition. 
Each trial began with a fixation cross at the center of the computer screen that 
remained visible for a randomly variable duration (800–1600 ms, jittered in 100 ms 
steps).  The fixation cross was then replaced by a centrally presented face, which was 
displayed for a fixed duration of 250 ms, and followed by a blank interval that lasted 
until response detection (see below). Figure 1b illustrates the temporal structure of one 
trial. 
 
 Figure 1. a) Examples of stimuli, one for each experimental condition: stimulation condition 
(painful vs. non-painful) and race (White/own-race faces vs. Black/other-race faces). b) 
Schematic illustration of the experimental procedure. 
 
Participants were required to decide whether each face was painfully or not 
painfully stimulated by pressing one of two appropriately labeled keys of the computer 
keyboard (‘F’ or ‘J’, counterbalanced across participants) as quickly and accurately as 
possible.  The experimental list of stimuli was organized in 12 blocks of 80 trials, which 
were preceded by a brief session of practice with stimuli that were not included in the 
set of experimental stimuli.  In each block, all possible combinations of face’s sex, race, 
and stimulation condition were equally represented and randomly ordered at run-time 
for each participant. 
 
IAT. The stimuli were colored digital photographs of 10 White male and 10 Black 
male faces that were different than the faces used for the ERPs recording session.  The 
attributes were 10 positive words (e.g., peace, love, and paradise) and 10 negative words 
(e.g., disgust, vomit, and earthquake).  A standard race-IAT was administered to each 
participant following the pain decision task.  A description of the IAT procedure is 
illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Schematic description of the IAT procedure 
 
 
IAT consisted of five classification tasks administered in a sequential order on the computer screen. Block 1, 2 and 4 were 
learning blocks, whereas blocks 3 and 5 were critical to compute IAT scores. The order of the critical blocls was counterbalanced 
across participants. In each block, participants were required to classify stimuli by pressing one of two different keys on the 
computer keyboard (‘D’ and ‘K’). Instructions and key assignments were displayed on the computer screen before each block. 
Stimuli were presented at the center of the screen and remained visible until response. 
 
IRI. The Italian version of the IRI is a self-report questionnaire composed of 28 
items measuring affective and cognitive components of empathy.  The questionnaire is 
organized in four 7-item subscales, two affective subscales and two cognitive subscales.  
The affective component is assessed by the empathic concern (EC) and personal distress 
(PD) subscales.  The EC subscale taps the feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern 
for others.  The PD subscale assesses the feelings of anxiety in situations of social 
relations.  The cognitive component is assessed by the perspective-taking (PT) and 
fantasy subscales (FS).  The PT subscale measures the tendency to spontaneously adopt 
the psychological point of view of others.  The FS subscale measures the tendency to 
imaginatively transpose oneself into fictional situations (e.g., like movies or book 
characters).  Both the PT and FS subscales have been shown to be positively correlated 
with other validated measures of cognitive empathy, such as the Hogan (1969) empathy 
scale. 
EEG acquisition and analysis. EEG activity was recorded from 64 electrodes 
distributed over the scalp according to an extension of the international 10/20 system 
referenced to the left earlobe.  The EEG was re-referenced offline to the average of the 
left and right earlobes.  Trials contaminated by eye blinks, large horizontal eye 
movements or incorrect responses in the pain decision task were discarded from 
analysis.  
Mean N1, P2, and N2 component amplitudes were measured at fronto-central 
electrode sites in 80–100 ms, 120–150 ms, and 200–240 ms time-windows locked to the 
onset of the face stimuli, respectively.  The mean P3 amplitude was measured in a 400–
750 ms time-window at Pz, P3 and P4 electrode sites.  An additional 280–340 ms 
window, spanning the trough between N2 and N3 peaks, was selected based on visual 
localization of factor effects maximum values. Statistical analyses were conducted on 
individual amplitude estimates of activity recorded at each of frontal (AF3/AF4, 
AF7/AF8, Fz, FCz, F1/F2, F3/F4, F5/F6, F7/F8, FC1/FC2, FC3/FC4, FC5/FC6, 
FT7/FT8), central (Cz, C1/C2, C3/C4, C5/C6), and parietal (Pz, P3/P4) electrode sites.  
In all multi-factorial analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where 
appropriate. 
The standardized Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA) 
(Pascual-Marqui, 2002) was used for brain localization of the potential sources of ERP 
reactions to pain.  sLORETA analyses were conducted following the creation of a 
boundary element method (BEM) model, with about 5000 nodes from MRI data, the 
selection of a temporal window in which ERP responses differentiated between painful 
and non-painful stimulations, and a location-wise inverse weighting from the minimum 
norm least square (MNLS) analysis with estimated variances. 
 
3.2 Results 
Pain decision task. Reaction times (RTs) exceeding each individual mean RT in a 
given condition +/-2.5 SD and RTs associated with incorrect responses were excluded 
from the RT analysis.  Individual mean proportions of correct responses and RTs were 
submitted to separate repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVAs), both 
considering stimulation condition (painful vs. non-painful) and race (White faces vs. 
Black faces) as within-subjects factors. Neither ANOVA showed significant factor 
effects (max F = 2.2; min p = .16). 
 
IRI. Scores were computed by summing 1–7 scores to each item of the four 
subscales. Inter-individual mean rating scores were 27.1 (SD = 4.03) for the PT 
subscale, 25.0 (SD = 4.94) for the FS subscale, 26.8 (SD = 2.96) for the EC subscale, 
and 21.4 (SD = 5.70) for the PD subscale. 
 
IAT. Score calculation followed the improved algorithm proposed by Greenwald et 
al. (2003).  D positive scores were taken to indicate a preference towards White people.  
Mean D scores were significantly different from zero (mean D+/-standard error: 0.37+/-
0.17; t(11) = 2.2, p < .05), reflecting a successful detection of a positive bias towards 
own-race members. 
 
ERP: N1, P2, and N2. Figure 2 shows mean amplitudes of the subset of face-locked 
ERP components recorded at electrode site Fz that previous studies have indicated as 
sensitive to race, namely, N1, P2, and N2.  We submitted to ANOVA individual 
amplitude values of each component considering stimulation (painful vs. non-painful), 
race (White faces vs. Black faces), and electrode site as within-subjects factors.  The 
ANOVAs carried out on N1, P2 and N2 mean amplitude values revealed main effects of 
race over all electrodes of the frontal area (all ps < .05).  As expected, Black (other-
race) faces elicited N1 and P2 of greater amplitude than White (own-race) faces, and 
White faces elicited an N2 of greater amplitude than Black faces.  The ANOVAs 
detected no other main effect or interaction (all ps > .05). 
 
 
Figure 2. ERPs time-locked to the presentation of the faces recorded at electrode site Fz in 
response to white/own-race and Black/other-race faces collapsed across stimulation conditions 
(painful vs. non-painful). 
 
ERP: N2–N3. Figures 3a and 4 show face-locked ERPs recorded from a selection of 
frontal electrode sites, separately for White and Black faces.  A visual inspection of 
Figures 3a and 4 suggests that participants processed differently the faces in painful and 
non-painful conditions, exhibiting a positive shift in response to painful stimulation 
only when applied to White (own-race) faces relative to Black (other-race) faces.  This 
observation was substantiated by an ANOVA carried out on individual ERP mean 
amplitude values recorded in a 280–340 ms time-window considering recording side 
(left vs. right hemisphere electrodes) as additional factor, which showed a significant 
interaction between stimulation condition and race on all the frontal and central 
electrode sites (min F = 5.4; max p = .013, min ηp
2
 = .516).  This pattern was bilaterally 
distributed, for recording site did not produce significant effects either as main factor or 
in interactions with race and stimulation conditions (all Fs < 1; min p > .45).  Planned 
comparison indicated that painful stimuli elicited a positive shift relative to non-painful 
stimuli in the N2–N3 time window only when applied to White (own-race) faces (min t 
= 2.39; max p = .036).  This shift was absent when Black (other-race) faces were 
painfully stimulated (all ps < .23).  These findings suggest that, in a temporal window of 
280–340 ms, participants were in a state of experience sharing elicited by the 
presentation of suffering own-race members, but not of suffering other-race members.  
A scalp topographic map of N2–N3 activity elicited by White (own-race) faces in the 
painful stimulation condition is depicted in Figure 3b (upper panels). 
The results of sLORETA analysis revealed that the neural activity in the N2–N3 
time window that differentiated between painful and non-painful stimulations applied to 
White faces was mainly localized in the left IFG (Brodman area, BA, 45; peak MNI 
coordinates: -50, 25, 20, Fig. 3b, bottom), a core region of the mirror neuron system.  
This finding provides further support to the view that the early ERP reaction to pain was 
a likely reflection of neural resonance elicited by own-race faces in a painful condition. 
We also correlated individual pain reactions detected in the N2–N3 temporal 
window for each electrode site over frontal and central areas with the ratings collected 
with the IRI subscales.  Pain reactions in the present time-window were isolated by 
subtracting ERPs elicited in the non-painful stimulation condition from ERPs elicited in 
the painful condition, separately for White (own-race) faces and Black (other-race) 
faces.  Pain reactions recorded from a subset of frontal electrodes positioned on the left 
hemisphere (i.e., AF7, AF3, F7, F5, F3, F1, FT7, FC5) correlated with the EC ratings 
(measuring the affective component of empathy), but only when White faces were 
presented. Spearman rs ranged from .50 at electrode site F7 to .73 at electrode site AF7 
(all ps < .05).  Figure 5a shows the scatterplot of individual EC ratings and pain effects 
recorded at electrode site AF7, and a graphical indication of the additional electrode 
sites where EC ratings and pain effects were significantly correlated.  Pain reactions in 
this temporal window, however, did not correlate with IAT D score (all ps > .05).  
Figure 5b shows the scatterplot of individual EC ratings and pain reactions recorded at 
the electrode site AF7 for Black faces.  At all frontal electrode sites, the correlations 
between EC ratings and pain reactions elicited by Black faces were not significant (rs 
ranged from .33 to .45 all ps > .05). 
 
 
Figure 3. a) ERPs recorded at a selection of frontal electrode sites (i.e. Fz, FCz, F3 and F4) 
relative to the two stimulation conditions (painful vs. non-painful) for White/own-race faces. b) 
Voltage topography of the N2-N3 activity recorded in the painful condition (upper panel) and 
source estimation of the N2-N3 activity in the painful vs. non-painful conditions for White/own-
race faces (lower panels). 
 Figure 4. ERPs recorded at a selection of fronal electrode sites (i.e. Fz, FCz, F3 and F4) relative 
to the two stimulation conditions (painful vs. non-painful) for Black/other-race faces. 
 
 
Figure 5. a) Scatterplot of the correlation between individual EC ratings and the pain effect 
observed at the electrode site AF7 in the time range of the N2-N3 components for White faces. 
Pain effect was computed by subtracting waveforms elicited in the non-painful stimulation 
condition from the waveforms elicited in the painful condition. A schematic illustration of the 
EEG montage shows the electrode sites on the scalp for which correlations were significant 
(AF7 in Black color, AF3, F7, F5 F3, F1, FT7 and FC5 in gray color). b) Scatterplot of the 
correlation between individual EC ratings and the pain effect observed at the electrode site AF7 
in the time range of the N2-N3 components for Black/other-race faces. 
 
ERP: P3. An ANOVA on individual P3 amplitude values recorded at Pz electrode 
site revealed a main effect of race.  P3 amplitude was greater for Black (other-race) 
faces (4.4 µV) than White (own-race) faces (3.3 µV; F(1, 11) = 11.38, p < .01, ηp
2
 = 
.532).  The main effect of stimulation condition was also significant (F(1, 11) = 7.05, p 
< .05, ηp
2
 = .414).  Notably, the interaction between these two variables did not reach 
significance (F < 1), suggesting no role of race in modulating a neural reflection of the 
cognitive component of empathy.  P3 pain reactions were again isolated by subtracting 
amplitude values in the non-painful stimulation condition from amplitude values in the 
painful condition, separately for White (own-race) faces and Black (other-race) faces.  
P3 pain reactions amounted to .80 µV and .94 µV for White and Black faces, 
respectively.  An analogous pattern was observed when separate ANOVAs were carried 
out on P3 mean amplitude values recorded at P3 and P4 electrode sites.  Both ANOVAs 
indicated main effects of race (P3: F(1, 11) = 7.45, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .404; P4: F(1, 11) = 
6.27, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .363), and marginally significant main effects of stimulation 
condition (P3: F(1, 11) = 4.09, p = .068, ηp
2
 = .271; P4: F(1, 11) = 3.58, p = .085, ηp
2
 = 
.246).  No interaction between race and stimulation condition was observed (F < 1, p > 
.7).  Face-locked P3 components recorded at Pz in painful and non-painful stimulation 
conditions are shown in Figure 6a for White (own-race) faces Black (other-race) faces. 
Figure 6b shows scalp topographic maps of P3 activity elicited in the painful 
stimulation condition for White faces and Black faces and the source estimations of the 
P3 that differentiated between painful and non-painful stimulations applied to White 
and Black faces.  The results of the sLORETA analysis suggested that reactions to the 
pain of White own-race individuals and Black other-race individuals in the P3 time 
window had potential sources in different brain regions underpinning the mentalizing 
system.  The left middle frontal gyrus (MFG; BA 9; peak MNI coordinates: -30, 35, 40) 
was the likely source of the reaction to the pain of own-race individuals.  The left 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; BA 40; peak MNI coordinates: -60, -50, 20; BA 22; 
peak MNI coordinates: -63, -40, 20) was the likely source of the reaction to the pain of 
other-race individuals. Since both these brain regions are involved in the attribution of 
mental states to others (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Frith & 
Frith, 1999; Moriguchi, Ohnishi et al., 2006; Spiers & Maguire, 2006), these results 
suggest that participants devolved the same amount of cognitive resources while 
mentalizing others’ pain. 
P3 reactions to pain did not correlate with any of the IRI subscales, including the 
PT and the FS subscales.  Differential P3 pain reactions between White and Black faces 
recorded at Pz, P3 and P4 electrode sites did not correlate with IAT D scores (p > .38).  
Since the different potential sources of the P3 reactions to the pain of own-race and 
other-race individuals could suggest that these reactions are differently sensitive to the 
implicit pro-ingroup preference, we decided to compute correlations between P3 pain 
reactions and IAT D scores for White and Black faces, separately.  Interestingly, P3 
pain reactions recorded at P3 electrode site correlated with IAT D scores for White 
(own-race) faces (r = .512, p < .05), but not for Black faces (p > .10; see Figures 7a and 
7b), likely reflecting a link between a pro-White (i.e., pro-ingroup) attitude and the 
magnitude of the P3 reaction to pain in the left hemisphere.  No correlations were found 
between P3 pain reactions recorded at Pz and P4 electrode sites and IAT D scores (p = 
.153 and p = .499, respectively). 
 
 Figure 6. a) P3 ERP component recorded at the electrode site Pz relative to the two stimulation 
conditions (painful vs. non-painful) for White/own-race faces and for Black/other-race faces. b) 
Voltage topographies and source estimation of P3 activity as a function of race and stimulation 
conditions (painful vs. non-painful). 
 
 
Figure 7. a) Scatterplot of the correlation between individual IAT scores and the pain effect 
observed at the electrode site P3 in the time range of the P3 components for White/own-race 
faces. Pain effect was computed by subtracting waveforms elicited in the non-painful 
stimulation condition from the waveforms elicited in the painful condition. b) Scatterplot of the 
correlation between individual IAT scores and the pain effect observed at the electrode site P3 
in the time range of the P3 components for Black/other-race faces. 
3.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 showed that neural reactions to the pain of own-race 
individuals recorded in a 280–340 ms time-range, spanning the N2 and N3 ERP 
components, were magnified relative to neural reactions to the pain of other-race 
individuals.  However, neural reactions of comparable magnitude towards the pain of 
own-race and other-race individuals were observed in a 400–750 ms time-window, a 
time-range typically associated with the P3 ERP component.  In line with previous 
studies using similar experimental paradigms (Avenanti et al., 2010; Decety et al., 2010; 
Fan & Han, 2008; Li & Han, 2010; Xu et al., 2009), these neural reactions to pain have 
been interpreted as reflecting the engagement of distinct empathy-related subprocesses: 
Experience sharing and mentalizing (see also Experiment 1 described in Chapter 2). 
Consistently with findings of Experiment 1 and as suggested previously by Fan and 
Han (2008), I argue that pre-P3 ERP reaction to pain can be ascribed to the experience 
sharing component of empathy, as further corroborated by the correlation between such 
ERP modulations and the EC ratings of the IRI.  The set of correlations was particularly 
evident at left-frontal electrode sites, nicely dovetailing with recent fMRI work 
reporting analogous correlations between EC ratings and BOLD responses recorded 
from the left insula and ACC (Singer et al., 2004). The likely source of this ERP 
response was found in the left IFG, a key region of the mirror neuron system, thus 
dovetailing with prior similar evidence (e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 2006; Fr hholz   
Grandjean, 2012; Jabbi & Keysers, 2008; Minio-Paluello et al., 2006; Schulte-Ruther et 
al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2004, 2009).  
In the P3 time-range, the racial bias on neural reactions to pain was reduced to nil.  
The source of P3 responses to pain was localized in the MFG and in the TPJ for own-
race faces and other-race faces, respectively, in line with the cognitive functional 
characterization of this activity.  The MFG is held to be involved in mentalizing (e.g., 
David et al., 2008; Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; 
Moriguchi et al., 2006; Ohnishi et al., 2004; Spiers & Maguire, 2006).  The TPJ is 
crucial in detecting goals from observed behavior, in self/others distinctions (Frith & 
Frith, 2001) and in representing beliefs of other individuals (e.g., Saxe & Wexler, 
2005).   
In their meta-analysis, Lamm, Decety and Singer (2011) pointed out the pervasive 
bilateral activation of AI and medial/anterior cingulate cortex whenever an empathic 
response is elicited.  Additional brain structures are however engaged based on the 
stimuli used to elicit an empathic reaction.  More specifically, while realistic empathy-
eliciting stimuli (e.g., body parts in painful situations) engage selectively IFG and MFG 
(among other regions), abstract visual symbols (e.g., colors displayed on a screen 
indicating a painful stimulation) engage preferentially TPJ (among other regions).  
Lamm et al. (2011) proposed that these two different circuitries concur to the empathic 
state throughout two different pathways.  The first, including IFG and MFG, allows 
action understanding that in turn triggers inferences about potential (affective) 
consequences of observed actions.  The second pathway, including TPJ, subserves 
mentalizing and autobiographical memory, allowing the understanding of others’ 
mental states on the basis of inferences based on one’s own past experience.  These 
considerations suggest that P3 reactions to the pain of own-race and other-race 
individuals are qualitatively different. 
In the present study, P3 reactions to pain of White own-race faces correlated with 
IAT D scores although that was confined to the left hemisphere.  This finding bears a 
close conceptual analogy with results by Avenanti et al. (2010), who showed reduced 
sensory-motor contagion following the exposure to other-race individuals’ pain in 
participants exhibiting a higher degree of implicit pro-ingroup preference.  Conversely, 
an analogous correlation was absent when we considered pre-P3 ERP reactions to pain.  
This finding suggests that, in the P3 time-window, participants’ implicit pro-White 
preference interacted with the process of evaluation of the painful condition, such that 
the evaluation tended to be greater for participants who showed a particularly high 
implicit pro-White preference.  However, the interactive effect did not spread 
throughout the scalp, and the P3 recorded at the other electrode sites (Pz and P4) did not 
correlate with the IAT D scores, suggesting that the overall evaluation of painful stimuli 
was largely independent on the implicit pro-White preference. 
The present results complement and extend previous fMRI (Xu et al., 2009) and 
TMS (Avenanti et al., 2010) work by mapping out the time-course of the temporally 
asynchronous engagement of an early neural resonance component of empathy, which 
amplifies responses to the pain of own-race members, and of a cognitive component 
likely related to mentalizing which magnitude appears not to be influenced by their race, 
although the underlying different potential source estimates suggest that this later 
reaction qualitatively differs between own-race and other-race conditions.  
  
Chapter 4 
 
 
Experiments 3: Trustworthiness implicit appraisal 
 
 
4.1 Experiment 3: Visual working memory for trustworthy and 
untrustworthy faces 
In Experiment 3, I adopted a different paradigm, namely the change detection 
task, and the SPCN ERP component, to test whether trustworthiness may modulate 
visual working memory (i.e. VWM) processing under condition of task-irrelevance. 
That was necessary prior to investigate whether implicit perceived trustworthiness 
affects neural empathic responses (i.e. aim of the Experiment 4 and 5). 
Due to the specificity of the object of the current experiment, i.e. the maintenance 
of implicitly perceived trustworthiness’ faces in VWM, I’ll go into more detail in the 
introduction and in the discussion section of the present chapter.  
As I described in Chapter 1, trustworthiness is one of the first evaluation people 
constantly perform when facing strangers at “first sight” (e.g., Adolphs, 2002; Baron, 
Gobbini, Engell, & Todorov, 2011; Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2008; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Todorov, 2008; Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 
2008; Willis & Todorov, 2006).  This is not surprising, especially from an evolutionary 
perspective, since assessing faces’ trustworthiness is a critical social tool in order to 
avoid untrustworthy individuals (and consequent risky social interactions), and to 
approach trustworthy individuals for immediate or future cooperation (e.g., Boone and 
Buck, 2003; Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008; Trivers 1971; Zebrowitz and Montepare, 
2005).  This evolutionary view is supported by empirical evidence linking 
trustworthiness and approachability appraisals (Todorov, 2008; Santos and Young, 
2008a, 2008b).   
As the reader might remember, a conspicuous body of behavioral research 
examined the physical characteristics that guide people in trustworthiness evaluation 
(e.g., Knutson, 1996; Montepare & Dobish, 2003; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; 
Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). To this end, Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) 
developed a data-driven statistical model individuating facial features related to 
judgments of trustworthiness: High inner eyebrows, pronounced cheekbones, wide 
chins and shallow nose sellion, characterize faces appearing trustworthy while faces 
evaluated as untrustworthy are characterized by low inner eyebrows, shallow 
cheekbones and thin chins and deep nose sellion.  While this behavioral model provides 
a clear indication of which facial cues are involved in trustworthiness appraisal, 
researchers have more recently begun to investigate the neural underpinnings of such 
facial evaluation. Thus far these investigations have primarily utilized functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; e.g., Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Adolphs, 
2002; Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Said, Baron, & Todorov, 2008; Winston, 
Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002).  Two recent meta-analyses (Bzdok, Langner, 
Caspers, Kurth, Habel, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2011; Mende-Siedlecki, Said, & 
Todorov, 2012) summarized these findings as revealing differential roles of brain 
circuitries in processing trustworthy and untrustworthy faces, with the former class of 
faces engaging reward-associated brain regions (including the nucleus accumbens) and 
untrustworthy faces engaging a brain region responding to potential threat, i.e. the 
ventral portion of amygdala. In general, these favor a key role of approach and 
avoidance motivation systems in reacting to faces characterized by different levels of 
trustworthiness as mentioned above (Chen and Bargh, 1999; Cosmides and Tooby 
2000; Said et al. 2008; Todorov, 2008). In line with this evidence, people may notice, 
remember, or interpret the same social information quite differently, in particular when 
facing ambiguous social cues. This observation suggests that individuals may differ in 
their perception of a stranger as innocuous or, rather, as a potential offender. Notably, 
compelling evidence suggests that anxiety may play a crucial role in this context since 
individual differences in anxiety levels are associated with differences in the 
distribution of cognitive resources (e.g., Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Holmes, Nielsen, Tipper 
& Green, 2009; Moser, Huppert, Duval & Simons, 2008; Rossignol, Philippot, Bissot, 
Rigoulut & Campanella, 2012) such that high-anxious individuals tend to allocate 
excess attention and working memory resources to threat-related cues and to 
misinterpret emotionally ambiguous stimuli as more negative compared to non-anxious 
individuals (see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; 2005 for reviews; Calvo, Eysenck, & 
Castillo, 1997; Klumpp, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2010; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007).  Incidentally, high 
levels of anxiety are closely linked to avoidance motivation (e.g., Gable, Reis, & 
Downey, 2003). 
On the basis of these findings, the main hypothesis of this study was that implicit 
perceived trustworthiness may modulate visual working memory (i.e., VWM) faces’ 
representations and, as an important corollary to this, that individual differences in 
anxiety (either general and social anxiety) would further modulate the resolution(i.e., 
precision) of these representations.  
To investigate these questions I monitored ERPs while participants performed a 
change detection task that required encoding and maintaining for a short interval the 
identity of standardized either trustworthy and untrustworthy faces.  The SPCN, time-
locked to the onset of the face, was used to index the resolution of face representations 
in VWM. 
Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (i.e., BOLD) fMRI signal is characterized by a 
particularly low temporal resolution and is not suitable to investigate the time-course of 
trustworthiness appraisal.  Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) provide instead high-
resolution measures of the time-course of neural activity patterns associated with 
perceptual and cognitive processes.  In the context of trustworthiness appraisal, only a 
few recent ERP studies have explored which stages of processing are sensitive to 
physical cues of faces’ trustworthiness (Dzhelyova, Perrett, & Jentzsch, 2012; Marzi, 
Righi, Ottonello, Cincotta, & Viggiano, 2012; Rudoy & Paller, 2009; Yang, Qi, Ding, & 
Song, 2011). Modulations of face processing driven by explicit trustworthiness 
appraisal occur as early as the C1 and P1 components time-locked to face onset (Marzi 
et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2011).  Faces’ trustworthiness continues to modulate cascading 
neural activity during early selection of visual stimuli with affective and motivational 
significance (as reflected in early posterior negativity modulations, i.e. EPN; Dzhelyova 
et al., 2012; Marzi et al., 2012), later structural encoding (as reflected in N170 
modulations; Dzhelyova et al., 2012), and higher-order stages of processing as reflected 
in modulations of a fronto-central positivity (Marzi et al., 2012; Rudoy & Paller, 2009) 
and late positive component (i.e., LPC; Yang et al., 2011; Marzi et al., 2012).  However, 
these studies did not illuminate whether the trustworthiness of a face may be implicitly 
appraised when individuals are simply exposed to such stimuli and, at the present, it 
remains unknown whether exposure to faces characterized by different levels of 
trustworthiness/untrustworthiness might reflect individual differences in individual 
anxiety.   
As mentioned before, the present investigation focused on a privileged stage of face 
processing, i.e. VWM, since it acts as a cognitive hub (Haberlandt, 1997) for low-level 
processes − by which physical cues of trustworthiness are first encoded − and higher-
order cognitive processes including decision-making, and long-term memory (Luck, 
2008). In particular, I aimed to elucidate whether the amount of VWM resources were 
differently allocated to untrustworthy vs. trustworthy faces and whether that might be 
also subjective to individual differences in anxiety level. I adopted faces included in the 
database created according to the method described by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008; 
see also Todorov & Oosterhof, 2011). Such faces vary along the trustworthiness 
dimension +/- 2 SD and +/- 3 SD from neutral.  Incidentally, the vast majority of 
strangers an observer continuously comes across is more likely perceived as moderately 
trustworthy or untrustworthy, therefore, understanding whether these moderately 
trustworthy/untrustworthy faces are differently represented in VWM has a relevant 
ecological significance.   
The VWM task used in the current study was a modified version of the change 
detection task (e.g., Vogel & Machizawa, 2004; Sessa, Luria, Gotler, Jolicoeur, & 
Dell’Acqua, 2011; Sessa, Tomelleri, Luria, Castelli, Reynolds, & Dell'Acqua, 2012) and 
required participants to memorize face identities without an explicit trustworthiness 
evaluation, emphasizing the ecological validity of the task.  I monitored the SPCN
15
 
(also labeled contralateral delay activity, CDA; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) time-locked 
to faces recorded at posterior parietal sites indexing VWM maintenance, component of 
the ERP. Sessa et al. (2011, 2012) demonstrated that SPCN amplitude varies 
proportionally to the resolution of faces’ representations in VWM, such that high-
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 The SPCN is computed as the difference between contralateral activity and ipsilateral activity time-
locked to a lateralized target stimulus.  Its amplitude correlates positively with VWM informational load 
(e.g., Jolicœur, Brisson, and Robitaille, 2008; Perron, Lefebvre, Robitaille, Brisson, Gosselin, Arguin and 
Jolicœur, 2009; Robitaille, Grimault and Jolicœur, 2009; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004) and it has been 
shown to increase as the number (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004), and the complexity (Luria, Sessa, Gotler, 
Jolicœur, and Dell’Acqua, 2010) of stimuli to be held in VWM is increased up to the level of VWM 
saturation at which point the SPCN component usually tends to reach an asymptote. 
resolution faces’ representations elicit larger SPCN amplitudes relative to low-
resolution faces’ representations. 
I predicted that trustworthy and untrustworthy faces would have been represented 
in VWM with a different resolution and that this difference (computed by subtracting 
SPCN elicited by trustworthy and untrustworthy faces) would have been related to 
individual differences in personality traits, i.e. the level of participants’ anxiety, such 
that higher anxious participants would have maintained higher-resolution representation 
of untrustworthy faces as compared to lower anxious participants. To this aim, at the 
end of the ERP recording session, participants were also administered the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) and the Italian version of the Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale and the Social Phobia Scale questionnaires (Sica et al., 2007; for the 
English version refer to Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
 
4.1.1 Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from 16 healthy volunteer students (3 males) from the 
University of Padova (mean age: 24.56 years, SD = 1.63) who reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorders.  All participants 
gave their informed consent according to the ethical principles approved by the 
University of Padova.  Data from 4 participants (all females) were discarded from the 
analyses because of an excessive rate (higher than 30% of trials) of EEG artifacts. 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
Memory task.  Prior to the ERP experiment an independent student sample (N = 30; 
12 males, mean age: 23.43 years, SD = 1.86) provided 7-step ratings of facial 
trustworthiness (trustworthy versus untrustworthy) and emotional expression (happy 
versus angry) of 110 neutral facial expression identities generated using FaceGen 
Modeller 3.2 (Singular Inversions, 2007; +/-2 and +/-3 SD from neutral) according to 
the methods described by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008).  This procedure allowed 
selecting the most appropriate face stimuli for the present investigation resulting in 10 
untrustworthy (-2 and -3 SD) and 10 trustworthy (+2 and +3 SD) bald Caucasian male 
faces with a non-significant correlation with the emotion scale (consensus neutral 
expression p > .1; for a similar procedure see Yang et al., 2011).    
The face stimuli were scaled using image-processing software so that each face 
fitted in 3.3° x 4.5° (width x height) rectangle from a viewing distance of approximately 
70 cm.  Face stimuli were randomly selected and memory-display and test-display were 
composed of 2 faces − with either trustworthy or untrustworthy facial characteristics − 
horizontally aligned and located at the upper or the lower two quadrants of an imaginary 
rectangle centered around fixation.  The distance between the center of the face and the 
fixation cross was 4.9°.    
Examples of two different trials are reported in Figure 1a and b and described in 
detail in the respective captions.  The memory-display consisted of two faces displayed 
in each visual hemifield, preceded by arrow cues pointing to the side of the to-be-
memorized face.  The face located in the opposite hemifield had to be ignored.  
Following the memory-display, participants were required to examine the same pre-
cued side of the test-display for a possible change in the identity of the face, which 
occurred unpredictably on 50% of trials. When a change occurred, the face was replaced 
with a different face of the same level of trustworthiness.  The experiment consisted of 
192 trials per condition (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy; 8 blocks of 48 trials each).  
 
 Figure 1. Examples of change detection task trials when either a) a trustworthy face (example 
for the right hemifield) or b) an untrustworthy face (example for the left hemifield) had to be 
encoded. ISI: interstimulus interval.  
 
At the end of the ERP recording session, participants completed in hardcopy the 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) and the Italian version of the 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and the Social Phobia Scale (SPS) 
questionnaires (Sica, Musoni, Chiri, Bisi, Lolli & Sighinolfi, 2007; for the English 
version see Mattick, & Clarke, 1998). 
 
STAI.  The Italian version of the STAI is a 20-item self-report questionnaire (for 
each form: Y-1, state and Y-2, trait) that measures a temporary (state: e.g. “I feel at 
ease”, “I feel upset”) or persisting (trait: e.g. “I am a steady person”, “I lack self-
confidence”) emotional state of generalized anxiety.  Participants responded using a 4-
point Likert-type scale. 
 
SIAS and SPS.  The Italian version of the SIAS is a 19-item self-report 
questionnaire that measures the fear of social interaction situations (e.g. “When mixing 
socially, I am uncomfortable”, “I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well”).  
The Italian version of the SPS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire that measures the 
fear of being evaluated or observed by unknown people during daily activities (e.g. “I 
worry about shaking or trembling when I'm watched by other people”, “I am worried 
people will think my behavior is odd”). Participants responded using a 5-point Likert-
type scale.   
 
Electrophysiological recording and analysis  
EEG was recorded during the change detection task from 32 active electrodes 
distributed over the scalp in accordance with the international 10/20 system, placed on 
an elastic Acti-Cap referenced to the left earlobe. The EEG timeseries was re-referenced 
offline to the average of the left and right earlobes.  Trials contaminated by eye blinks, 
large horizontal eye movements or incorrect responses in the change detection task were 
discarded from analysis.  We computed contralateral waveforms by averaging the 
activity recorded at right hemisphere electrodes when participants were cued to encode 
the face stimulus on the left side of the memory-display with the activity recorded from 
the left hemisphere electrodes when they were cued to encode the face stimulus on the 
right side of the memory-display.  SPCN was quantified at posterior electrodes sites 
(P7/P8) as the difference in mean amplitude between the ipsilateral and contralateral 
waveforms in a time window of 500–1100 ms relative to the onset of the memory array 
(i.e., the SPCN mean amplitude was quantified in a time-window following the 
disappearance of the memory-display).  
We computed, for each participant and condition, an SPCN trustworthiness score 
reflecting differential resolution of VWM representations of trustworthy and 
untrustworthy faces based on the following equation:  
 
SPCN trustworthiness score = SPCN Trustworthy faces – SPCN Untrustworthy faces 
 
SPCN is a negative-going ERP response. Positive SPCN trustworthiness scores 
(SPCN differences) thus indicated that more information was encoded in VWM from 
untrustworthy faces compared to trustworthy faces (i.e., VWM advantage for 
representations of untrustworthy faces) and negative SPCN trustworthiness scores 
indicated the opposite (i.e., VWM advantage for representations of trustworthy faces). 
 
4.1.2 Results 
Memory task 
VWM performance was quantified using a standard index of sensitivity (d’; Green 
& Swets, 1974).  This measure allowed estimating how sensitive the participants were 
to changes between the memory and test-displays and whether this sensitivity differed 
as a function of faces’ trustworthiness.  These values were submitted to paired-sample t 
test considering the independent variable face trustworthiness (trustworthy faces, i.e. 
including faces +2 and +3 SD from neutral, vs. untrustworthy faces, i.e., including faces 
-2 and -3 SD from neutral).  Analysis revealed that participants were equally accurate in 
responding to trustworthy (mean d’ = 2.43, SD = .57) and untrustworthy (mean d’ = 
2.38, SD = .64) faces, t < 1.  To better characterize these findings, we performed a 
backward stepwise regression analysis in which variables were sequentially removed 
from a full model (including STAI Y-1, STAI Y-2, SPS and SIAS as predictors, and d’ 
values, for trustworthy and untrustworthy faces separately, as dependent variables).  
When d’ for trustworthy faces was predicted, it was found that STAI Y-1 (β = .711, p < 
.005) and SPS (β = -.711, p < .005) were significant predictors (adjusted R2 = .654).  For 
untrustworthy faces, SPS was a marginally significant predictor (β = -.503, p = .075; 
adjusted R
2
 = .211).  In general, these findings suggest a pervasive effect of high levels 
of social phobia in deteriorating behavioral performance. 
 
STAI.  The mean rating scores was 37.13 (SD = 11.94) for state anxiety (form Y-1) 
and 41.19 (SD = 8.45) for trait anxiety (form Y-2). 
SIAS and SPS.  The mean rating scores was 17.06 (SD = 7.96) for SIAS and 13.44 
(SD = 9.27) for SPS.   
 
SPCN 
Figure 2a illustrates contralateral and ipsilateral waveforms recorded at electrode 
sites P7/P8 time-locked to the memory-display for trustworthy and untrustworthy faces, 
separately. Figure 2b shows SPCN (contralateral minus ipsilateral) waveforms.  An 
informal observation of waveforms indicates that SPCN was modulated by faces’ 
trustworthiness.   
 
 
Figure 2. a) Contralateral and ipsilateral waveforms recorded at P7/P8 electrode sites time-
locked to the onset of the memory-display for trustworthy and untrustworthy faces separately. 
b) SPCN (contralateral-minus-ipsilateral) for trustworthy and untrustworthy faces, separately. 
The shaded area indicates the SPCN (contralateral-minus-ipsilateral waveforms) temporal 
window selected for statistical analyses (500–1100 ms). 
 
SPCN mean amplitude values recorded at electrode sites P7/P8 were submitted to a 
paired-sample t test considering the independent variable face trustworthiness 
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy).  Trustworthy faces elicited larger SPCN amplitude (-
1.83 µV; SD = 1.05) than untrustworthy faces (-1.05 µV; SD = 1.36), t(11) = 2.984, p < 
.012, ηp
2
 = .447, indicating that implicit evaluation of trustworthiness modulated VWM 
processing; in particular, under conditions of exposure to faces in the middle of the 
trustworthiness dimension, trustworthy faces were overall maintained as higher-
resolution representations compared to untrustworthy faces.  For completeness, we also 
analyzed mean SPCN amplitude values recorded at electrode sites P3/P4 and O1/O2.  
The pattern for P3/P4 was similar to that observed for P7/P8 (i.e., a larger SPCN 
amplitude for trustworthy faces than untrustworthy faces, t(11) = 2.386, p < .036, ηp
2
 = 
.341). The trend was analogous for SPCN mean amplitudes at electrode sites O1/O2, 
but statistically not significant (t <1). 
Notably, SPCN trustworthiness scores were highly correlated with the level of both 
participants’ state anxiety (i.e., STAI Y-1 scores), r = .812, p < .005, and social anxiety 
(i.e., SIAS scores), r = .631, p < .05 (see Figure 3a and Figure 3b).   
 
 
 Figure 3. Correlations between SPCN trustworthiness scores and the level of participants’ (a) 
state anxiety (r = .812, p < .005) and (b) social anxiety (r = .631, p < .05).  
 
The bar graph depicted in Figure 4 is presented only for illustrative purposes and 
illustrates mean SPCN amplitudes for trustworthy (blue bars) and untrustworthy (red 
bars) faces in participants with high and low levels of state and social anxiety, 
separately.  The graph noticeably shows that trustworthy faces elicited similar SPCN 
amplitudes irrespective of the level of participants’ anxiety; on the other hand 
untrustworthy faces elicited increased SPCN amplitudes in high-anxious participants 
compared to low-anxious individuals. 
 
 
 Figure 4. Bar graph of mean SPCN amplitudes for trustworthy (blue bars) and untrustworthy 
(red bars) faces for high and low levels of state and social anxiety, separately. 
 
Based on the known properties of SPCN, these findings support the conclusion that 
the higher the anxiety self-reported by participants (in particular state and social 
anxiety) the higher was the resolution of VWM representations of untrustworthy faces 
(compared to lower-anxious participants).  Finally, since the unbalance between the 
number of male (i.e., three) and female (i.e., nine) participants in this study might 
prevent interpreting our results as indicative of the general population, we analysed 
separately the effect of trustworthiness on the SPCN amplitude in male and female 
participants.  Although not significant, both males and females showed a comparable 
tendency in showing increased SPCN amplitudes when trustworthy faces (vs. 
untrustworthy faces) had to be encoded (males: t = -3.541 p = .072; females: t = -1.912 
p = .092), suggesting that, at least under the present experimental conditions, both males 
and females encoded trustworthy faces as higher resolution representations compared to 
untrustworthy faces.  
 
4.1.3  Discussion  
The results of the present experiment were clear-cut: The SPCN revealed that 
perceived trustworthiness is automatically maintained in VWM even when totally task-
irrelevant. Further, individuals’ level of general/social anxiety is related to the 
resolution with which faces characterized by features of trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) are represented in VWM.   
The SPCN was monitored during maintenance of representations of parametrically 
manipulated trustworthy and untrustworthy faces that differed slightly from faces that 
were neutral on the trustworthiness dimension (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). 
Importantly, the memory task did not require explicit evaluation of faces’ 
trustworthiness.  On the basis of known properties of the SPCN, modulations of SPCN 
amplitude as a function of faces’ trustworthiness denote differences in the resolution of 
those faces representations in VWM such that larger SPCN amplitudes reveal 
maintenance of higher-resolution representations (Sessa et al., 2011; 2012).   
SPCN amplitude, on average, was increased for trustworthy faces compared to 
untrustworthy faces. This finding suggests that participants maintained in VWM 
trustworthy faces in higher-resolution representations as compared to untrustworthy 
faces. Notably, individual estimates of the difference in SPCN amplitude elicited by 
trustworthy vs. untrustworthy faces (i.e., SPCN trustworthiness scores) strongly 
correlated with individual estimates of state and social anxiety (i.e., STAI Y-1 scores and 
SIAS scores, r = .812 and .631, respectively), indicating that untrustworthy faces elicited 
larger SPCN amplitudes in high-anxious individuals than in low-anxious individuals.  
These findings provide novel evidence that VWM is sensitive to physical cues of 
trustworthiness and that this sensitivity is further modulated by individuals’ anxiety. 
We also observed overall larger SPCN amplitude for trustworthy faces relative to 
untrustworthy faces.  As noted above, it has been suggested that trustworthiness 
appraisal, in particular for those faces at the extremes of the trustworthiness dimension, 
approximates the detection of emotional facial expressions (e.g., Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008).  Congruent with these observations, ERP modulations for extreme trustworthy 
and untrustworthy faces nearly mimics ERP modulations for the corresponding facial 
emotional expressions (e.g., Marzi et al., 2012), indicating increased processing for 
highly untrustworthy faces compared to highly trustworthy faces.   
To my knowledge, only two recent studies reported findings of memory tasks for 
trustworthy and untrustworthy faces (Rule, Slepian & Ambady, 2012; Todorov, Said, 
Oosterhof & Engell, 2011), providing contrasting evidence on which class of faces 
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) benefit from prioritized memory processing.  Rule et al. 
(2012) have found a long-term memory advantage in terms of behavioral accuracy for 
untrustworthy faces compared to trustworthy faces.  On the contrary, Todorov et al. 
(2011) reported a higher hit rate for trustworthy than untrustworthy faces in the context 
of a one-back recognition task.  Notably, face stimuli used in those two investigations 
differed such that Rule et al. (2012) selected faces composing the trustworthy and 
untrustworthy face sets from faces that obtained highest and lowest trustworthiness 
scores on participants’ ratings along a 7-point scale; conversely, and similarly to the 
present investigation, Todorov et al. (2011) used face stimuli in the middle of the 
trustworthiness dimension (i.e., +/- 1 SD and +/- 3 SD) generated on the basis of the 
approach of Oosterhof and Todorov (2008).  The findings of the present investigation, 
in demonstrating a VWM advantage for moderately trustworthy faces relative to 
moderately untrustworthy faces, appear to complement previous evidence of prioritized 
processing of extreme untrustworthy faces (compared to trustworthy faces).   
Indeed, congruent ERP work in this field also indicates that individuals with high 
levels of social anxiety (including both clinical and non-clinical anxiety) tend to process 
incoming emotional stimuli, in particular negative facial expressions, in greater detail 
compared to control groups at diverse stages of processing, as indexed by enhanced 
amplitude of P1 (e.g., Kolassa, Kolassa, Bergmann, Lauche, Dilger, Miltner, & Musial, 
2009; Kolassa & Miltner, 2006), P2 (Rossignol, et al., 2012) and N170 components 
(Kolassa & Miltner, 2006). In this vein, a recent ERP study using a similar task to that 
implemented in our study, monitored the SPCN component and demonstrated that 
anxiety is associated with inefficient gating of threat-related faces (i.e., fearful faces) 
from VWM even when task-irrelevant (Stout et al., 2013).  Furthermore, even when 
stimuli are not characterized by a clear negative valence, high-anxious individuals tend 
to misinterpret these emotionally ambiguous stimuli as more negative compared to non-
anxious individuals (Calvo & Castillo, 2001; Klumpp, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2010; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007).  To note, the memory task 
implemented in the present investigation required participants to encode faces’ identities 
that did not express an emotion, although it has been proposed that trustworthiness 
appraisal approximates the detection of emotional facial expressions (Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2008; Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 
2008), in particular for those faces at the extremes of the trustworthiness dimension, 
such that highly trustworthy and untrustworthy faces are perceived as happy and angry, 
respectively (Todorov, 2008).   
These observations suggest that high anxiety individuals tended to perceive 
moderately untrustworthy faces as more untrustworthy compared to low anxiety 
individuals, leading to increased resolution of those VWM representations. This 
interpretation is consistent  with previous evidence showing increased resolution of 
VWM representations of face identities with negative expressions (e.g., Sessa et al., 
2011). The present findings suggest that the improved VWM processing of 
untrustworthy faces in high-anxious individuals (compared to low-anxious individuals) 
is related to a general oversensitivity towards potential threat regardless of the nature 
(either social or not) of the threat. 
Taken together, these findings seem to reveal high flexibility of aversive/avoidance 
and appetitive/approach motivational systems (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2000; Todorov, 2008) in reacting to social stimuli and consequently biasing 
downstream cognition, such as memory.  This flexibility may rely on the notion of 
value-prediction code linked to a stimulus (e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 
2011b; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009) that combines information of both 
intensity/magnitude and valence of that stimulus and associated potential outcome (i.e., 
gain or loss, that in the context of trustworthiness appraisal translates into opportunities 
of cooperation vs. risky interactions).  Within this theoretical framework it appears 
reasonable to hypothesize that when exposed to very untrustworthy faces, which also 
may appear as expressing anger, the high intensity and negative valence conveyed by 
those faces increases the likelihood of reaching a threshold of threat detection such that 
the value-prediction code assigned by individuals is weighted more highly than value 
assigned to trustworthy faces.  This will then bias processing (including VWM 
maintenance) in favor of potential threat in the environment.  Incidentally, this 
explanation fits nicely with previous behavioral and ERP work showing a VWM 
advantage for negative facial expressions (i.e., angry and fearful faces) compared to 
neutral and/or positive facial expressions (i.e., happy faces; Jackson, Wolf, Johnston, 
Raymond, & Linden, 2008; Jackson, Wu, Linden, & Raymond, 2009; Sessa et al., 
2011). On the other hand, when perceived threat from untrustworthy faces is low, 
people may tend to assign a low value to them, and to assign a higher value and to 
allocate a larger proportion of cognitive resources to/on stimuli with rewarding 
characteristics (e.g., Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), such as trustworthy faces (e.g., 
Todorov, 2008), according to an approach behavior.  Along this theoretical perspective, 
the findings of this study also advocate that value-prediction codes assigned to 
untrustworthy faces strongly depend on the levels of individuals’ anxiety, such that 
higher levels of anxiety are associated with higher-resolution representations of 
untrustworthy faces (compared to low-anxious individuals). 
Modulations of the SPCN as a function of trustworthiness were not accompanied 
by analogous behavioral effects.  This dissociation between SPCN modulations and 
behavior is not alarming for at least two classes of considerations.  First, SPCN is a pure 
measure of VWM representation; on the contrary the overt response required in the 
change detection task reflects not only the (quality) of current VWM representation, but 
also additional processes allowing to compare the face presented in the test-display with 
current VWM representation (see, for instance, Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007).  This 
interpretation is also in line with the finding of deteriorating effect of social phobia 
selectively on behavioral performance, for both trustworthy and untrustworthy faces. 
Convincing evidence suggests that anxiety may deteriorate behavioral performance, in 
both matching tasks (i.e., Attwood, Penton-Voak, Burton, & Munafò, 2013) and VWM 
tasks (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2008; Moriya & Sugiura, 2012).  .  
A second type of considerations refers to the observation that brain responses are 
often more sensitive to subtle processing differences than behavioral measures (e.g., 
Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 2004; Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Wilkinson & 
Halligan, 2004) and this dissociation may be particularly evident when the behavioral 
task requires a dichotomous response such that was required in the change detection 
task implemented in this study (Sessa et al., 2011, 2012).   
To conclude, present findings provide evidence that physical cues of faces’ 
trustworthiness modulate the quality of faces’ representations in VWM even under 
conditions in which trustworthiness is implicitly appraised, and given the privileged 
position of VWM within the stream of processing, this finding may be particularly 
relevant for models of approach/avoidance motivational systems and behavior.  
Moreover, high levels of individuals’ anxiety modulate VWM maintenance of those 
faces’ representations.  
 
On the basis of the results of this experiment, I adopted standardized Oosterhof 
and Todorov’s trustworthy and untrustworthy faces to investigate whether implicitly 
perceived trustworthiness shapes empathy.  
  
Chapter 5 
 
 
Experiment 4 and Experiment 5: Empathy and Trustworthiness 
 
 
In Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 I investigated the impact of trustworthiness 
on neural empathic responses for pain. In Experiment 4 I adopted computerized 
Oosterhof and Todorov’s trustworthy and untrustworthy faces; in Experiment 5 
implemented an analogous design with a set of real faces that, in a first phase of the 
study, were rated on the dimension of trustworthiness by an independent sample.  
As discussed at length in Chapter 1, a critical feature of empathy, as measured by 
both neuroimaging and event-related potentials (i.e., ERPs) techniques, is that it may be 
modulated by social and affective relations between individuals. As it might be 
expected, people tend to be more empathetic toward similar others − for instance in 
terms of group membership (see Bufalari & Ionta, 2013; Eres & Molenberghs, 2013) – 
an aspect that has been explored in Experiment 2.  
In this vein, neural responses associated with empathy are shaped by learned 
preferences and appraisal of others’ social behaviour. Singer and colleagues (2006) have 
offered an elegant demonstration of this kind of variance in empathy in the context of 
empathy towards others’ pain, providing evidence that painfully stimulated unfair 
individuals induce in the observers reduced activations of empathy-related brain regions 
compared to fair individuals. Taken together, these findings very clearly confirmed the 
view that previous knowledge on someone else is a significant source of information 
that biases downstream processes, critically including processes empathy towards 
others’ pain. 
However, is previous knowledge on someone’s fair/unfair social conduct an 
essential source of information for shaping people’ empathic responses? Results as 
those reported in Experiment 2 strongly advocate that simply facial features diagnostic 
of a different group membership (i.e., skin colour) than that of the observer may 
modulate empathy. People indeed immediately form impressions of others on first 
meeting on the basis of others’ physical appearance and immediately like or dislike 
them adjusting their behaviour even in the absence of previous knowledge on others’ 
personality and social conduct. Evaluation of a stranger as trustworthy or untrustworthy 
is one of these appraisals ‘at first sight’ taking only a fraction of a second (e.g., Bar, 
Neta, & Linz, 2006; Todorov, Said, Oosterhof, & Engell, 2011; Willis & Todorov, 
2006). Experiment 4 showed that trustworthiness appraisal is automatically performed 
(i.e., task-irrelevant) in less than half of a second following the presentation of a face 
that had to be memorized (see also Sessa, Tomelleri, Luria, Castelli, Reynolds, & 
Dell’Acqua, 2012). Importantly, this appraisal seems reliable: Convincing evidence 
substantiates that individuals perceived as untrustworthy tend in fact to exploit the trust 
of others in social and economic exchanges (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010); on the other hand, 
individuals perceived as trustworthy are more likely to possess a particular variation of 
the oxytocin receptor gene, known as the GG genotype, associated with a more 
prosocial and empathetic behavior (Kogan, Saslow, Impett, Oveis, Keltner, & Saturn, 
2011).  
The ongoing considerations led us to hypothesize that, even when information on 
others’ social behaviour is lacking, empathy may be shaped solely by this first 
impression. In particular, we conjectured that individuals perceived as trustworthy 
would have induced in the observer a greater neural reaction to their pain when 
compared with individuals perceived as untrustworthy, similarly to individuals known 
to be fair/unfair.  
By means of ERPs and source analyses techniques, I monitored neural reactions 
towards trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals in a painful context (i.e., a needle 
injection vs. a Q-tip touch) in two experiments using both computerized bald male faces 
parametrically manipulated on the trustworthiness dimension (Experiment 4) and real 
male faces rated on the trustworthiness dimension by an independent sample of 
participants (Experiment 5). Noteworthy, real faces do not have standardized facial 
features of trustworthiness as Oosterhof and Todorov’s do so that more variability in 
trustworthiness appraisal might be expected. This second experiment on the effect of 
perceived trustworthiness in shaping an empathic reaction was relevant since a recent 
driving force in the social neuroscience field underlined the importance of the use of 
naturalistic stimuli in social cognition (Zaki & Ochsner 2009). Indeed, social 
neuroscientists address social issues without directly test cognitive processes in realistic 
social contexts; that might shape in an unpredictable way brain activity deployed to 
perform the experimental task. The authors highlighted that the processing of target 
states involve multimodal information that need to be dynamically integrated by 
perceivers. Further, external information is usually part of a social context that might 
constrain perceivers’ interpretation of such information about targets’ internal states. 
As the reader might remember, previous work investigating the temporal aspects of 
empathy toward others’ pain by means of the ERP approach consistently showed a 
positive shift of scalp-recorded electrical activity when participants were presented with 
painful stimulation applied to others relative to neutral stimulation in different temporal 
windows on the basis of the task at hand encompassing P2, N2, N3 and P3 ERP 
components. Experiment 1 built compelling and direct evidence of the relationship 
between early pre-P3 time-window, including P2, N2, N3, and mechanisms associated 
with experience sharing; and, by contrast, late time-window including the P3, which is 
instead associated with mechanisms underlying mentalizing. Critically, Fan and Han 
(2008) showed that the contextual reality of stimuli shapes electrophysiological 
empathic reaction by postponing it for cartooned stimuli relative to realistic stimuli. 
In the present experiments, I implemented a variant of the pain decision task in 
which participants, in each experimental trial, were first exposed to a face looking either 
trustworthy or untrustworthy, and following a short blank interval, a syringe or a Q-tip 
were displayed, indicating that a painful stimulation or a non-painful stimulation, 
respectively, was applied to the presented face in that trial. The temporal separation 
between the face stimuli and the painful/non-painful stimuli was decisive in order to 
allow participants to implicitly appraise faces as trustworthy or untrustworthy before the 
presentation of the painful/non-painful stimuli. Participants were instructed to decide 
whether each face was painfully or neutrally stimulated by imaging that the stimulation 
associated with the object (i.e., syringe or Q-tip) was applied to the presented face.  
Computerized faces with standardized facial features of trustworthiness were used 
in Experiment 4, whereas real and more ecologically valid faces, previously rated on the 
trustworthiness dimension, were used in Experiment 5. 
 
 
 
5.1 Experiments 4: Empathy for computerized trustworthy and untrustworthy 
individuals’ pain 
5.1.1 Method 
Participants.  
Seventeen volunteer students (4 males; mean age: 23.16 years, SD = 2.48; 2 left-
handed) participated in Experiment 4; all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and no history of neurological disorders; all gave their informed consent according to 
the ethical principles approved by the University of Padova. 
 
Stimuli  
It has been suggested that trustworthiness appraisal, in particular for those faces 
at the extremes of the trustworthiness dimension, approximates the detection of 
emotional facial expressions (e.g., Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). In order to avoid 
potential confounds between emotion and trustworthiness appraisals in driving 
modulatory effects on empathy,  similarly to Experiment 4, prior to the ERP experiment 
an independent student sample (N = 29; 6 males, mean age: 23.43 years, SD = 1.86) 
provided 7-step ratings of faces’ trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and 
emotional expression (happy vs. angry) of 110 neutral bald Caucasian males generated 
using FaceGen Modeller 3.2 (Singular Inversions, 2007; +/-2 and +/-3 SD from neutral, 
in the middle of the trustworthiness dimension) according to the methods described by 
Oosterhof and Todorov (2008). The resulting 12 most trustworthy and 12 most 
untrustworthy faces with a non-significant correlation with the emotion scale 
(consensus neutral expression p > .1) were selected as face stimuli for the pain decision 
task.  
 
Procedure 
Pain decision task. Participants performed a modified version of the pain decision 
task. Each trial began with a randomly variable fixation cross at the center of the 
computer screen (800-1600 ms in steps of 100 ms). A trustworthy or untrustworthy face 
and either a Q-tip or a syringe evocating a neutral or a painful stimulation respectively, 
were interleaved by a variable blank interval (800-1600 ms in steps of 100 ms) and 
presented for 250 ms. The different types of trials were randomly intermixed. 
Participants were instructed to decide, without speed pressure, whether each face was 
painfully or neutrally stimulated by imaging that the stimulation evocated by the object 
was applied to the presented face. An example of face stimuli and a schematic 
illustration of the procedure used in Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. a) Example of computerized Oosterhof and Todorov’s trustworthy and untrustworthy 
faces, analogous as those used in Experiment 4. b) Schematic illustration of the modified 
version of the pain decision task. The face and the tool associated with either painful or neutral 
stimulation have been temporally separated in order to allow implicit trustworthiness appraisal.  
 
Self-report questionnaires. Following the pain decision task, participants completed 
the Empathy Quotient (i.e., EQ) questionnaire developed by Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright (2004), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (i.e., IRI), which have been 
described in Chapter 1.  
EEG acquisition and analysis. The EEG was recorded during the pain decision task 
from 64 active electrodes placed on an elastic Acti-Cap referenced to the left earlobe. 
The EEG was re-referenced offline to the average of the left and right earlobes. 
Horizontal EOG (HEOG) was recorded bipolarly from electrodes positioned lateral to 
the outer canthi of both eyes. Vertical EOG (VEOG) was recorded bipolarly from two 
electrodes, one above (Fp1) and one below the left eye. The impedance was kept less 
than 10KΩ. EEG, HEOG and VEOG signals was amplified (pass band 0.1−80 Hz) and 
digitized at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. The EEG was filtered before being analyzed 
(pass band 0.5–40 Hz and notch 50 Hz) and segmented into 1000-ms epochs starting 
200 ms prior to the onset of the Q-tip/syringe. The epochs were baseline corrected based 
on the mean activity during the 200 ms prestimulus period, for each electrode site. 
Trials associated with incorrect responses or contaminated by large horizontal eye 
movements, eye blinks or other artifacts (exceeding ± 30μV, ± 60μV and ± 80μV 
respectively) were excluded from analysis. Following artifact rejection, separate 
average waveforms for each condition were generated time-locked to the Q-tip/syringe. 
Mean ERPs amplitude values were measured at pooled electrodes selected from the 
fronto-central (Fz, FCz, F1–F2, F3–F4, FC1–FC2, FC3–FC4), and centro-parietal (CPz, 
CP1–CP2, CP3–CP4, Pz, P1-P2, P3-P4) regions, in time windows of 400-500 ms and of 
300-500 ms. In all multi-factorial analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used 
where appropriate. 
Neural reaction to pain was calculated by subtracting mean amplitude values for 
neutral stimulation from those registered for painful stimulation. 
The standardized Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA) 
(Pascual-Marqui, 2002) was used for brain localization of the potential sources of ERP 
reactions to pain.  sLORETA extrapolates 3D statistical maps from EEG data of the 
possible sources of scalp-recorded ERP components.  Using sLORETA, 3D maps and 
stereotaxic information about current density source of neural activity modulated by the 
painful vs. non-painful manipulation were derived from the present EEG dataset. The 
analysis was conducted following the creation of a boundary element method (BEM) 
model, including cortical and skin, with about 5000 nodes from magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) data, the selection of a temporal window in which P3 ERP responses 
differentiated between painful and non-painful stimulations (i.e., P3 reactions to pain), 
and a location-wise inverse weighting from the Minimum Norm Least Square (MNLS) 
analysis with estimated variances. 
5.1.2 Results 
Pain decision task.  
Individual mean proportions of correct responses and reaction times (RTs) were 
submitted to a repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) considering stimulation 
condition (painful vs. non-painful) and trustworthiness (trustworthy faces vs. 
untrustworthy faces) as within-subjects factors. ANOVA carried out on mean 
proportions of correct responses did not show any significant effects (Fs < 1).  ANOVA 
carried out on reaction times showed a significant effect of the interaction F(1,16) = 
5.291, p = .035;  ηp
2
 = .249 indicating that participants were more responsive to the 
painful stimulation (414 ms) relative to the neutral stimulation (452 ms) applied to 
trustworthy faces (t(16) = -2.059, p = .056). 
EQ. Mean EQ score was similar to those found in the original study (Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright, 2004), i.e. 42.12 (SD = 6.43).  
IRI. Scores were computed by summing 1–7 scores to each item of the four 
subscales. Inter-individual mean rating scores were 3.61 (SD = 0.48) for the PT 
subscale, 3.4 (SD = 0.57) for the FS subscale, 3.71 (SD = 0.36) for the EC subscale, and 
2.91 (SD = 0.58) for the PD subscale. 
 
ERPs: P3 
Visual inspection of electrophysiological results shows effects on the P3 
compoenent. This is not surprising as the modified version of the pain decision task 
used in Experiment 4 needed imagination to be performed. Goldman and Jordan (2013) 
refer to imagination as a high-level process of mentalizing. Indeed, it specifically 
required participants to form an inner representation of the other’s pain. 
Figure 2a shows P3 waveforms time-locked to syringe/Q-tip elicited at fronto-
central and centro-parietal sites in painful and non-painful conditions and separately for 
trustworthy and untrustworthy faces. Statistical analyses on the fronto-central and 
centro-parietal P3 mean amplitude values were submitted to a 2 (stimulation: painful vs. 
non-painful) x 2 (trustworthiness: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy faces) repeated 
measures ANOVA as within-subjects factors. The centro-parietal P3 was larger for 
painful stimuli than non-painful stimuli, F(1, 16) = 20.685, p < .001; ηp
2
 > .564). Most 
importantly, ANOVAs showed significant interactions between stimulation and 
trustworthiness on both the fronto-central P3 (F(1, 16) = 16.397, p < .005; ηp
2
 > .506) 
and on the centro-parietal P3, F(1,16) = 8.007, p < .05; ηp
2
 > .334. Planned comparisons 
indicated that painful stimuli elicited a positive shift of the fronto-central P3 relative to 
non-painful stimuli only when applied to trustworthy faces (t(16) =, p < .05); this shift 
of the fronto-central P3 was absent when untrustworthy faces were painfully stimulated 
(t < 1).   
The results of sLORETA analysis revealed that the magnified P3 reaction to the 
pain of trustworthy individuals compared to the pain of untrustworthy individuals − i.e., 
[trustworthy faces (painful minus non-painful stimulation conditions)] minus 
[untrustworthy faces (painful minus non-painful stimulation conditions) − was mainly 
localized in the precuneus (peak Montreal Neurological Institute, i.e. MNI, coordinates: 
5, -55, 65) along with the superior temporal gyrus (peak MNI coordinates: 45, 25, -20), 
the middle temporal gyrus (peak MNI coordinates: 55, 10, -20), a portion of the inferior 
frontal gyrus (Brodmann Area, BA, 47; peak MNI coordinates: 40, 30, -20), the 
supramarginal gyrus (peak MNI coordinates:  -55, -45, 35) and the inferior parietal 
lobule (peak MNI coordinates: -55, -35, 35). Since almost all of these brain regions are 
involved in the attribution of mental states to others and intentional empathy (e.g., 
Amodio and Frith, 2006; de Greck, Wang, Yang, Wang, Northoff, and Han, 2012; Frith 
and Frith, 1999; Moriguchi, Ohnishi et al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Spiers & 
Maguire, 2006), these results suggest that participants devolved a larger amount of 
cognitive resources while mentalizing on the pain of trustworthy individuals compared 
to untrustworthy individuals (see Figure 2b).   
  
Figure 2. a) ERPs reactions to painful (i.e. grey lines) and neutral (i.e. black lines) for 
trustworthy (i.e. right panels) and untrustworthy (i.e. left panels) registered at pooled fronto-
central electrodes (i.e. upper panels) and at pooled centro-parietal electrodes (i.e. lower panels). 
b) Sources estimation of the selective response to the pain of trustworthy-looking individuals 
(compared to untrustworthy-looking individuals; i.e., trustworthy faces [painful minus non-
painful stimulation conditions] minus untrustworthy faces [painful minus non-painful 
stimulation conditions]). Precuneus (peak MNI coordinates: 5, -55, 65); STG = superior 
temporal gyrus (peak MNI coordinates: 45, 25, -20); MTG = middle temporal gyrus (peak MNI 
coordinates: 55, 10, -20); IFG = inferior frontal gyrus (peak MNI coordinates: 40, 30, -20); 
SMG = supramarginal gyrus (peak MNI coordinates:  -55, -45, 35); IPL = inferior parietal 
lobule (peak MNI coordinates: -55, -35, 35). 
 
I also computed pain reactions in the P3 time-window for both the fronto-central 
and the centro-parietal P3 by subtracting P3 mean amplitude values elicited in the non-
painful stimulation condition from P3 mean amplitude values elicited in the painful 
condition, separately for trustworthy faces and untrustworthy faces. No correlations 
have been registered with individual IRI subscale scores. By contrasts, the centro-
parietal P3 reactions to pain correlated with the EQ scores when trustworthy faces were 
presented, r = 5.28, p < .05. This correlation was also marginally significant for 
untrustworthy faces, r = 3.43, p = .089. These findings support the conclusion that the 
more pronounced P3 reaction to the pain of trustworthy individuals indexes indeed a 
magnified empathic response. Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of the correlation between 
individual EQ scores and P3 pain reactions (i.e., painful minus non-painful conditions) 
recorded at centro-parietal electrode sites towards trustworthy faces.  
 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot of the correlation between individual EQ scores and P3 pain reactions 
(i.e., painful minus non-painful conditions) towards trustworthy faces. 
 
5.1.3 Discussion 
P3 ERP reactions to the pain of individuals looking trustworthy recorded at fronto-
central and centro-parietal electrode sites were magnified relative to P3 reactions to the 
pain of individuals looking untrustworthy. Following previous studies using similar 
experimental paradigms (Avenanti et al., 2010; Decety et al., 2010; Fan & Han, 2008; 
Li & Han, 2010; Xu et al., 2009), I interpret these P3 reactions to pain as reflecting the 
engagement of empathy-related processes. The positive correlation between such P3 
ERP reactions recorded at centro-parietal electrode sites and the EQ scores can be taken 
as evidence compatible with this view. More specifically, and in line with results of 
Experiment 1 and of others scholars (e.g., Decety et al., 2010; Fan & Han, 2008), I 
suggest that the P3 reactions to pain primarily index mentalizing. Convergent with this 
interpretation, the likely source of the more pronounced P3 reaction to the pain of 
trustworthy (vs. untrustworthy) individuals was localized in the precuneus, a key region 
of the mentalizing network (e.g., Lamm et al., 2011; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009; 
Zaki & Ochsner, 2012) with a well-established critical role in social cognition tasks 
(e.g., Harris, Todorov & Fiske, 2005). 
  
5.2. Experiment 5: Empathy for trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals’ pain 
− real faces 
 
5.2.1 Method 
 
Participants 
Seventeen volunteers students (4 males; mean age: 22.35 years, SD = 3.04; 4 left 
handed) participated in Experiment 5; all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and no history of neurological disorders; all gave their informed consent according to 
the ethical principles approved by the University of Padova. 
  
Stimuli  
It has been underlined the importance of the naturalism in social neuroscience 
studies (Zaki & Ochsner, 2009). In order to investigate modulatory effects on empathy 
in a more ecological context, prior to the ERP experiment an independent students 
sample (N = 45; 6 males, mean age: 23.48 years, SD = 2.3) provided 7-step ratings of 
faces’ trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) of 50 real Caucasian faces with 
standardized neutral expression included in Eberhardt’s database. The resulting 10 most 
trustworthy and 10 most untrustworthy faces were selected as stimuli for the pain 
decision task.  
 
Figure 4. Example of real trustworthy and untrustworthy faces. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4. The only difference was that the 
backcolor of the screen was light gray instead of black. 
EQ. Following the pain decision task, participants completed the Empathy Quotient 
(i.e., EQ) questionnaire developed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), which has 
been described in Chapter 1.  
EEG acquisition and analysis. The EEG was recorded during the pain decision task 
with same parameters as those used for Experiment 4. The EEG was filtered before 
being analyzed (pass band 0.5–40 Hz and notch 50 Hz) and segmented into 1000-ms 
epochs starting 100 ms prior to the onset of the Q-tip/syringe The epochs were baseline 
corrected based on the mean activity during the 100 ms prestimulus period, for each 
electrode site. Trials associated with incorrect responses or contaminated by large 
horizontal eye movements, eye blinks or other artifacts (exceeding ± 30μV, ± 60μV and 
± 80μV respectively) were excluded from analysis. Following artifact rejection, separate 
average waveforms for each condition were generated time-locked to the Q-tip/syringe. 
Mean ERPs amplitude values were measured at the same fronto-central and centro-
parietal electrodes as in Experiment 4, in time-windows of 320–450 ms and 300–980 
ms. In all multi-factorial analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where 
appropriate. 
Neural reaction to pain was calculated by subtracting mean amplitude values for 
neutral stimulation from those registered for painful stimulation 
 
5.2.2 Results 
Pain decision task. Individual mean proportions of correct responses and reaction 
times were submitted to a repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) considering 
stimulation condition (painful vs. non-painful) and trustworthiness (trustworthy faces 
vs. untrustworthy faces) as within-subjects factors. ANOVAs on both accuracy and 
reaction times did not show significant main effects nor did interaction (all Fs < 1).  
EQ. Mean EQ score was similar to those found in the original study (Baron-Cohen 
& Wheelwright, 2004), i.e. 48.65 (SD = 10.75).  
ERPs.  
Visual inspection of electrophysiological results shows effects in an earlier time-
window (i.e., N2-N3 time-range) relative to those observed in Experiment 4, although it 
is sustained until the P3 component time-range. This is might be due to the naturalism 
of the stimuli used. 
Figure 4 shows N2-N3 and P3 waveforms time-locked to syringe/Q-tip elicited at 
fronto-central and centro-parietal sites in painful and non-painful conditions and 
separately for trustworthy and untrustworthy faces. Statistical analysis on the front-
central and centro-parietal ERPs mean amplitude values were submitted to a 2 
(stimulation: painful vs. non-painful) x 2 (trustworthiness: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy 
faces) repeated measures ANOVA as within-subject factors for both the N2-N3 activity 
(320-450 ms) and the P3 (300-980 ms) for fronto-central and centro-parietal pooled 
electrodes, separately. 
N2-N3. The fronto-central N2-N3 activity showed a positive shift for painful 
compared to non-painful stimuli selective for trustworthy faces: the interaction between 
stimulation and trustworthiness was significant, F(1,16) = 11.285, p <.005; ηp
2
= .414. 
Post-hoc analysis showed significant comparison between painful and non-painful 
stimuli for trustworthy faces (t (16) = 3.071 p = .007) but not for untrustworthy faces (t 
< 1).  
The centro-parietal N2-N3 activity was larger for painful (4.793 μV) relative to 
neutral (3.580 μV) stimulation as indicated by the main effect of stimulation F(1,16) = 
17.743, p = .001; ηp
2
= .526. Most importantly, the ANOVA showed significant 
interaction between stimulation and trustworthiness, F(1,16) = 6.338, p = .023; ηp
2
= 
0.284. Post-hoc analysis indicated that painful stimulation elicited a positive shift of the 
centro-parietal N2-N3 relative to non-painful stimuli only participants were required to 
imagine that they were applied to trustworthy faces (t(16) = 4.215, p = .001); this shift 
of the centro-parietal N2-N3 was absent for untrustworthy (t (16) = 1.823 p = .087).   
P3. The fronto-central P3 was more positive for painful (-0.722 μV) relative to 
neutral (-1.090 μV) stimulation as indicated by the main effect of stimulation F(1,16) = 
4.570 p < .05; ηp
2
= .222.   
The centro-parietal P3 was more positive for painful (2.245 μV) relative to neutral 
(1.448 μV) stimulation as indicated by the main effect of stimulation F(1,16) = 18.116 p 
= .001; ηp
2
= .531. Most importantly, the ANOVA showed a significant interaction 
between stimulation and trustworthiness, F(1,16) = 5.335, p = .035, ηp
2
= 0.250. Post-
hoc analyses indicated that painful stimulation elicited a positive shift of both the 
fronto-central and the centro-parietal P3 relative to non-painful stimuli only when 
applied to trustworthy faces (min t(16) = 2.328, max p = .033); this shift was absent for 
untrustworthy faces (max t(16) = 1.566, min p = .135).  
 
 
Figure 4. ERPs reactions to painful (i.e. grey lines) and neutral (i.e. black lines) for trustworthy 
(i.e. right panels) and untrustworthy (i.e. left panels) registered at pooled fronto-central 
electrodes (i.e. upper panels) and at pooled centro-parietal electrodes (i.e. lower panels). 
 Crucially, the reaction to the pain of real trustworthy individuals was shifted in an 
earlier temporal window compared to that observed in Experiment 4.  
I also computed pain reactions in the N2-N3 and the P3 time-windows for both the 
fronto-central and the centro-parietal ERPs by subtracting ERPs mean amplitude values 
elicited in the non-painful stimulation condition from ERPs mean amplitude values 
elicited in the painful condition, separately for trustworthy faces and untrustworthy 
faces. No correlations have been registered with individual EQ scores. By contrasts, 
either the fronto-central and the centro-parietal N2-N3 reaction to pain positively 
correlated with both the Perspective Taking (i.e., PT; r = .496, p = .021 at fronto-central 
sites; r = .586, p = .007 at centro-parietal sites) and the Empathic Concern (i.e., EC; r = 
.539, p = .013 at fronto-central sites; r = .551, p = .011 at centro-parietal sites) subscale 
scores of the IRI when untrustworthy faces were presented, see Figure 5. 
 
 Figure 5. Scatterplot of the correlation between individual Perspective Taking and Empathic 
Concern subscale scores and N2-N3 pain reactions (i.e., painful minus non-painful conditions) 
towards untrustworthy faces recorded at fronto-central and at centro-parietal pooled electrode 
sites, separately. 
 
Although such correlation was observed only for untrustworthy faces’ pain but was 
not significant for trustworthy faces’ pain, it further strengthens the association between 
the N2-N3 differential activity and an empathic reaction to others’ pain. Interestingly, 
the Pt and the Ec subscales are related to the two subprocesses of empathy, i.e. 
mentalizing and experience sharing, respectively. This is in not surprising as the 
specific version of the pain decision task and the ecological validity of the stimuli have 
been used in the present experiment. Indeed, the experimental paradigm specifically 
required participants to imagine that either a painful or neutral stimulation was applied 
to the presented face. At one hand, similarly to Experiment 4, it engages necessarily 
mentalizing mechanisms. On the other hand, in line with Zaki and Ochsner’s 
observations (2009) about the necessity of ecological validity in social cognition, real 
faces might involve, relative to computerized faces, more automatic and affective 
processes, and so partly engaging also experience sharing mechanisms.  
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
N2-N3 and P3 ERP reactions to pain were magnified relative to P3 reactions to the 
pain of individuals looking untrustworthy. Following Experiment 4, I interpret these 
ERP reactions to pain as reflecting the engagement of empathy-related processes. 
Noteworthy, relative to results of Experiment 4, this reaction to pain was observed in an 
earlier temporal window that, in line with the results of Experiment 1 and other scholars 
(e.g., Decety et al., 2010; Fan & Han, 2008), reflects the engagement of experience 
sharing. Importantly, neural reaction to pain positively correlated  with individual 
empathy traits, supporting its functional meaning as related to empathy.   
5.3 General Discussion 
Both computerized and real trustworthy faces elicited magnified neural responses to 
pain when compared to untrustworthy faces as observed on both the P3 (Experiment 4) 
and the N2-N3 and the P3 (Experiment 5). I interpreted these ERP reactions to pain as 
reflecting the engagement of empathy-related processes. The correlations between P3 
and N2-N3 ERP reactions recorded and the EQ scores can be taken as evidence 
compatible with this view. 
At least in Experiment 4, the likely neural source of the P3 empathic reaction to 
pain was the precuneus, a key region of the mentalizing system. These findings dovetail 
nicely with previous evidence showing that the precuneus is activated when adopting 
the perspective of another person to imagine/understand his or her emotional reactions 
or pain (Ruby & Decety, 2004; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006) or when perceiving 
faces of significant others (Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago, & Haxby, 2004). 
Furthermore, greater activity in the precuneus (along with medial prefrontal cortex, 
bilateral temporo-parietal junction and posterior cingulate cortex) has been observed 
when members of the ingroup were presented in conditions of emotional pain compared 
to when members of the outgroup were presented in similar painful conditions (Cheon, 
Im, Harada, Kim, Mathur, Scimeca, Parrish, Park, & Chiao, 2011) leading to the 
fascinating hypothesis that trustworthy individuals are perceived as more proximate to 
oneself. Complementary evidence to this proposal is offered by an fMRI study that 
investigated differences in individuals’ judgments on physical similarity to the self of 
morphs created by mixing the self-face with novel trustworthy or untrustworthy faces 
(Verosky & Todorov, 2010). Notably, Verosky and Todorov reported that participants 
were more likely to identify the morphs with trustworthy faces as looking like the self, 
compared to morphs with untrustworthy faces. In addition, activity in several brain 
regions differentiated between the self and untrustworthy faces to a much greater extent 
than between the self and trustworthy faces. Although the following may be considered 
just a speculation, these findings might support the view that magnified P3 reactions 
observed in the present study to the pain of individuals looking trustworthy (compared 
to the pain of individuals looking untrustworthy) originated from the fast implicit 
appraisal of these individuals as more closely linked to the self. If this interpretation is 
correct, greater empathic responses towards individuals looking trustworthy (vs. 
individuals looking untrustworthy) are analogous to the greater empathic responses 
previously observed towards members of the ingroup (vs. members of the outgroup) and 
individuals in close affective relationships (vs. strangers). 
Remarkably, results of Experiment 4 with computerized faces have been replicated 
with ecologically valid real faces consensually looking as either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy (Experiment 5). Indeed, neural reactions to pain observed in real faces 
have been observed in an earlier time-window, pre-P3, that is related to mechanisms 
underlying experience sharing, as demonstrated, for instance, in Experiment 1. 
That is, the naturalism of the stimuli affected empathy in a different fashion. 
Computerized faces induced magnified P3 reaction to pain, involving mentalizing 
mechanisms, whereas real faces induced magnified reaction to pain also in an earlier 
time-window pre-P3, namely in the N2-N3 time-window, involving experience sharing 
mechanisms. Consistently with these findings, Fan and Han (2008) presented 
participants with either realistic or cartooned hands (i.e., one or two hands) that could be 
either painfully or neutrally stimulated. Participants underwent in the same experimental 
session both a pain decision task and a counting task
16
. Results showed that cartoons 
elicited a later ERP reaction to pain relative to real stimuli, indicating that the contextual 
reality of stimuli postponed the early empathic processing of pain.  
Consistently with this view, Zaki and Ochsner (2009) highlighted that realistic 
social contexts might shape in an unpredictable way brain activity deployed to perform 
the experimental task because it involves multimodal information that need to be 
dynamically integrated by perceivers. The results of the Experiment 5 are in line with 
those of Spunt and Lieberman (2011), who suggested that the connection between 
mirror and mentalizing that they found in support of an integrative model of empathy, 
might have been conveyed by the naturalism of their stimuli.  
In conclusion, I observed decreased empathy-related neural responses toward 
untrustworthy-looking individuals compared to trustworthy-looking individuals − likely 
related to reduced activation of brain regions previously associated with mentalizing 
and intentional empathy − providing, to my knowledge, the first proof that empathy 
may be shaped by first impressions of others. Although this sensitivity of empathy to 
others’ physical features may be adaptive in a variety of social contexts, especially 
                                                          
16
 The counting task required participants to say the number of hands presented: either one or two. 
when considering its established reliability (e.g., Kogan et al., 2011; Stirrat & Perrett, 
2010), the present findings may be of particular importance in other delicate contexts 
where looking untrustworthy may be detrimental, such as legal processes or care-giving. 
Importantly, in this last context, for instance, it has been recognized that showing 
empathy to patients, whatever their physical appearance, can improve care (Canadian 
Medical Association Journal, 2011).  
  
  
 
Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The present thesis described a series of five ERP experiments aimed at exploring 
the multifaceted nature of empathy (Chapter 2; Experiment 1) and the variance in 
empathic processes, as a function of others’ race (Chapter 3; Experiment 2) and others’ 
perceived trustworthiness (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5; Experiment 3, 4 and 5) of a face, 
addressed through classical and modified versions of the pain decision task. 
Dissecting multifaceted empathy. In Experiment 1, I directly tested the hypothesis 
according to which the existing evidence of an anatomical dissociation between 
experience sharing and mentalizing is followed by complementing functional 
dissociation, or rather interaction, in the temporal domain. That was the first aim of the 
present studies. To address this issue, I implemented a novel version of the pain 
decision task in which both sensorimotor (picture of a face with either painful or neutral 
expression) and contextual cue (a sentence describing either a painful or neutral context) 
were presented. 
One of the pitfalls of research on empathy concerns the oversimplification of 
stimuli. Of course, it has been necessary to isolate as much as possible elements that 
could enhance only one of the subprocesses of empathy in order to build rigorous 
knowledge about the basic structure of empathy. But consequently, at present, 
compelling scientific, yet epistemological, evidence either supporting or rejecting an 
integrative model of empathy is still under examination. In an attempt to make a step 
forward in this direction, the concurrent presence of both types of cues was necessary in 
order to uncover the specific contribution of each cue and to allow the observation of an 
interaction between them, if present. Fan and Han (2008) provided the first suggestion 
that there is a family of ERP components that are modulated by bottom-up mechanisms 
in an early time window pre-P3, including P2, N2 and N3; and a later time-window, 
including the P3 component that is modulated by top-down mechanisms. 
In line with this first evidence, the results of Experiment 1 showed that experience 
sharing and mentalizing are, to a large extent, dissociable mechanisms.  
In the time-window including the P2 and the N2-N3 the perceptual cue selectively 
activated mechanisms underlying the experience sharing; in the immediately following 
time-window, which includes the P3, the contextual cue selectively activated 
mechanisms underlying the mentalizing. In support of such view, empathic reaction to 
pain registered in these time-windows have been associated with empathic abilities 
underlying experience sharing, the earlier, and mentalizing, the latter. 
However, an intermediate time-window between N2-N3 activity and the P3 peak, 
was sensitive to both sensorimotor and contextual cues. Crucially, the concurrent 
presence of pain of both sensorimotor and contextual cues did not magnify empathic 
reaction to pain, it is rather the result of the contribute of the pain of only one of the 
cues. This might be an index of an unspecific response, probably not strictly empathy-
related that mediates the transfer of information between the two subprocesses. Of 
course, future studies should investigate more directly such hypothesis. 
Through the temporal deployment of electrophysiological reaction to pain, I 
highlighted how the subprocesses functionally contribute at any given time by 
dissecting empathy into two time-windows, one earlier, pre-P3 associated with 
mechanisms underlying experience sharing, and one later, that includes the P3 
component, associated with cognitive mentalizing.  
In the light of this new evidence, I explored the second aim of the present studies: 
Variance in neural empathic response to pain as function of race and perceived 
trustworthiness of a face. 
Variance in empathic processes: Race. Complementing existing literature (e.g., 
Avenanti et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2009), I demonstrated with Experiment 2 that whereas 
experience sharing is modulated by race, mentalizing is not affected by it. 
Neuroscientific studies suggested that people are more naturally empathic towards own-
race individuals relative to other-race individuals (e.g., Xu et al., 2009) and that this 
empathic bias is dependent on individual differences in implicit racial prejudice 
(Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al., 2012; Forgiarini et al., 2011). Noteworthy, the 
neuroscientific technique involved in these previous studies, e.g. fMRI and TMS, are 
suboptimal to clearly define whether this bias is related to all empathic processes or 
rather to an empathy subprocess. By virtue of the excellent temporal resolution of the 
ERPs, I explored the time-course of the empathic response to pain in White participants, 
which were exposed to own- and other-race faces either penetrated by a needle or 
touched by a Q-tip.  
Results revealed that implicit racial bias is confined to experience sharing but 
empathic response towards other-race pain is observable in a later time-window linked 
to mentalizing. 
Specifically, I observed a positive shift in the N2-N3 time range when White 
participants were exposed to White individuals in a painful condition but not when 
Black individuals were in in a painful condition. sLORETA identified the IFG (BA 45) 
as the neural source of this empathic reaction. This region of the IFG is known to be a 
core region of the putative mirror neuron system; a large body of evidence indicates that 
it is involved in the recognition of others’ emotions (e.g., Chakrabarti, Bullmore,   
Baron-Cohen, 2006; Fr hholz   Grandjean, 2012) and similarly to the ACC, it concurs 
to the experience sharing component of empathy (e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 2006; 
Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009).  In addition, this difference was 
associated with individual EC scores of the IRI. 
Furthermore, I observed an empathic reaction in the time-window including the P3 
component. Notably, it was of comparable size between own- and other-race faces. 
Nevertheless, source localization of this later ERP response provided different source 
estimates indicating that empathic response to own- and other-race pain were 
qualitatively different. That is, the left TPJ (BA 40; involved in in self/other distinctions 
and autobiographical memories, Frith & Frith, 2001) was estimated as the neural source 
of the P3 empathic reaction to other-race pain; the left MFG (BA 9; involved in 
mentalizing; Spiers & Maguire, 2006) was estimated as the neural source for the 
reaction to own-race pain. 
In this study only a weak association has been found with implicit racial prejudice 
(i.e., the empathic reaction to own-race faces was magnified for higher pro-White 
attitude, as measured by the IAT). Indeed, whereas implicit racial prejudice has been 
shown to be directly associated with the corticospinal inhibition (Avenanti et al., 2010), 
the SCR (Forgiarini et al., 2012) and brain areas involved in experience sharing 
(Azevedo et al., 2012), it did not affect scalp electrical activity (i.e. see also Sheng & 
Han, 2012) or at least not pervasively (Experiment 2). Mathur and collegues (Mathur, 
Harada, Lipke & Chiao, 2010) showed that the implicit racial prejudice was not 
associated with brain areas involved in cognitive empathy, other studies did not even 
measured it (e.g. Cheon et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2009). I propose that the interplay 
between cross-racial empathy for pain and implicit racial prejudice has not been 
exhaustively disclosed. Thus, social psychology reports that the implicit racial bias can 
be expressed in terms of prejudice and stereotype, which are related to either affective 
or semantic/cognitive mechanisms, respectively (Amodio & Ratner, 2011). 
Furthermore, prejudice and stereotype can be measured separately and independently by 
two different types of IAT, which have been specifically implemented and validated to 
measure either the prejudice and the stereotype (Amodio & Devine, 2006). In all the 
described studies investigating cross-racial empathy for pain, only the prejudice race-
IAT has been measured. This observation opens new theoretically relevant scenarios. 
For instance, semantic integration starts early in processing, within 200 ms post-
stimulus onset (e.g. Penolazzi, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2007) and can be observed in a 
quite wide time-ranges, from the N400 (e.g., semantic violation-related ERP 
component; e.g. Kutas & Hillyard, 1983) to the P600 (e.g. van Herten, Kolk, & Chwilla, 
2005). It has recently been shown that semantic relations between words can modulate 
an earlier ERP component, namely the N2pc, which is a lateralized component, 
recorded at posterior electrode sites, which reflects attentional suppression of distractors 
stimuli during target(s) processing (e.g. Luck & Hillyard, 1994; Dell’Acqua, Sessa, 
Toffanin, Luria & Jolicoeur, 2010), or the enhancement of target(s) processing among 
distractors (Eimer, 1996). A semantic relationship between target and distractors 
reduces the amplitude of the N2pc starting at 170-180 ms post-stimulus onset 
(Dell’Acqua, Pesciarelli, Jolicoeur, Eimer & Peressotti, 2007). This finding provided 
evidence that cognitive effects such those related to semantic associations, can trigger 
very early modulations measurable online by using ERPs. On the basis of these 
considerations, it is worthwhile wondering whether either earlier or later scalp electrical 
activity as well as fMRI signal can be modulated directly by semantic associations with 
racial stereotype (assessed through the stereotype-IAT; Amodio & Devine, 2006) 
clarifying whether or not individual differences in implicit racial bias can be associated, 
to some extent, with empathic reaction to other-race pain.  
Indeed, when an observer is exposed to a face of a different race, this immediately 
influences observer’s physiological responses, likely mediated by the activity of the 
amygdala, which conveys very fast responses. For instance, when White participants are 
exposed to pictures of Black people, they show differences in muscular activity, skin 
conductance, startle-eyeblink, cardiovascular response (see Eberhardt, 2005 for a 
review), and ERPs associated not only to VWM resolution but also to the perception 
(Ofan, Rubin & Amodio, 2011) and attention (Amodio, 2010; Dickter & Bartholow, 
2007; Ito & Urland, 2003). Interestingly, Sessa et al., (2012) conducted an ERP 
experiment that provided evidence of a link between the resolution of visual 
representations of other-race faces in VWM − as reflected by the Sustained Posterior 
Contralateral Negativity (i.e., SPCN) − and participants’ implicit racial prejudice 
assessed through the prejudice-race IAT (i.e., the standard-race IAT), such that higher 
prejudiced participants encoded in VWM lower-resolution representations of other-race 
faces. This evidence suggests that, although more sensitive to individual differences of 
implicit racial prejudice, VWM representations of own- and other-race faces are 
maintained with different resolutions so that race influences VWM.. Experiment 2 
showed that similarly, race influences also higher order cognitive processes, such as 
those implied in social interaction, namely empathy to others’ pain. 
Variance in empathic processes: Trustworthiness. Although implicitly 
appraised, race of a face is processed quickly and automatically, driven by physical 
facial features. Recently it has been demonstrated that facial trustworthiness is appraised 
at first sight in a fraction of second (Willis and Todorov, 2006), similarly to race, at 
least when explicitly requested. In Experiment 3 I tested the trustworthiness evaluation 
by using standardized trustworthy and untrustworthy faces such as Oosterhof and 
Todorov’s computerized 2D models, to address whether physical facial features of 
trustworthiness are automatically represented in VWM even when irrelevant for the 
task. Such a finding would strengthen the relevance of trustworthiness dimension in the 
first impression people form when encountering strangers. 
To this aim, I adopted the change detection task, which has been specifically 
designed to test VWM representations. In this task, participants are usually required to 
memorize the identity of the face presented in the visual hemifield previously cued by 
an arrow and to ignore the one presented in the non-cued hemifield; after a brief blank 
interval, the faces were presented again and participants were required to say whether 
the test and the memorized faces were identical or not (see Sessa et al., 2010 for similar 
paradigm). I monitored the SPCN, which is an electrophysiological marker of the 
quantity (e.g. Vogel and Machizawa, 2004), the quality (e.g. Luria et al., 2010) and the 
resolution (e.g. Sessa et al., 2011) of visual information maintained in memory at any 
given moment during the retention interval, when the visual information is held in 
memory and before a response is required. SPCN mean amplitudes showed that 
trustworthiness is extracted from faces, even when task-irrelevant, modulating VWM 
representations of faces such as trustworthy faces are represented with greater resolution 
relative to untrustworthy faces. Interestingly, this evidence depends on individual 
differences of participants’ general and social anxiety. This result suggests that although 
conveyed in a bottom-up manner, physical facial features of trustworthiness can also be 
subjective to individual differences in valence attribution/interpretation. Most 
importantly, trustworthiness is appraised even implicitly, indexing that it is a very 
relevant dimension. In Experiment 3 I demonstrated that perceived trustworthiness 
shapes VWM representations of faces even under conditions in which trustworthiness is 
task-irrelevant. This evidence may suggest that perceived trustworthiness may modulate 
in an automatic fashion a variety of psychological processes, including empathy. 
Indeed, I in Experiments 4 and 5 I investigated the impact of implicitly perceived 
trustworthiness on empathy. It is well known that empathy may be modulated by social 
and affective relations between individuals. People tend to be more empathetic toward 
similar others − for instance in terms of group membership (see Bufalari & Ionta, 2013; 
Eres & Molenberghs, 2013) – as it has been shown, for instance in Experiment 2, with 
race. In this vein, neural responses associated with empathy are shaped by learned 
preferences and appraisal of others’ social behaviour, such as social fairness. The issue 
addressed in Chapter 5 (Experiment 4 and 5) was whether empathy could be modulated 
even by the first impression people form of others, when information about social 
behaviour and personality traits is lacking.  
I implemented a modified version of the pain decision task in which I presented 
participants with computerized (Experiment 4) and real (Experiment 5) trustworthy- and 
untrustworthy-looking faces associated with either a painful or neutral stimulation. The 
change in the pain decision task used in these two experiments consisted of the temporal 
separation between the face and the object evoking the painful (i.e. the needle of a 
syringe) or the neutral (i.e. the Q-tip) stimulation. This separation was essential to allow 
participants to implicitly appraise trustworthiness. Results of both Experiments 4 and 5 
showed that perceived trustworthiness modulates empathy for pain. Trustworthy-
looking faces induced in the observers magnified empathic responses relative to 
untrustworthy-looking faces, similarly to individuals known to be fair/unfair (Singer et 
al., 2006). 
Interestingly, the naturalism of the stimuli affected empathy in a different fashion. 
Computerized faces induced magnified P3 reaction to pain, involving mentalizing 
mechanisms, whereas real faces induced magnified reaction to pain also in an earlier 
time-window pre-P3, namely in the N2-N3 time-window, involving experience sharing 
mechanisms. Consistently with these findings, Fan and Han (2008) demonstrated that 
cartoons relative to real stimuli elicit postponed empathic reaction to others’ pain.  In 
this vein, Zaki and Ochsner (2009) highlighted that realistic social contexts imply the 
dynamic integration of multimodal information that might shape brain activity in an 
unpredictable way while performing particular experimental tasks. Taken together, Fan 
and Han’s study and the results of the Experiments 4 and 5 (i.e. with computerized and 
real faces, respectively) suggest that such integration involves experience sharing 
mechanisms that might need automaticity. Indeed, as Spunt and Lieberman (2011) 
suggest, naturalism of the stimuli likely acts as a connection, not an interaction, between 
mirror and mentalizing.  
 
6.1 Is neural activity specific for empathy? 
A critical aspect of studies on empathy towards others’ pain is whether the reaction 
observed, at least the electrophysiological reaction, to pain is empathy-specific. 
Noteworthy, that has never been demonstrated. In fact, empathy is a 
multicomponential process and cognitive sub-mechanisms might occur. That would 
qualify the reaction to pain as a general activity elicited in some affective context. 
Indeed, pain decision task procedure might involve overlapping mechanisms with those 
underlying an affective priming task where the interval between the face and the object 
is equal to zero as the case of Experiment 2, or in the context of the Experiments 4 and 
5, is variable between 800 and 1600 ms. The affective priming is that effect occurring in 
a paradigm where two kinds of stimuli are presented sequentially and interleaved by a 
blank screen. The first stimulus (i.e., the prime) can either facilitate or inhibit 
participants’ performance required on the second stimulus (i.e., the target). 
Behaviorally, faster reaction times and better accuracy in congruent trials (i.e., when the 
prime and the target have both either positive or negative valence) when compared with 
incongruent trials are classically observed. Although electrophysiological studies of 
affective priming have demonstrated that affective incongruency is reflected on larger 
N400 (e.g., Aguado, Dieguez-Risco, Méndez-Bértolo, Pozo, & Hinojosa, 2013; Eder, 
Leuthold, Rothermund, & Schweinberger, 2011) the findings of the current research 
might still be related to affective priming effect such as a negative shift of the the P300 
for incongruent trials (e.g., untrustworthy faces with the Q-tip). That needs to be tested 
directly.  
To rule out the possibility that previous findings of Experiment 4 and 5 were not 
specific to empathic reactions to pain, we administered some participants with an 
affective priming task. Previous findings have shown that the affective priming effect 
decays within 300 ms between the prime and target onsets (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; 
Klauer & Musch, 2003). In line with this evidence, I conducted a control experiment in 
which the principal manipulation was the inter-stimulus interval (i.e., ISI) duration. I 
manipulated the ISI such that in one condition (i.e. short ISI) it was compatible with an 
affective priming paradigm and in in the other condition (i.e., long ISI) it was the exact 
mean of the variable ISI used for Experiments 4 and 5. I specifically focused on these 
last experiments to build this control because of the temporal separation between the 
face and the object that might have magnified possible underlying mechanisms of 
affective priming, less observable with pictures where the face was directly stimulated. 
I would please the reader to see details of the sixth experiment, reported in 
Appendix 2.  
Results of the Experiment 6 showed first of all no behavioral effects, so that I 
cannot directly conclude that the experimental manipulation did not succeed in eliciting 
an affective priming because of the fact that statistical non-significant effect is not 
informative per se. Most importantly, the main effect of the ISI was the only significant 
result of this experiment with larger centro-parietal P3 in long ISI condition (7.829 μV) 
relative to short ISI condition (4.506 μV). Most importantly there is no effect of 
trustworthiness, indicating that the mere presence of a face either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy does not affect the neural response on the object as evidence that no 
affective congruency is observed in the studies on empathy described in the present 
thesis.  
 
6.2 So, what is empathy? 
Edith Stein defined empathy in the early years of the 20
th
 century as that ability of 
realizing: “empathy is a sui generis intentional state that reveals to us persons and their 
experiences”; she insisted on the immediacy of empathy as “read in another’s face”, 
further she distinguished it from “knowing another’s experience through inference or 
projecting one’s experience into them” (see Stein, 1964: 10). 
This philosophic concept might be considered an early line of reasoning about what 
at present is known as simulation theory (ST), which is encompassed in the Theory of 
Mind
17
. As opposed to theory theory (TT), ST states that people understand others’ 
mental states by taking the other perspective and using one’s own experience and 
resources to simulate the other’s mind. According to ST one can understand the other’s 
mind because it is as if the other would be the self. Goldman and Jordan (2013), 
endorsing ST, proposed a bi-level model of mindreading according to which low- and 
high-level simulational processes are distinguished. Whereas low-level simulational 
processes trace mirror neuron system account, high-level processes encompass 
imagination. 
Goldman and Jordan (2013) suggest that through imagination people recreate the 
feeling of a state and hold it in mind to simulate it, to feel like real first-hand 
                                                          
17
 The theory according to which people attribute mental states to oneself and to the others and 
understand that the others might have mental states different from one’s own. The Theory of Mind 
(ToM) encompasses two main accounts: The Theory Theory (TT), which is the predominant theory and 
states that our understanding of others’ mind is possible through the development of a “commonsens” 
along the lifetime that allow people to predict others’ behavior; and the Simulation Theory (ST). 
experience, and so understanding the other’s perspective. Imagining is a real-like 
experience through which simulation is possible. According to the authors, indeed, 
mindreading needs “shared representation” and imagination is the gate. 
In the light of the studies described in the present thesis, what I think of empathy 
might be endorsed in Goldman and Jordan’s view. Empathy is indeed, first of all, that 
specific ability that allows people to use inner experience to grasp, with large degree of 
certainty, other’s inner state and so allowing to react properly in the emerging 
interaction. 
Results of Experiment 1 might be refined in the light of Goldman and Jordan’s 
account. The sensorimotor cue triggered simulation per se, i.e. mechanisms more 
automatic of neural resonance, the contextual cue triggered simulation through 
imagination. However, the presence of both cues did not magnify empathic reaction, 
suggesting that people process the available information but exploit only the necessary 
to react properly, quickly and parsimoniously. Further there is an intermediate time-
window in which unspecific response that might act as a transfer from experience 
sharing to mentalizing is observable. An alternative view might proposes that 
intermediate time-window as temporal overlapping between the two subprocesses that 
can share mechanisms due to the specific context or task requirements. This needs to be 
further investigated by future research. 
So experience sharing and mentalizing are functionally dissociable through the 
selective engagement of one or the other in response to specific cues. 
Computerized faces used in Experiment 4 and the specific experimental design 
totally suppressed the empathic response in the experience sharing time-window, 
whereas the presence of more ecologically valid stimuli, as those used in Experiment 2 
and 5, restored such response.  
On the basis of the results of the presented studies, I conclude that the more people 
need to imagine the other’s state, the more mentalizing is selectively engaged; the more 
visual information is available, the lesser people need to imagine the other’s state and 
concurrently the more neural resonance is involved that in turns activates experience 
sharing (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the proposed model of empathy. 
 
  
Appendix 1 
EQ. Italian version. 
Istruzioni 
1. Inserire nome (facoltativo). 
2. Inserire genere. 
3. Leggere attentamente le 60 affermazioni e marcare la casella inerente alla risposta 
prescelta (non piu’ di una ad affermazione). 
 
 
Nome e cognome: 
O Uomo 
O Donna 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
D’ACCORDO 
PARZIALMENT
E D’ACCORDO 
LEGGERMENTE 
IN DISACCORDO 
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
CONTRARIO 
1.  Capisco con facilità se 
qualcuno vuole partecipare ad 
una conversazione. 
    
2.  Preferisco gli animali agli 
esseri umani. 
    
3.  Provo a seguire le nuove 
mode e le nuove tendenze. 
    
4.  Quando un concetto per 
me facilmente intuibile non 
viene compreso alla prima 
spiegazione, ho difficoltà a 
rispiegarlo. 
    
5.  Sogno la maggior parte 
delle notti. 
    
6. Prendermi cura degli altri è 
qualcosa che mi fa veramente 
piacere. 
    
  
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
D’ACCORDO 
PARZIALMENT
E D’ACCORDO 
LEGGERMENTE 
IN DISACCORDO 
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
CONTRARIO 
7.  Provo a risolvere da solo i 
miei problemi piuttosto che 
discuterne con gli altri. 
 
    
8.  Trovo difficile capire come 
comportarmi in mezzo alla 
gente. 
   
 
 
 
9.  Sono al massimo della mia 
forma nelle prime ore della 
giornata. 
    
10. La gente mi dice spesso 
che insisto troppo sui miei 
argomenti. 
    
11. Non mi preoccupa più di 
tanto essere in ritardo ad un 
appuntamento con un amico. 
 
    
12. Mi tengo lontano da 
amicizie e relazioni sociali, dal 
momento che ritengo siano 
troppo difficili da curare. 
 
    
13. Non infrangerei mai una 
legge, seppur minima.  
    
14. Spesso ho difficoltà nel 
distinguere le buone dalle 
cattive maniere. 
 
    
15. In una conversazione 
tendo ad incentrare il mio 
discorso sul mio modo di 
pensare piuttosto che su 
quello degli altri. 
 
    
16. Preferisco gli scherzi all’ 
ironia. 
    
17. Preferisco vivere il 
presente piuttosto che 
pensare al futuro. 
    
18. Quando ero bambino/a mi 
divertivo a sezionare i vermi 
per vedere cosa succedeva. 
 
    
19. Riesco facilmente a capire 
se qualcuno dice una cosa ma 
ne intende un’ altra 
    
  
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
D’ACCORDO 
PARZIALMENT
E D’ACCORDO 
LEGGERMENTE 
IN DISACCORDO 
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
CONTRARIO 
20. Sono molto moralista     
21. Non capisco perché la 
gente si offende tanto per 
certe cose. 
    
22. Riesco facilmente a 
mettermi nei panni degli altri. 
    
23. Penso che le buone 
maniere siano la cosa più 
importante che un genitore 
possa insegnare al proprio 
figlio. 
    
24. Mi piace agire d’istinto.     
25. Sono bravo/a a prevedere 
i sentimenti degli altri. 
    
26. Mi accorgo subito se 
qualcuno in un gruppo è a 
disagio o imbarazzato. 
    
27. Se ciò che dico offende 
qualcuno, penso che non sia 
un mio problema ma di chi si 
sente offeso. 
    
28. Se qualcuno mi chiede un 
parere sul suo nuovo taglio di 
capelli rispondo sinceramente 
anche se non mi piace. 
    
29. Non riesco sempre a 
capire perché qualcuno 
potrebbe sentirsi offeso da 
certe affermazioni. 
    
30. La gente mi dice spesso 
che sono totalmente 
imprevedibile. 
    
31. Amo stare al centro delle 
attenzioni nelle situazioni di 
gruppo. 
    
32. Vedere qualcuno piangere 
non mi turba più di tanto. 
    
  
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
D’ACCORDO 
PARZIALMENT
E D’ACCORDO 
LEGGERMENTE 
IN DISACCORDO 
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
CONTRARIO 
33. Mi piace discutere di 
politica. 
    
34. Il mio essere diretto viene 
spesso interpretato come 
scortesia anche se non è 
questa la mia intenzione. 
    
35. Non mi confondo nelle 
situazioni formali. 
    
36. La gente mi dice che sono 
bravo/a a capire ciò che sente 
e pensa. 
    
37. Quando parlo con la gente 
tendo più a discutere delle 
loro esperienze che delle mie. 
    
38. Mi turba veder soffrire un 
animale. 
    
39.Riesco a  prendere le mie 
decisioni senza lasciarmi 
influenzare dai sentimenti 
degli altri. 
    
40. Non riesco a rilassarmi fin 
quando non concludo tutto ciò 
che ho pianificato per quel 
giorno. 
    
41. Riesco facilmente a capire 
se ciò che dico annoia o 
interessa qualcuno. 
    
42. Mi turbano le immagini di 
gente che soffre quando 
guardo le notizie in tv. 
    
43. Gli amici spesso si 
confidano con me perché 
dicono che capisco bene i loro 
problemi 
    
44. Riesco a percepire se la 
mia presenza è indesiderata, 
anche se non mi viene detto 
espressamente.  
    
45. Mi creo spesso nuovi 
hobbies ma mi annoio 
facilmente e passo ad altro 
    
  
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
D’ACCORDO 
PARZIALMENT
E D’ACCORDO 
LEGGERMENTE 
IN DISACCORDO 
ASSOLUTAMENTE 
CONTRARIO 
46. Talvolta la gente mi dice 
che esagero nello scherzo.  
    
47. Mi innervosirebbe troppo 
fare un giro su grandi 
montagne russe. 
    
48. La gente mi dice spesso 
che sono insensibile ma io non 
capisco il perché.  
    
49. Se vedo un estraneo in un 
gruppo penso che stia a lui 
fare uno sforzo per inserirsi.  
    
50. Solitamente i film non mi 
coinvolgono emotivamente. 
    
51. Mi piace essere 
perfettamente organizzato/a 
nella vita di tutti i giorni e 
spesso faccio una lista delle 
cose che ho da fare. 
    
52. Riesco a percepire in modo 
rapido e intuitivo come 
qualcun altro si sente. 
    
53. Non mi piace rischiare     
54. Riesco facilmente ad 
intuire ciò di cui un’ altra 
persona vorrebbe parlare. 
    
55. Capisco se qualcuno sta 
celando le sue emozioni. 
    
56. Prima di prendere una 
decisione valuto tutti i pro e i 
contro. 
    
57. Non rifletto sulle regole da 
rispettare quando sono tra la 
gente. 
    
58. Sono bravo/a a prevedere 
le mosse degli altri. 
    
59. I problemi degli amici mi 
coinvolgono emotivamente. 
    
60. Di solito tengo in 
considerazione i punti di vista 
degli altri anche se non li 
condivido. 
    
EQ. English version. 
Istructions 
1. Please fill in the name (optional). 
2. Please fill in the sex . 
3. Please then read each statement very carefully and rate how strongly you agree or 
disagree with it by circling your answer. There are no right or wrong answers, or trick 
questions. IN ORDER FOR THE SCALE TO BE VALID, YOU MUST ANSWER EVERY QUESTION. 
 
 
Name: 
O Male 
O Female 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
STRONGLY 
 AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
1.  I can easily tell if someone 
else wants to enter a 
conversation. 
    
2.  I prefer animals to humans.     
3.  I try to keep up with the 
current trends and fashions. 
    
4.  I find it difficult to explain 
to others things that I 
understand easily, when they 
don’t understand it first time. 
    
5.  I dream most nights.     
6. I really enjoy caring for the 
other people. 
    
  
STRONGLY 
 AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
7.  I try to solve my own 
problems rather than 
discussing them with others. 
 
    
8.  I find it hard to know what 
to do in a social situation. 
   
 
 
 9.  I am at my best first thing 
in the morning. 
    
10. People often tell me that I 
went too far in driving my 
point home in a discussion. 
    
11. It doesn’t bother me too 
much if I am late meeting a 
friend. 
 
    
12. Friendships and 
relationships are just too 
difficult, so I tend not to 
bother with them. 
 
    
13. I would never break a law, 
no matter how minor.  
    
14. I often find it difficult to 
judge if something is rude or 
polite. 
 
    
15. In a conversation, I tend to 
focus on my own thoughts 
rather than on what my 
listener might be thinking. 
 
    
16. I prefer practical jokes to 
verbal humor. 
    
17. I live for today rather than 
the future. 
    
18. When I was a child, I 
enjoyed cutting up worms to 
see what would happen. 
 
    
19. I can pick up quickly if 
someone says one thing but 
means another. 
    
  
STRONGLY 
 AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
20. I tend to have very strong 
opinions about morality. 
    
21. It is hard for me to see 
why some things upset people 
so much. 
    
22. I find it easy to put myself 
in somebody else’s shoes. 
    
23. I think that good manners 
are the most important thing 
a parent can teach their child. 
    
24. I like to do things on the 
spur of the moment. 
    
25. I am good at predicting 
how someone will feel. 
    
26. I am quick to spot when 
someone in a group is feeling 
awkward or uncomfortable. 
    
27. If I say something that 
someone else is offended by, I 
think that that’s their 
problem, not mine.  
    
28. If anyone asked me if I 
liked their haircut, I would 
reply truthfully, even if I didn’t 
like it. 
    
29. I can’t always see why 
someone should have felt 
offended by a remark. 
    
30. People often tell me that I 
am very unpredictable. 
    
31. I enjoy being the centre of 
attention at any social 
gathering. 
    
32.Seeing people cry doesn’t 
reall upset me. 
    
  
STRONGLY 
 AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
33. I enjoy having discussions 
about politics. 
    
34. I am very blunt, which 
some people take to be 
rudeness, even though this is 
unintentional. 
    
35. I don’t tend to find social 
situations confusing. 
    
36. Other people tell me I am 
food at understanding how 
they are feeling and what they 
are thinking. 
    
37. When I talk to people, I 
tend to talk about their 
experiences rather than my 
own. 
    
38. It upsets me to see an 
animal in pain. 
    
39.I am able to make 
decisions without being 
influenced by people’s 
feelings. 
    
40. I can’t relax until I have 
done everything I had planned 
to do that day. 
    
41. I can easily tell if someone 
else is interested or bored 
with what I am saying. 
    
42. I get upset if I see people 
suffering on news programs. 
    
43. Friends usually talk to me 
about their problems as they 
say that I am very 
understanding. 
    
44. I can sense if I am 
intruding, even if the other 
person doesn’t tell me.  
    
45. Mi creo spesso nuovi 
hobbies ma mi annoio 
facilmente e passo ad altro 
    
  
STRONGLY 
 AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
46. People sometimes tell me 
that I have gone too far with 
teasing.  
    
47. I would be too nervous to 
go on a big rollercoaster. 
    
48. Other people often say 
that I am insensitive, though I 
don’t always see why.  
    
49. If I see a stranger in a 
group ,I think that it is up to 
them to make an effort to join 
in.  
    
50. I usually stay emotionally 
detached when watching a 
film. 
    
51. I like to be very organised 
in day to day life and often 
make lists of the chores I have 
to do. 
    
52. I can tune into how 
someone else feels rapidly and 
intuitively. 
    
53. I don’t like to take risks.     
54. I can easily work out what 
another person might want to 
talk about. 
    
55. I can tell if someone is 
masking their true emotion. 
    
56. Before making a decision I 
always weigh up the pros and 
cons. 
    
57. I don’t consciously work 
out the rules of social 
situations. 
    
58. I am good at predicting 
what someone will do. 
    
59. I tend to get emotionally 
involved with a friend’s 
problems. 
    
60. I can usually appreciate 
the other person’s viewpoint, 
even if I don’t agree with it. 
    
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Italian version. 
 
Troverai ora una lista di affermazioni che possono essere più o meno vere / 
false per te. 
Non ci sono risposte giuste o sbagliate: basati sulle tue sensazioni ed opinioni.  
Ti chiediamo di leggere attentamente ciascuna affermazione e di indicare la tua 
opinione con i numeri: 
 
 1 se essa è Mai vera per te 
 2 se essa è Raramente vera per te 
 3 se essa è Qualche volta vera per te 
 4 se essa è Spesso vera per te 
 5 se essa è Sempre vera per te 
     
1 
Mai vera per me 
2 
Raramente vera 
per me 
3 
Qualche volta 
vera per me 
4 
Spesso vera per 
me 
5 
Sempre vera per 
me 
            
                          
 
1. Sogno ad occhi aperti e fantastico, con una certa regolarità, 
sulle cose che potrebbero accadermi. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Provo spesso sentimenti di tenerezza e di preoccupazione 
per le persone meno fortunate di me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. A volte trovo difficile vedere le cose dal punto di vista di 
un’altra persona. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. A volte non mi sento particolarmente dispiaciuto/a  per le 
altre persone che  hanno problemi. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Resto veramente coinvolto/a dagli stati d’animo dei 
protagonisti di un racconto. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. In situazioni d’emergenza, mi sento apprensivo e a disagio. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Riesco solitamente ad essere obiettivo/a quando guardo un 
film o una rappresentazione teatrale e raramente mi lascio 
coinvolgere del tutto.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. In caso di disaccordo, cerco di tenere conto del punto di 
vista di ognuno prima di prendere una decisione. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Quando vedo qualcuno che viene sfruttato, provo sentimenti 
di protezione nei suoi confronti. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. A volte mi sento indifeso/a quando mi trovo in situazioni 
emotivamente coinvolgenti. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Qualche volta cerco di comprendere meglio i miei amici 
immaginando come appaiono le cose dalla loro prospettiva. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Mi accade raramente di essere coinvolto/a da un buon libro 
o da un bel film. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Quando vedo qualcuno farsi male tendo a rimanere calmo. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Le disgrazie degli altri solitamente non mi turbano molto. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Se sono sicuro di avere ragione su qualcosa, non perdo 
tempo ad ascoltare le ragioni degli altri.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Dopo aver visto una commedia o un film mi sento come se 
fossi stato uno dei protagonisti. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Mi spaventa il fatto di trovarmi in situazioni che provocano 
tensione emotiva. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Quando vedo qualcuno che viene trattato ingiustamente, 
talvolta mi capita di non provare molta pietà per lui. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Solitamente sono molto efficace nel far fronte alle 
situazioni d’emergenza. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Spesso mi sento abbastanza colpito dalle cose che vedo 
accadere. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Credo che ci siano due prospettive diverse per ogni 
questione e cerco di capirle entrambe. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Mi descriverei come una persona dal cuore piuttosto 
tenero. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Quando guardo un bel film riesco facilmente ad 
immedesimarmi nel personaggio principale. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Tendo a perdere il controllo durante le emergenze. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. Quando sono in contrasto con qualcuno, solitamente provo 
a “mettermi nei suoi panni” per un po’. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. Quando leggo una storia o un romanzo interessante, 
immagino come mi sentirei se gli avvenimenti della storia 
accadessero a me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Quando vedo qualcuno che in una situazione di 
emergenza necessita disperatamente di aiuto, vado in crisi. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Prima di criticare qualcuno provo ad immaginare come mi 
sentirei se fossi al suo posto. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Engligh version. 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations.  For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate letter on the scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you 
have decided on your answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item 
number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as 
honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
   A                     B                 C                 D                 E 
DOES NOT DESCRIBE ME WELL                                                     DESCRIBES ME VERY 
WELL           
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, 
about things that might happen to me.  
A         B         C          D         
E 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people 
less fortunate than me.  
A         B         C          D         
E 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the 
"other guy's" point of view.  
A         B         C          D         
E 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people 
when they are having problems. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the 
characters in a novel. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-
at-ease. 
 
A         B         C          D         
E 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, 
and I don't often get completely caught up in it. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement 
before I make a decision. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel 
kind of protective towards them. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle 
of a very emotional situation. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 
imagining how things look from their perspective. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or 
movie is somewhat rare for me. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.  A         B         C          D         
E 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb 
me a great deal.  
A         B         C          D         
E 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste 
much time listening to other people's arguments. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I 
were   one of the characters.  
A         B         C          D         
E 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
 
A         B         C          D         
E 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I 
sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.  
A         B         C          D         
E 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with 
emergencies. 
 
A         B         C          D         
E 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see 
happen. 
 
A         B         C          D         
E 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question 
and try to look at them both. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted 
person. 
 
A         B         C          D         
E 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put 
myself in the place of a leading character. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
 
A         B         C          D         
E 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put 
myself in his shoes" for a while. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I 
imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were 
happening to me. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an 
emergency, I go to pieces. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I 
would feel if I were in their place. 
A         B         C          D         
E 
                                                       
 
 
  
 Appendix 2 
 
Experiment 6 
 Noteworthy, it has never been demonstrated that electrophysiological reaction to pain is 
empathy-specific. In fact, empathy is a multicomponential process and cognitive sub-
mechanisms might occur. That would qualify the reaction to pain as a general activity elicited in 
some affective context. Indeed, pain decision task procedure might have overlapping 
mechanisms with those underlying an affective priming task where the interval between the face 
and the object is equal to zero, or in the context of the current studies, is variable between 800 
and 1600 ms. The affective priming is that effect occurring in a paradigm where two kinds of 
stimuli are presented sequentially and interleaved by a blank screen. The first stimulus (i.e., the 
prime) can either facilitate or inhibit participants’ performance required on the second stimulus 
(i.e., the target). Behaviorally, faster reaction times and better accuracy in congruent trials (i.e., 
when the prime and the target have both either positive or negative valence) when compared 
with incongruent trials are classically observed. Although electrophysiological studies of 
affective priming have demonstrated that affective incongruency is reflected on larger N400 
(e.g., Aguado, Dieguez-Risco, Méndez-Bértolo, Pozo, & Hinojosa, 2013; Eder, Leuthold, 
Rothermund, & Schweinberger, 2011) findings of the current research might still be related to 
affective priming effect such as a negative shift of the P300 for incongruent trials (e.g., 
untrustworthy faces with the Q-tip) and it needs to be tested directly.  
To rule out the possibility that previous findings were not specific to empathic reactions 
to pain, I administered some participants with an affective priming task.  
Previous findings have shown that the affective priming effect decays within 300 ms between 
the prime and target onsets (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Klauer & Musch, 2003). In line with this 
evidence, the principal manipulation in Experiment 6 was the inter-stimulus interval (i.e., ISI) 
duration. We manipulated the ISI such that in one condition (i.e. short ISI) it was compatible 
with an affective priming paradigm and in in the other condition (i.e., long ISI) it was the exact 
mean of the variable ISI used for Experiment 4 and Experiment 5.  
 
Stimuli  
The stimuli used are the same as those used for Experiment 4.  
Affective priming task. Participants performed an affective priming task, which has been 
implemented similarly to the pain decision task. Figure 1 shows a schematic illustration of the 
paradigm. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the paradigm, adapted to be an affective priming by manipulating the 
interval between the face (i.e., here the prime) and the object (i.e., here the target). 
 
Each trial began with a randomly variable fixation cross at the center of the computer 
screen (800-1600 ms in steps of 100 ms). A trustworthy or untrustworthy face (presented for 
200 ms) and either a Q-tip or a syringe (presented for 250 ms) evocating a neutral or a painful 
stimulation respectively, were interleaved by a blank screen presented for either 25 ms (short 
ISI) or 1200 ms (long ISI). Notably, the long ISI falls exactly in the mean of the variable 
interval between the face and the object implemented in the pain decision task (800-1600 ms in 
steps of 100 ms). Participants were instructed to observe the face but to decide whether the 
stimulation evocated by the object was either painful or neutral by pressing one of two response 
keys (“F” and “J”) of the computer keyboard. In the 20% of the trials the object was replaced by 
another face, which could be either identical or different to the first one. In those cases 
participants were required to say whether the faces were identical or not. 
The different types of trials were randomly intermixed. Participants were instructed to 
perform the task as faster and accurately as possible.  
EEG acquisition and analysis. The EEG recording and analysis was the same as in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The time window considered for statistical analysis in this 
experiment was of 310-820 ms. 
Priming task. Individual mean proportions of correct responses were submitted to a 
repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) considering stimulation condition (painful vs. 
non-painful) and trustworthiness (trustworthy faces vs. untrustworthy faces) as within-subjects 
factors. ANOVA did not show significant factor effects (F < 1). 
P3. Figure 2 shows P3 waveforms time-locked to syringe/Q-tip elicited at fronto-central 
and centro-parietal sites in painful and non-painful conditions and separately for trustworthy 
and untrustworthy faces and for short and long ISI. Statistical analyses on the fronto-central and 
centro-parietal P3 mean amplitude values were submitted to a 2 (stimulation: painful vs. non-
painful) x 2 (trustworthiness: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy faces) x 2 (ISI: short vs. long) 
repeated measures ANOVA as within-subjects factors. The centro-parietal P3 was larger in long 
ISI (7.829 μV) relative to short ISI condition (4.506 μV) as the main effect of ISI was 
significant at centro parietal sites, F(1, 9) = 16.727, p < .001; ηp
2
 > .650).  
 Figure 2. P3 components in response to the syringe (i.e., the object evoking pain) for trustworthy and 
untrustworthy faces. This is the most important comparison because it shows how trustworthiness, per se, 
does not prime a congruent/incongruent affective response to the object that should trigger an empathic 
response to pain. 
 
Most importantly, trustworthiness nor other main effects or interaction between the factors 
approached significance (all Fs <1 at fronto-central sites; max F=3.018 min p=.116 at centro-
parietal sites).   
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